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FOREWORD
The Otterbein Miscellany is published once or twice a year as 
an outlet for faculty writing on a wide variety of topics. The 
college underwrites this publication in the belief that it will 
help maintain a genuine community of scholars. Papers are 
accepted, therefore, on the basis of their interest to the whole 
academic community rather than to members of a particular 
discipline. Editorial responsibility rests with a committee of the 
faculty.
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faculty and administration, active and emeritus — others on 
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At the inception of The Ouerbein Miscellany in l%r), its 
board of advisors proposed to offer the publication once or twice 
a year, depending on the volume of manuscripts submitted and 
accepted. The publication was offered annually until 1978, when 
in that year submissions were not sufficient to warrant publica­
tion. Ifecause of the number of manuscripts available this year, 
however, we are offering a double issue of the Miscellany. At 
least two of the essays presented in this issue were submitted 
in 1978. We are therefore numbering this issue as Vols. XIV-XV, 
1978-1979.
A main theme of this issue, as Professor Paul Hcdditt sug­
gests in his introduction to the featured symposium on Robert M. 
Pirsig, is the illusive question of “creativity.” What is creativ­
ity, not only in education, but in all aspects of life? Pirsig’s 
book has the virtue of pulling this question down off the pedestal 
on which theoretical treatment has placed it and handling it more 
intimately, autobiographically.
Pirsig’s Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance is some­
thing of a surprising cultural phenomenon in the sense that it is 
essentially a philosophical work which has had wide popular 
appeal. Once we have suggested that readers seem to like the 
book, however, it is important to have some indication of what we 
wish to do with it in terms of establishing an active relationship 
with the philosophy it expresses. I he essays on Pirsig by 
members of the symposium are varying attempts to address this 
question.
One of the great scholars of our time, Paul Tillich, had a 
good deal to say about the nature of creativity. Put he continually 
underscored the notion that creativity goes hand in hand with the 
patience of work. Tillich offered a telling anecdote which illus­
trates this idea;
A Chinese emperor asked a famous painter to paint a picture 
of a rooster for him. The painter assented, but said that it 
would take a long time. After a year the emperor reminded 
him of his promise. The painter replied that after a y(‘ar of 
studying the rooster he had just begun to perceive the sur­
face of its nature. After another year the artist asserted that 
he had just begun to penetrate the essence of this kind of 
life. And so on, year after year. Finally after ten years of 
concentration on the nature of the rooster, he painted the
111
picture — a work described as an inexhaustible revelation of 
the divine ground of the universe in one small part of it a 
rooster. *
Not all scholarly writing attains to the creative excellence of 
the Chinese painter’s rooster. We should remember, however that 
every catalogue of a library is crowded with the names of journals 
in which persons, patiently pursuing their work, have contributed 
to the store of human learning. Our main wish for The Olterbein 
Miscellany, now as always, is that it may be regarded as a 
vehicle for the expression of creative thought.
The editor owes a special debt of gratitude not only to the 
writers whose contributions are contained herein, but also to 
members of the skilled staff of the Otterbein Printing Department 
Mr. Forest Moreland, and Margie Shaw. ’
The Editor
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Paul L. Redditt
CREATIVITY AND THE QUEST FOR QUALITY:
A Symposium on Robert M. Pirsig’s Zen and the Art of Motorcycle 
Maintenance: An Inquiry into Values
The seminar for which the following papers were originally 
prepared was conceived from the desire of Otterbein’s team 
directing the Project for Institutional Renewal through the 
Improvement of Teaching (PIRIT) to address the subject of 
creativity. Creativity, in the sense of a holistic and appropriate 
response to the ambiguities of social and intellectual interaction 
in a complex environment, is one of the goals of liberal education. 
In our discussions of creativity, members of the PlRlT team have 
found it useful to conceive of creativity as a tension between 
structure and vitality. For teacher and student, structure includes 
such factors as belief systems, specific goals in presenting and 
acquiring information and skills, and a sense of security which 
sets limits to the intellectual and social risks an individual is 
willing to take. Vitality, on the other hand, includes such factors 
as a sense of play, an eagerness for new experience and insight, 
and a willingness to risk a degree of security in exchange for 
intellectual and social stimulation.
We believe that any attempt to foster creativity in ourselves 
as faculty members and in our students must take both of these 
factors into account and exploit the developmental potential 
which lies in the tension between them. An artist is profoundly 
aware of this tension: a painting or a poem must have a strong 
sense of structure, derived from the traditions in which it lies 
and in the nature of the materials from which it is made. It must 
also possess vitality: evidence of the artist’s new insights, his 
willingness to take risks. The successful painting or poem mani­
fests the tension between and the resolution of these two forces 
which, until the work appears, seem at odds with each other.
Similarly, both teachers and students need to take this tension 
into account in the learning process. Both need to work from a 
sense of structure: their concrete skill and information goals and 
their sense of security derived from past experience, their social 
relationships, their beliefs and values. On the other hand, the 
environment is constantly changing for both of them, and they 
need to learn to respond in terms of such creative attributes as 
sensitivity to problems, fluency, novelty of ideas, mental flexi­
bility, the ability to synthesize and analyze, to evaluate, to
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redefine and reorganize organized wholes, and so on. Thus open­
ness to change is set within a structure, and the successful 
learner can accept change and ambiguity without feeling himself 
unduly threatened.
In thinking about vitality straining at the restrictions of 
structure, the PIRIT team determined to look for someone who 
had in fact done or said something provocative, something fresh, 
something holistic, something appropo of the college context and 
the American scene in general. Robert M. Pirsig seemed to offer 
us what we were seeking. He wanted to take a fresh holistic 
approach to a society fractured into romantic versus technologi­
cal forces. This led him to examine the very foundation of 
Western thought and to offer what he thought was the solution to 
a millenia-long dichotomy in Western thinking. He wanted to take 
a fresh, holistic approach to teaching, an approach which he him­
self had hammered out during his tenure as a teacher of rhetoric. 
He offered a fresh look at insanity — both in terms of going 
insane, and in terms of coping with it. He even offered a fresh 
way of conceiving the assembling of a barbecue rotissere; i.e., 
approach the task with a deep composure as a sculptor ap­
proaches his work. None of us individually knew how successful 
Pirsig really had been in even putting the questions, but we 
suspected that in the collective expertise of our colleagues lay 
some perspective that might help us evaluate also the correct­
ness of Pirsig’s answers. But more importantly we suspected that 
the process of reading and reflecting on Pirsig would open us all 
up, bringing fresh insights, and indeed vitality, to our structured 
thought patterns. Pirsig may be right or wrong, but he does cause 
us to think.
2
Norman Cha,
* THE ^GE OE AQIIAIHES,
irsig s Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenanct
ney
• j theme of modern philosophical thought, especially in
US existentialist mode, is that we live in an age of anxiLy. 
Modern man, so runs the familiar analysis, is an outsider: he 
su ers rom t e evil of “alienation.” We may characterize this 
nian who was once totally integrated (as in a 
primor la or mythical time) has become radically split in three 
main aspects. He is divided within himself, he is divided from 
o er men, an he is divided from his environment. His only hope 
or recovery (for those thinkers who hold out hope) is to find the 
way to a reintegration which will restore his unity with himself, 
IS community with his fellow men, and his companionability with 
an alien and hostile outer world.
ut what is the way to this reintegration? Does the way lie, 
or instance, through psychoanalysis, or through traditional 
re jgious faith? For Robert Pirsig, the author of Zen and the Art 
of Motorcycle Maintenance, neither of these proposed ways would 
suffice. For Pirsig, the way lies through the discovery of “zen,” 
a term he spends much of his book trying to explain. A main 
purpose^ of this essay is to grasp Pirsig’s explanation, and to 
place the book in an intellectual context. By means of such 
analysis, I wish to suggest an alternative for reckoning with the 
evil of alienation than the one Pirsig himself advocates.
Robert Pirsig was born in 1929. He holds a B.A. degree in 
philosophy and an M.A. degree in journalism from the University 
of Minnesota. In recent years he has earned his living primarily 
as a technical writer.
In the summer of 1968, Pirsig and his eleven-year-old son, 
Chris, mounted a 305 cc red Honda Superhawk and left their home 
town of St. Paul, Minnesora, for a two month motorcycle ride. 
Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance is largely an autobio­
graphical account of the trip. But the book is also a “chautau- 
qua, or a long intellectual monologue. A main purpose of the;
'•'Major portions of this essay appeared in the 1976 edition of The 
Ollerbein Miscellany under a different title. The essay appears here, in 
modified and expanded form, at the request of the PIRIT team.
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trip is to return to Bozeman, Montana, where in the late 50’s and 
early ’60’s, while teaching English at Montana State, Pirsig 
suffered a mental collapse that eventually hospitalized him for a 
series of shock treatments. Throughout the book Pirsig alludes 
to “Phaedrus” (a name appropriated from a Platonic dialogue). 
The reader does well to understand early in the book that 
Phaedrus is the name Pirsig attributes to the person he was 
before he underwent the shock therapy that blotted out his 
memory of the past. In returning to Bozeman, Pirsig is also 
attempting to recall his past and relate it to his present.
Pirsig is a thinker who stands in the mainstream of American 
Transcendentalism. Like Emerson before him, who is generally 
regarded as the chief spokesman of the American Transcenden- 
talist movement, Pirsig is a philosopher of the self conceived 
both as representative and as defined by its capacity for growth. 
He is a thinker dedicated to a new or ^*8^^ kind of “seeing,” 
ultimately to illumination or mystic vision ( zen ), a realization 
in experience, not in theory, of what Emerson referred to as the 
seer “becoming” what he sees.
But we must make a basic distinction between Emerson and 
Pirsig as philosophical thinkers. While Emerson was primarily 
concerned with the cultivation of innocent vision (a vision unin­
hibited by inquiry and analysis) as a means of regaining a child­
like appreciation of the oneness of the world with us and around 
us, Pirsig recognizes that inquiry and analysis are crucial to our 
existence, especially in an age in which we are compelled to 
think our way through the technomania of society. Pirsig, in 
other words, is an Emersonian of strongly rationalistic bent. 
ITiough he longs for the intellectual naivete' of the child, he 
recognizes the necessity for the intellectual maturity of the man. 
How to bring naivete' and maturity, intuition and judgment into 
confluence, how to have a childlike appreciation of the world and 
yet have a rationalistic understanding of the world — these are 
dichotomies with which Pirsig is concerned.
I propose not to rehearse the plot of the book so much as 
concentrate on its central philosophical ideas. (Much of the 
pleasure of the book lies in the reader’s tracing its plot-line.) 
And I perceive these to be at least threefold: (1) the idea of 
classical and romantic understanding; (2) the idea of Quality; 
and (3) the idea of zen. We will discuss each of these in turn.
Classical and romantic understanding. Pirsig assumes that 
there are at least two basic modes of human understanding:
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classical and romantic. He describes th 
following manner: ese two modes in the
A classical understanding sees the wnrl.) 
underlying form itself. A romantic understandinT^"^ 
primarily in terms of immediate appearance If ^ 
show an engine or a mechanical drawing or^°el T" •° 
schematic to a romantic it is unlikely he would1.1., I, ha. .o app.., haa.L. .L" a.,"'h^t 
IS Its surface. Dull, complex lists of names, lines and 
numbers. Nothing interesting. But if you were to show the 
same description to a classical person he might look at k 
and then become fascinated by it u ^ it
within the lines and shapes and symbols is a tremendous 
richness of underlying form.
The romantic mode is primarily inspirational, imagina­
tive. creative, intuitive. Feelings rather than facts predomi­
nate. Art when it is opposed to “Science” is often 
romantic. It does not proceed by reason or by laws. It pro­
ceeds by feeling, intuition and esthetic conscience'. In the 
northern European cultures the romantic mode is usually 
associated with femininity, but this is certainly not a 
necessary association. ^
The classic mode, by contrast, proceeds by reason and 
by laws - which are themselves underlying forms of thought 
and behavior. In the European cultures it is primarily a 
masculine mode and the fields of science, law and medicine 
are unattractive to women largely for this reason. Although 
motorcycle riding is romantic, motorcycle maintenance is 
purely classic. The dirt, the grease, the mastery of under­
lying form required all give it such a negative romantic 
appeal that women never go near it.^
Throughout the book Pirsig depicts certain characters as 
manifesting either a classical or romantic understanding of life. 
Pirsig’s “Phaedrus” self, for example, was almost exclusively 
classical in his understanding (a fact which contributed to his 
breakdown). The husband and wife, John and Sylvia Sutherland 
on the other hand, with whom Pirsig and his son make the motor­
cycle trip, are almost exclusively romantic in their understanding. 
Pirsig sees both the classical and romantic understandings as 
“valid ways of looking at the world.” Hut they are “irreconcil­
able with each other.”2 A main assumption of Pirsig’s is that 
authentic existence must be based on a mode of understanding 
that is neither strictly classical nor romantic, but that is inde­
pendent of the two. And he identifies this mode of understanding 
as “zen.” Let us delay our examination of Pirsig’s notion of 
zen,” however, until we have examined his notion of Quality.
The idea of Quality. In the book Pirsig touches upon two 
thousand years of epistemological theories: those offered by the
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Sophists, Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, and others. He is fasci­
nated by the subject-object distinction that runs through the 
history of Western philosophy. Inherent to this distinction is the 
question of whether value, or what Pirsig describes as “Quality,” 
exists merely in the mind (the subject) or whether it exists in the 
thing itself (the object). Pirsig approaches this question in the 
following manner:
Quality . . . you know what it is, yet you don’t know 
what it is. But that’s self-contradictory. But some things 
are better than others, that is, they have more quality. But 
when you try to say what the quality is, apart from the 
things that have it, it all goes poo/! There’s nothing to 
talk about. But if you can’t say what Quality is, how do you 
know what it is, or how do you know that it even exists? If 
no one knows what it is, then for all practical purposes it 
really doesn’t exist at all. But for all practical purposes it 
really does exist. What else are the grades based on? Why 
else would people pay fortunes for some things and throw 
others in the trash pile? Obviously some things are better 
than others . . . but what’s the “betterness”? ... So round 
and round you go, spinning mental wheels and nowhere 
finding anyplace to get traction. What the hell is Qualitv’
What is it?3
If Quality exists in the object, Pirsig maintains, “then you 
must explain just why scientific instruments are unable to detect 
it.” On the other hand, if Quality exists merely in the mind, 
then . . . Quality ... is just a fancy name for whatever you 
like.”4 Neither the answer that Quality exists in the object nor 
that it exists in the mind is satisfactory from Pirsig’s point of 
view. He describes the discovery he made, therefore, at the time 
he was Phaedrus, of where Quality does exist:
And really, the Quality he was talking about wasn’t 
classic Quality or romantic Quality. It was beyond both of 
them. And by God, it wasn’t subjective or objective either, 
it was beyond both of those categories. Actually this whole 
dilemma of subjectivity-objectivity, or mind-matter, with 
relationship to Quality was unfair. That mind-matter 
relationship has been an intellectual hang-up for centuries.
They were putting that hang-up on top of Quality to drag 
Quality down. How could he say whether Quality was mind 
or matter when there was no logical clarity as to what was 
mind and what was metter in the first place?
And so: he rejected the left horn. Quality is not objec­
tive, he said. It doesn’t reside in the material world.
Then: he rejected the right horn. Quality is not subjec­
tive, he said. It doesn’t reside merely in the mind.
And finally: Phaedrus, following a path that to his 
knowledge had never been taken before in the history of 
Western thought, went straight between the horns of the
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subje<'tivity-objectivity dilemma and said Quality is neither 
a part of mind, nor is it a part of matter. It is a third entity 
which is independent of the two.5
The acquiring of an understanding of Quality, Pirsig implies, 
depends upon the acquiring of a viewpoint for looking into the 
essence of things, a viewpoint which Pirsig identifies as “zen.”
The idea of zen. Pirsig makes no claim in his hook for being 
fully cognizant of “that great body of factual information relating 
to orthodox Zen Buddhist practiee.”*^ By whatever means of 
intuition and judgment, however, he seems to have attained a 
grasp of the Zen Buddhist notion that there is a mode of under­
standing which is an intuitive looking-into, in contradistinction 
to intellectual and logical understanding. Whatever else the term 
“zen” might mean, in the context of Zen and the Art of Motor­
cycle Maintenance, it means the unfolding of a worldview unper­
ceived in the confusion of a dualistic mind. When one is under 
the sway of the zen mode of understanding, the universe and man 
are one indissolvable existence, one total whole. Only Quality 
is. Anything and everything that appears as an individual entity 
or phenomenon (motorcycle or man), is but a temporary manifesta­
tion of Quality in form. Or as Pirsig expresses this idea in his 
own idiom again as he recalls a realization at the time he was 
Phaedrus:
‘‘The sun of quality . . . does not revolve around the 
subjects and objects of our existence. It does not just 
passively illuminate them. It is not subordinate to them in 
any way. It has created them. They are subordinate to it!
“Zen,” for Pirsig, in short, is a realization of the oneness of 
the world with us and around us. Philosophically speaking, he is 
a monist, or one who sees in the universe the manifestation or 
working of a single principle.
Insofar as Pirsig’s Zert and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance 
has won broad acclaim, he is seemingly a prime spokesman for a 
mode of philosophical monism which is in vogue in our time. Why 
should philoso phical monism be in vogue? We have suggested a 
possible answer to this question in the beginning of this essay. 
The fact that modern man experiences a sense of division within 
himself, from other people, and from his environment instills in 
him a yearning for a sense of being-at-home in the universe, a 
sense of companionship with the world in which he moves and 
has his being. This yearning for companionship may well be an 
attempt on the part of modern man to recapture the feeling of
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intimate belonging that presumably was characteristic of man in 
a pretechnological age.®
Of course, Pirsig as a thinker recognizes that modern man 
cannot return to a pretechnological age. Indeed, Pirsig himself is 
an advocate of technology (as symbolized by the motorcycle). But 
he also discerns that as modern man’s destiny interlocks with 
technology, he must sustain an apprehension (zen) of that deeper 
reality (Quality) which underlies and supports the quotidian 
reality of existence. Apart from such an apprehension, Pirsig’s 
book suggests, human life is bound to be a pretty lackluster 
affair.
But in spite of the merits of Pirsig’s book, at least three 
major difficulties confront us concerning its intellectual content. 
First, nowhere does a clear explanation of “Quality” present 
itself. If, as Pirsig suggests. Quality is the underlying principle 
which alone is the (ground of all things, then how can he maintain 
that some things are better in Quality than others? Why should he 
not maintain that all things are equal in Quality since all things 
are grounded in Quality? Apparently he holds to some notion of 
the gradation of Quality, which is not explained by his implied 
metaphysic.
Second, Pirsig’s positive attitude toward the world of entities 
does not positively and satisfyingly include persons. He tends to 
take other persons for granted (as is evident in the stoical 
posture he assumes in relation to the mental anguish of his son). 
Love and friendship among persons may be a concern for Pirsig, 
but it is not a primary concern. One feels that his interest in the 
world of men is muted.
The third problem that confronts us in the intellectual content 
of the book, however, requires more extensive analysis than the 
previous two. I have earlier suggested that religion as a formal 
mode of thought plays little part in Pirsig’s quest for authentic 
existence. Nevertheless, he shares a disposition with many 
religious seekers who express a “piety for the Age of Aquar­
ius.’’^ The essence of this piety can perhaps be approached 
through quotation of a passage by the American poet, Wallace 
Stevens:
We feel the obscurity of an order, a whole,
A knowledge, that which arranged the rendezvous.
Within its vital boundary, in the mind.
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Out of this same light, out of the central mind, 
We make a dwelling in the evening air, 
a w ich being there together is enough.
centra argument of these lines is similar to the one advanced 
y *^116 interest of self-authenticity. Through “imagina-
nation or meditation the self is encouraged to find its identity 
in t e central mind.” The culmination of this process is the 
oneself of an identity which transcends the 
1. “'®^*''^tion (‘‘God and the imagination are one”). The
rea ization of this identity, in Stevens’ view, is ‘‘A self that 
touches all edges.”11
But is Stevens’ purity of mind ‘‘enough” in one’s quest for 
authentic existence? Persons who think in these terms — includ- 
ing Pirsig — tend to have as their goal inner detachment. If one 
has a task to perform (working on one’s motorcycle) do it with 
detachment. If one must act, act dispassionately, for your true 
self is unaffected by anything that you do. Emerson says in his 
essay on Self-Reliance,” in a phrase that both Stevens and 
Pirsig would approve, that ‘‘Nothing can bring you peace but 
yourself.”! 2 When we place our center of balance outside us, 
Emerson maintained, we are not drawing upon the strengths that 
are inherent within us. Emerson’s outlook has a good deal in 
common with certain Eastern religions — such as Vedanta, 
Baha’i, and Zen Buddhism — as they are popularly expressed 
from within Western culture.13 But Western religions have 
traditionally opposed this outlook. Indeed, when Western religious 
thinkers encounter the Eastern outlook, as suggested for example 
in the work of Pirsig, they may well interpret it as a denial of 
God rather than an alternative way of conceiving God. I am not 
insisting that the Eastern outlook is useless for dealing with the 
technomania of society. My question is, however, whether in 
adopting the Eastern outlook we do not lose sight of a conception 
of the self that is powerfully and meaningfully at work in the 
Western outlook?
In Western religions, which have their root in Biblical tradi­
tion, the God with whom we have actively to deal is a God who 
acts. He is a God whose will we may seek, whose judgment we 
may accept, and whose promises afford us hope. The Biblical 
writers have persisted in the notion that man makes himself 
through his action, but he does not do so in isolation. He makes 
himself through interaction with other persons, and ultimately
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through interaction with God. A God who did not act, from the 
Biblical perspective, would be of no real significance in search 
for a meaningful self-identity, for God, in Kierkegaardian terms, 
is none other than the “Teacher.”1^ And the self is his agent in 
the world.
In the view of some persons, the Biblical notion of the self- 
God relationship is rankling, precisely because it seems lacking 
in empirical significance. Even so, it raises the possibility that 
inherent in all our dealing with the world there is an underlying 
responsibility of the self to the world.
Perhaps no recent religious thinker has developed the notion 
of the self’s responsibility to the world with greater clarity or 
consistency than H. Richard Niebuhr. His conception of the 
“responsible self’’^^ places the identity of the self within a 
network of relationships, but not in such a way to exclude 
relationship to the God of Biblical tradition. On the contrary, he 
insists that the self can be a unity, or attain authentic existence, 
amidst all the forces and events which act upon it, only if there 
is “One beyond the many”^*’ with whom the self can interact. If 
the self has its identity exclusively in relation to the multiplicity 
of forces and events with which it interacts, it is not one but 
many. Only as the self acknowledges in trust “that whatever 
acts upon me, in whatever domain of being, is part of, partici­
pates in, one ultimate action, then though I understand nothing 
else about the ultimate action, yet I am now one.’’17
Underl ying Niebuhr’s argument is a theory of gestalt. We tend 
to view actions upon the self in terms of some larger whole: a 
social group, a political process, the natural environment. If the 
context within which the self operates is narrow its capacity for 
action will be limited. The self will not feel a part of the scope 
of things, for example, if it understands itself strictly in terms of 
a religious sect. On the other hand, if the self sees itself in 
relation to One who acts in all things, it will have a quite 
different response. It will see those with whom it interacts as 
belonging to “one universal society which has its center neither 
in me nor in my finite cause, but in the Transcendent One,’’18 
the One beyond the many. And this seeing of the self as distinct 
from yet as interacting with the Transcendent One has the effect 
of drawing us not away from the world in detachment, but toward 
the world in passion, as the realm where God acts.
The quality of this passion toward the world has been aptly 
described by Kierkegaard in his characterization of the “knight
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of faith”:
He f'If ^ A * ‘ ' [^>^Iongs] entirely to finiteness
him'taU' ^ ^iight in everything, and whenever one sees 
^ Particular pleasure, he does it with the 
<;niil *which is the mark of the earthly man whose 
tU- ^ such things ... He takes delight in
' y *tig he sees, in the human swarm, in the new omni- 
uses, in the waters of the Sound; ... he is interested in 
everyt ing that goes on, in a rat which slips under the curb, 
in the children’s play. 19 *
In Kierkepard’s characterization, the “knight of faith” is “a 
man for whom the things of this world are profoundly interesting 
in themselves, whose mind the ‘truth of things’ is not engulfed 
an os in some higher reference, and whose search for an 
f discovery that elsewhere is essentially
ere. '■'sig, in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance,
IS per aps in quest of a mode of existence that is similar to that 
o ler egaar s knight of faith, but his monistic vision disallows
the principle of the Transcendent One who is the Ground of the 
self.
In an age m which reputedly “God is dead,” it may seem 
credulous to assent to the notion of the Transcendent One who 
acts in, through, and with man in the world. Nevertheless, there 
IS a venerable tradition of piety in the history of Western thought 
- not taken into account by Pirsig - which insists that it is only 
on the basis of the principle of the I’ranscendent One that the 
self can assume a proper responsibility toward the world of 
thirigs. According to this tradition of piety, man lives ever on the 
borderland of something more than the self. Even if the self lives 
under an imperative of responsibility, it is not the overwhelming 
responsibility of lifting itself by its own bootstraps. “Thought is 
the hall-mark of man’s greatness.”21 But the tragedy of his 
thought is its brokenness. It may well be that man needs the 
conception of the Transcendent One to heal the brokenness.
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Margaret Hartman
VILLAINY: AN LXPOSR OF THE REAL VILLAIN
IN ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE
In this paper I wish to attack Pirsig and his account of Greek 
philosophy. I think he plays dirty , and the victims of his attack, 
Plato and Aristotle, are much too important and too worthy of 
respect to receive such shoddy treatment. Pirsig makes a number 
of inaccurate, undefended statements about the teachings of the 
Greek philosophers. Let me be clear: I have nothing against 
competent popularizers or innovative theorists; what I am against 
are popularizers who either do not know their subject matter or 
who recognize their interpretation is unusual but do not have the 
gumption to defend it. Indeed, I give his work too much credit by 
suggesting that it includes an interpretation of Plato and Aris­
totle. An interpretation is based on texts. Pirsig mentions some 
texts, but he seldom argues from the text, and what little he says 
in direct response to texts is usually errant. The passage in Zen 
and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance which I find most offensive 
occurs on pages 352-353.1
Reason was to be subordinate, logically, to Quality, and he 
was sure he would find the cause of its not being so back 
among the ancient Greeks, whose mythos had endowed our 
culture with the tendency underlying all the evils of our 
technology, the tendency to do what is “reasonable” even 
when it isn’t any good. That was the root of the whole 
thing. Right there. I said a long time ago that he was in 
pursuit of the ghost of reason. This is what 1 meant. Reason 
and Quality had become separated and in conflict with each 
other and Quality had heen forced under and reason made 
supreme somewhaer back then.
I cannot imagine any circumstances under which either Plato or 
Aristotle would endorse doing what is reasonable even when it 
isn’t any good. Contrary to Pirsig’s contention Plato and Aris­
totle emphasize the interrelation of reason and quality; and when 
they indicate a superior partner in this relationship, both choose 
goodness (quality). Sarah is right: “Quality is every part of Greek 
thought.’’ (328)
Since I am not impressed with Pirsig’s account of Plato and 
Aristotle and since reading his account makes me furious, I 
intend to focus my attention in this paper on the works of Plato 
and Aristotle. My paper should provide adequate textual refer­
ences for the interested reader to delve into these texts more
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thoroughly. Then the reader will be in a position to make his or 
her own judgment about the adequacies of Pirsig’s scholarship. 
Since it is impossible to discuss all relevant material, I will 
limit my discussion to three texts: Plato’s Republic and Phile- 
bus, and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.^
The early dialogues work to establish a connection between 
reason and ethical behavior, but it is not until the Republic that 
Plato directly confronts the question of the relationship between 
reason and the Good. Plato presents his views through the 
character Socrates^ who explains that an exposition of the nature 
of the Good “seems a pitch above the impulse that wings my 
flight today’’ (Republic 506de). Rather than trying to describe the 
Good, Socrates presents three images which help illuminate its 
nature. All three of these images, the Sun, the Line, and the 
Cave, are attempts to impress upon us the existence of an intel­
ligible world which is distinct from and superior to the world 
grasped by the senses. The intelligible world is composed of 
Forms, eternal and unchanging objects which are apprehended by 
the mind without use of the senses. The Forms are also called 
Ideas, but they are not creations of the mind. Actions and objects 
in our everyday world depend on the forms for their existence: 
actions can only be just if they participate in the eternal unchang­
ing Form of Justice, and sensible chairs (chairs whose existence 
is grasped by the senses) can only exist if they participate in 
the eternal, unchanging Form of Chair. An eternal unchanging 
Form of Justice is generally more acceptable to common sense 
than an eternal unchanging form of Chair, but textual evidence 
strongly suggests that Plato’s theory of Forms attempts to pro­
vide stability for both ethics and physical reality.
7’his background information prepares the way for the Sun 
analogy, the image in the middle dialogues where Plato most 
explicitly articulates the relationship between the Good and 
reason.
This (the sun), then, you must understand that I meant by 
the offspring of the good which the good begot to stand in a 
proportion with itself. As the good is in the intelligible 
region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this (the 
sun) in the visible world to vision and the objects of 
visions. (Republic 508bc)4
In this passage Plato tells us that we can examine the role of 
the sun in the visible world in order to increase our understanding 
of the role of the Good in the intelligible world: thus, we can 
examine the relationship between the sun and vision in order to
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In The Visible World 
Sun
In The Intelligible World 
Good
Presence Absence Presence Absence
Sight has Sight has
clear vision dim vision
of its objects of its objects
CLEAR DIM
VISION VISION
Mind has clear Mind has dim 
apprehension apprehension 
of its objects of its objects
CLEAR DIM
APPREHENSION APPREHENSION
presence of the sun which produces clear vision, 
I 1* ** presence of the Good which produces clear intel­
lectual apprehension. It is true that scholars debate about the 
nature of this intellectual apprehension: some scholars maintain 
that It IS mysucal apprehension while others declare that it is 
knowled^ attained by reason. But however one chooses to trans­
late the Greek words involved, it remains clear that apprehension 
of the Good is the highest mental achievement. Furthermore, it is 
clear that the Good itself is superior to the mental power which 
apprehends it. At 509a Plato says:
But as for knowledge and truth, even as in our illustration 
it is right to deem light and vision sunlike, but never to 
think that they are the sun, so here it is right to consider 
these two their counterparts, as being like the good or boni- 
form, but to think that either of them is the good is not 
right. Still higher honor belongs to the possession and 
habit of the good.
In commenting on this passage Paul Shorey explains that Plato 
is not scrupulous in distinguishing good and the good.^ Nonethe­
less Plato’s lack of precision is not problematic because he 
maintains that anyone who apprehends the Good will also do the 
good. In any case, Glaucon responds to Socrates’ description 
exactly as if Socrates had said “Still higher honor belongs to the 
Form of the Good.’’ Such an interpretation of Plato’s statement 
accords well with the analogy to the sun. Just as the sun is 
superior to vision (the faculty which functions best in the 
presence of the sun), so too the good is superior to the mental 
function which performs cognition. Although Plato’s language is 
not as clear as it might be, the Sun analogy provides strong
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evidence suggesting that Plato did not subordinate the Good to 
rationality.
Reading the Sun analogy leaves one with little doubt that 
Plato considered the Good superior to the mental function which 
achieves knowledge and apprehension of the Good, but whatever 
doubt remains is quickly dispelled by Plato’s introduction to the 
Line, an image presented as a continuation of the Sun analogy. 
Plato effects the transition to the Line by saying;
Conceive then, as we were saying, that there are these two 
entities, and that one of them is soverign over the intel­
ligible order and region and the other over the world of the 
eye ball, not to say the sky-ball, but let that pass. You 
surely apprehend the two types, the visible and the intel­
ligible. (Republic 509d)
Plato does not indicate the two identities to which he is referring 
in this passage, but the Sun analogy has already made it clear 
that the sun is the cause of things in the visible world and the 
Good is the cause of things in the intelligible world. In this 
passage Plato’s language emphasizes the superior role of these 
two entities; the sun is soverign over the visible world and the 
Good is soverign over the intelligible world. Surely then, the Sun 
and the Line imagery suggest that Pirsig is wrong when he says 
that Plato subordinates the Good to rationality.
I believe the material I have presented is adequate to show the 
inadequacy of Pirsig’s comments regarding the relationship of 
reason and the Good — at least in so far as his claims pertain to 
Plato’s mi ddle dialogues. Before turning to Plato’s later period,
I will discuss the Line analogy and the Cave allegory. The Line 
and the Cave images do complement and complete the Sun 
analogy, but my major reason for presenting them is to establish 
grounds for comparing the journey depicted by Plato’s Cave and 
Pirsig’s journey. 7'his section digresses from the paper’s main 
purpose, but the digression may provide useful tools for inter­
preting Pirsig. I will begin by describing Plato’s Line, for it is 
important to an adequate understanding of the Cave.
There is some scholarly debate concerning how the line 
should be drawn, but 1 feel confident that it should be drawn as 
a vertical line with its largest section at the top.6 Plato’s 
directions for constructing the line specify that the line should 
be divided unevenly, and then that each of the two sections 
formed should be divided in the same proportion as the first 
division. The line which emerges is a 4 section line, the sections
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being in the proportion 4:2;2:1. The top two sections represent 
the intelligible world, and the bottom two sections represent the 
visible world. The bottom two sections are most easy to explain: 
The bottommost section represents shadows and images of things 
in the sensible-world (e.g. a shadow of a tree), and the section 
immediately above represents the sensible things themselves 
(e.b. the tree).^ The top two sections of the line are distinguished 
in terms of the methods used to investigate intelligible objects. 
The bottom section of the intelligible world represents objects 
which are investigated by the method of hypothesis and the 
investigation involves use of sensible images. The objects 
represented by the top section of the line are investigated by 
dialectic and no sensible imagery is involved. The following 
diagram should help put the parts of the line in perspective.
intelligible
world
/ objects investigated
(1) by dialectic
(2) without use of sensible imagery
sensible
world
2
3
objects investigated
(1) by the method of hypothesis
(2) using sensible images
sensible objects 
plants, animals, artifacts
shadows and images of things in section 3
The Divided Line is presented at the end of Book VI of the 
Republic, and full appreciation of it depends upon a reading of 
the end of Book V and the earlier parts of Book VI. These sec­
tions of the Republic distinguish the philosophical from the non- 
philosophical life. Plato contends that those who spend their 
lives emphasizing the pleasures of the sensible world are mere 
lovers of spectables — spending their time on what is changing 
and unstable. More worthy is the philosophical life where one 
seeks the eternal unchanging world of the Forms. The Divided 
Line represents different grades of reality; progress up the line
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represents progress from the shadow world of the senses (for the 
sensible world is but a shadow of the intelligible world) to the 
intelligible world.
The Divided Line presents the different levels of reality, but 
it is the Cave allegory that discusses movement between levels. 
A subterranean cave symbolizes the sensible world, and the 
world outside the cave symbolizes the intelligible world. Plato 
first describes the region inside the cave. In the center of the 
cave there is a fire. Around the edges of the cave are prisoners, 
all chained in such a way that their backs are to the fire and they 
can only look at the cave wall in front of them. Between the 
prisoner and the fire is a wall. Lxtending above this wall are 
puppets, the shadows of which are cast on the cave wall by the 
fire. Given this physical set up the prisoners are only able to 
view the shadows of the puppets on the cave wall. These 
shadows clearly represent a very low degree of reality. Plato 
now describes the job of trying to raise these prisoners to see 
higher degrees of reality. The prisoners begin viewing shadows 
on the cave wall. As the prisoners are exposed to increasing 
degrees of reality they view the puppets which create the shadows 
and then the fire in the cave. At this point the prisoners are 
of the cave where they initially see shadows of 
sensible objects, then sensible objects themselves, and finally 
they reach the high point of their journey, vision of the sun. The 
various stages in the Cave allegory symbolize the stages repre­
sented by the Divided Line. The following chart presents the 
symbols and antitypes in the Cave and Line.
CAVE ALLEGORY 
(symbol)
Sun
LINE ANALOGY 
(antitype)
Good
sensible objects 
viewed directly
intelligible objects 
apprehended by dialectic
shadows of 
sensible objects
intelligible objects investigated 
by method of hypothesis
Fire Sun
puppets
shadows of puppets 
on cave wall
sensible objects viewed 
directly
shadows of 
sensible objects
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Thus the release of the prisoners represents t ™
the lowest level of the sensible world up into the^’ U
world and finally to a vision of the Good. If one 
£ .u r J • f 1 u i L achieves visionof the Good, one is truly a philosopher. But now the rub The
philosopher who has attained vision of the Good is not permitted 
to enjoy eternal bliss contemplating it; he or she must return to 
the cave in order to try to rescue others. Thus the cave allegory 
has two phases: the rise up out of the subterranean cave and the 
return down into the cave.8 The following diagrams present the 
journey depicted by the Cave and the intellectual journey the 
Cave symbolizes.
The Journey Depicted 
by the Cave
The Intellectual Journey Corresponding 
to the Cave
Vision 
of the 
Sun
return
to
the
cave
Vision 
of the 
Good
return 
to the 
sensible 
world
Although I do not wish to develop the comparison in great 
detail, I suggest that there are definite similarities between 
Plato’s Cave allegory and Pirsig’s journey across country. 
Pirsig’s journey takes him from the plains up to the top of the 
mountain and down to the sea. The geographical structure of 
Pirsig’s trip coordinates with the structure of Phaedrus’ journey. 
Phaedrus’ journey begins by examining concrete instances of 
quality in rhetoric classes and then moves into a purely intellec­
tual journey. On page 269 Pirsig describes Phaedrus’ intellectual 
journey.
But to understand the meaning of Quality in classic terms 
required a backup into metaphysics and its relation to 
everyday life. To do that required still another backup into 
the huge area that relates both metaphysics and everyday 
life — namely, formal reason. So I proceeded with formal 
reason up into metaphysics and then into Quality and then 
from Quality back down into metaphysics and science.
The following diagrams depicting Pirsig’s and Phaedrus’
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journeys should be compared to the diagrams depicting Plato’s 
Lave allegory.
Pirsig's Journey 
Across Country
Mountaintop
seaside
Phaedrus' Journey
Quality
\
\bottom of 
\ the sea
The fact that the downsides of the arches are not identical is not 
problematic for Pirsig completes a journey wbicb Phaedrus does 
not. Phaedrus does not return to a life filled with concrete 
instances of quality but ends up in a mental hospital. At the end 
of the book Pirsig achieves a quality relationship with his son 
that Phaedrus had not achieved. Perhaps that is one reason that 
Pirsig says that he will meet Chris at “the bottom of the ocean’’ 
(pages 267 and 400) rather than at the oceanside: in so far as the 
cross-country journey is inadequate to symbolize what Pirsig 
achieved that Phaedrus did not.
I intend to undertake a brief comparison of Plato’s Cave and 
Phaedrus’ journey, but do not expect Plato’s Cave to provide a 
complete explanation of Pirsig’s symbolism. 4'he facts that 
Pirsig is very concerned with his own mental states and that he 
associates the ocean with “the deepest levels of subconscious­
ness’’ (397) suggest that psychological as well as philosophical 
tools are needed for complete interpretation. I am not in a posi­
tion to supply the appropriate psychological tools, but I hope 
that access to Plato’s Cave will provide relevant philosophical 
background for understanding at least part of what the book is 
about.
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The four diagrams I have presented, two arches depicting the 
journeys related to the Cave and two arches depicting the jour­
neys in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, provide the 
basis for my comparison. I have already presented the passage 
in which Pirsig describes Phaedrus’ journey in terms of a way 
up and a way down. Pirsig’s language is extremely similar to the 
language Plato uses in describing the path to apprehension of 
the Good. Plato’s description appears in the Divided Line 
analogy, but the Line is the prelude to the Cave.
Understand then, said I, that by the other section of the 
intelligible (the top section of the line) 1 mean that which 
the reason {ho logos) itself lays hold of by the power of 
dialectic, treating its assumptions not as absolute begin­
nings but literally as hypotheses, underpinnings, footings, 
and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that 
which required no assumption and is the starting point of 
all, and after attaining to that taking hold of the first 
dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the con­
clusion . . ..(Republic 511bc)
Pirsig might well balk at Plato’s description of dialectic as the 
method which enables one to rise to the starting point of all, but 
the method Plato describes is not at odds with Pirsig’s general 
approach. Shorey translates ho logos as reason in this passage, 
but some scholars interpret dialectic as mental or mystical 
vision. Plato uses two different words to describe the mental 
state corresponding to the top section of the line. At 511e he 
calls that mental state noesis which suggests some sort of 
immediate apprehension, but at 534a he refers to the same state 
as episteme which suggests that it is knowledge attained by 
reason. Pirsig may refuse a mystical interpretation of Plato or he 
may not even be aware that such interpretations exist, but even 
if he insists that dialectic is reason, the similarity of his own 
approach to Plato’s is still evident.
From what 1 have said it should be apparent that there is a 
great deal of similarity between Plato s Good and Phaedrus 
Quality. In fact, at one point Pirsig says that he would have con­
sidered them the same except for the fact that Phaedrus vehe­
mently denied it (361). Pirsig later explains how Plato went 
wrong:
Plato hadn't tried to destroy arete. He had encapsulated it; 
made a permanent, fixed idea out of it; had converted it to a 
rigid, immobile Immortal Truth. He made arete the Good, the 
highest Idea of all. It was subordinate only to Truth itself, 
in a synthesis of all that had gone before. (373)
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Perhaps this passage gets at the heart of Phaedrus’ problems 
with Plato. Pirsig does not seem to understand the nature of the 
horms. I he Forms are not truths, but objects which make truth 
possible. Just as one must not confuse vision or color with the 
cause of vision and color, so too one must not confuse knowledge 
or truth with the cause of knowledge and truth. If Pirsig were to 
realize that Plato subordinates truth to Goodness he would find 
further similarity between their views. I suspect that the real 
issue between Plato and Pirsig is the absolute versus the 
relative nature of the Good, but I don’t find that Pirsig has 
addressed that question in any substantial way. I find the idea of 
mystical apprehension of a relative nature somewhat baffling, 
but I will not pursue that point since Pirsig avoids the issue.
There is one further similarity between Plato’s and Pirsig’s 
journeys whihc merits consideration. The second half of Zen and 
the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance is quite concerned with where 
Pirsig will meet Chris. At first one expects Pirsig to meet Chris 
at the top of the mountain. On page 222 Chris tells Pirsig about 
the previous night:
You said at the top of the mountain we’d see everything.
You said you were going to meet me there.
Pirsig does recall Phaedrus’ mystical apprehension of Quality 
at the top of the mountain, but he does not meet Chris there. 
These facts make sense when interpreted in light of Plato’s 
Cave. Phaedrus’ apprehension of Quality which takes place at 
the top of the mountain is quite like Plato’s apprehension of the 
Good. And just as Plato’s philosopher cannot meet those who 
have not made the journey into the intelligible realm while 
contemplating the Good, so too it makes sense that Pirsig cannot 
meet Chris at the top of the mountain. Chris has not shared 
Pirsig’s intellectual journey: if Pirsig wishes to meet Chris, he 
must return to the everyday world. Both the philosopher and 
Pirsig must travel their respective “downward paths’’ before they 
can adequately communicate with those who have not journeyed 
through the intelligible realm.
From this digression let us now return to the focus of this 
paper, the relationship between reason and the Good in the texts 
of Plato and Aristotle. Earlier I presented the Sun analogy as 
Plato’s clearest account of the relationship between reason and 
the Good in his middle dialogues. I suspect that Pirsig is not 
familiar with the later dialogue I now intend to discuss, the 
Philebus, but since Plato’s dialogue, Phaedrus, is a transitional
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dialogue to Plato’s later period, I believe discussion of the 
Philebus is relevant. I do not wish to discuss the differences 
between middle and late Platonic dialogues in great detail, but 1 
do think it is significant to point out that the late dialogues 
involve a new (or if not new a greatly elaborated) account of the 
nature of dialectic. I have already presented Plato’s account of 
dialectic in the Republic: it is the method by which one rises to 
first principles. In the Phaedrus Plato characterizes dialectic as 
the procedures of collection and division:
Phaedrus: What procedures do you mean?
Socrates: The first is that in which we bring a dispensed 
plurality under a single form, seeing it all 
together — the purpose being to define so-and-so, 
and thus to make plain whatever may be chosen 
as the topic for exposition . . .
Phaedrus; And what is the second procedure you speak of, 
Socrates?
Socrates: The reverse of the other, whereby we are enabled 
to divide into forms, following the objective 
articulation; we are not to attempt to hack off 
parts like a clumsy butcher . . ..{Phaedrus 265de)
The dialectician can identify what multiplicities share a single 
nature and thus unite them under one form, and he or she can 
also begin with one form and divide it into natural parts. The 
fact that Pirsig’s former self was so concerned with the pro­
cedures of collection and division helps explain why Pirsig 
refers to his former self as Phaedrus. Perhaps then Pirsig 
believes the later dialogues are where Plato subordinates the 
Good to reason. If that is what he wishes to contend, he owes 
us an account of the Philebus.
Ethical concerns play a major role in almost all of Plato’s 
early and middle dialogues, but not in many later dialogues. The 
Philebus, however, picks up earlier ethical concerns, particularly 
those expressed in the Protagoras and Republic, and it provides 
Plato’s final answer to the question: is pleasure or reason closer 
to the good? I trust I will not spoil the dialogue for those of you 
who have not read it by affirming what you already suspect: 
Plato believes reason is closer to the good than pleasure. He 
reaches this conclusion by hunting down the nature of the good.
Socrates: So now we find that the good has taken refuge 
in the character of the beautiful, for the qualities 
of measure and proportion invariably, 1 imagine.
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constitute beauty and excellence.
Protarchus: Yes indeed.
Socrat es: And of course we said that truth was included 
along with these qualities in the mixture.
Protarchus: Quite so.
Socrates: Then if we cannot hunt down the good under a 
single form, let us secure it by the conjunction 
of three, beauty, proportion, and truth, and then, 
regarding these three as one, let us assert that 
that may most properly be held to determine the 
qualities of the mixture, and because that is 
good the mixture itself has become so.
(Philehus 64e-65a)
Socrates then demonstrates that of the two, pleasure and reason, 
reason is closer to the good for it is closer to truth, proportion 
and beauty. Socrates ends by ranking things which contribute to 
a good life: (1) what possesses measure, (2) what is proportioned 
and beautiful, (3) reason and intelligence, (4) sciences, arts, and 
right opinions, and (5) pure pleasures of the soul, i.e. pleasures 
which do not also bring pain (Philehus 66abc). In light of this 
text I find it hard to see that Plato subordinated tbe good to 
reason.
At the beginning of this paper I said that Pirsig plays dirty. 
One reason I say that is that his book presents passages which 
suggest that he knows at least some of his statements are 
inaccurate. For example, at one point while discussing Aristotle, 
he says:
I have since read Aristotle again, looking for the massive 
evil that appears in the fragments from Phaedrus, but have 
not found it there. What 1 find in Aristotle is mainly a quite 
dull collection of generalizations, many of which seem 
impossible to justify in the light of modern knowledge, 
whose organization appears extremely poor, and which seems 
primitive in the way old Greek pottery in the museums seems 
primitive. I’m sure if I knew a lot more about it I would see 
a lot more and not find it primitive at all. But without know­
ing all that I can’t see that it lives up either to the raves of 
the Great Books group or the rages of Phaedrus. I certainly 
don’t see Aristotle’s works as a major source of either 
positive or negative values. But the raves of the great 
Books groups are well known and published. Phaedrus’ 
rages aren’t, and it becomes part of my obligation to dwell 
on these, (p. 353)
From this it appears that Pirsig does not believe that he can
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defend Phaedrus’ statements about Aristotle (and 1 suspect the 
same applies to Plato) on the basis of texts. But if Pirsig is 
unwilling to take responsibility for the accuracy of Phaedrus’ 
statements, on what ground can he find an obligation to dwell on 
“rages”? 1 suspect that the raves of the Great Books groups are 
known by a narrower audience than Pirsig’s book has reached. 
The end result is that competent scholars dismiss his work as 
ignorant undefended rages and the general public comes away 
with a terribly misguided impression of Plato and Aristotle. 
Competent scholars may well be at fault for not conveying their 
understandings to a wider audience, but on the scale of sins I 
find Pirsig’s slander more offensive.
Before turning to Aristotle’s understanding of the relationship 
between the good and reason, it seems appropriate to mention 
that Pirsig is as ignorant of the pre-Socratic philosophers (whom 
Pirsig refers to as cosmologists) and the sophists as he is of 
Plato and Aristotle. It is true that most pre-Socratic philosophers 
were particularly interested in cosmology, but it is equally true 
that some of the pre-Socratic philosophers were interested in 
ethics. Thus 1 find fault with Phaedrus’ search which Pirsig 
describes on page 373, “Phaedrus searched, but could find no 
previous cosmologists who had talked about the Good. Since he 
goes on to say that the sophists talked about the Good, he must 
not mean Plato’s Good; rather, he must mean the good life. But 
clearly some of the pre-Socratics were concerned about the good 
life. In different ways the good life is important to Heraclitus, 
the Pythagoreans, and Democritus. Consider, for example, the 
fragment from Democritus:
The man who chooses the good of the soul makes a more 
divine choice; he who chooses the good of the body makes 
a mortal choice.9
This fragment makes it clear that Democritus was concerned 
about the good life; other fragments discuss in more detail how 
the good life is achieved.
Pirsig’s treatment of the sophists is also distressing. He 
suggests, that it is the sophists who are most concerned about 
arete, i.e. excellence. But Pirsig has very little understanding of 
the arete the sophists discuss. On page 371 lightning hits 
Phaedrus;
Quality! Virtue! Dharma! That is what the Sophists were 
teaching! Not ethical relativism. Not pristine “virtue.” But 
arete. Excellence. Dharma! Before the Church of Reason.
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Before substance. Before form. Before mind and matter.
Before dialectic itself. Quality had been absolute. Those 
first teachers of the Western world were teaching Quality, 
and the medium they had chosen was that of rhetoric. He 
had been doing it right all along.
Lightning may have struck Phaedrus, but it’s too bad it didn’t 
bring illumination. I find no evidence in Pirsig’s text that the 
arete of the sophists is Phaedrus’ Quality. Indeed, my suspicion 
is that neither Pirsig nor Phaedrus have much understanding of 
the sophists view of arete. Pirsig mentions Protagoras’ view that 
man is the measure of all things, but the connection between that 
doctrine and Phaedrus’ Quality is very unclear. I suspect Pirsig 
would be surprised to learn that the arete Protagoras tried to 
teach was the ability to become a power in the city-state and the 
arete Gorgias tried to teach was the ability to help one’s friends 
and harm one’s enemies. “Arete” does mean excellence in 
Greek, but early Greek notions of what constitutes human excel­
lence are quite different from ours.^® Indeed, Socrates’ great 
contribution was to connect arete and reason: rather than separat­
ing quality and reason as Pirsig contends, the Greek philosophers 
(Socrates, Plato and Aristotle particularly) connected them in 
ways that had not been done previously.
I have already shown that Plato considered the Good and 
reason interdependent and that he considered reason subordinate 
to the Good. I will not discuss Aristotle in as great detail, but I 
will discuss the opening lines of the Nicomachean Ethics which 
explain the role of the good in Aristotle’s philosophy. Before 
doing that I would like to make two less important points: both 
emerge in response to Phaedrus’ attack on Aristotle’s treatment 
of rhetoric. Phaedrus complains:
As a branch of Practical Science it (rhetoric) was isolated 
from any concern with Truth or Good or Beauty, except as 
devices to throw into an argument. Thur Quality, in Aris­
totle’s system, is totally divorced from rhetoric. This con­
tempt for thetoric, combined with Aristotle’s own atrocious 
quality of rhetoric, so completely alienated Phaedrus he 
couldn’t read anything Aristotle said without seeking ways 
to despise it and attack it. (p. 3.58)
F'irst, Pirsig does not seem to know that Aristotle did not prepare 
the texts of his work which we now have. Aristotle’s exoteric 
works (the works written for distribution outside his school) are 
all lost. What we have now are texts compiled from the notes of 
Aristotle’s students. God forbid that the quality of my rhetoric 
ever be judged on the compilation of my students’ notes. Second,
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Pirsig must not understand Aristotle’s distinction between 
Theoretical and Practical Science. In his Introduction to Aristotle 
Richard McKeon, a highly respected scholar, distinguishes the 
ends of Aristotle s theoretical and practical sciences:
The end of the theoretic sciences is knowledge, and the 
subject matters which are investigated and the truths which 
are sought in them do not depeod on our action or our 
volition. The end of the practical sciences, on the other 
hand, is not merely to know, but rather to act in the light of 
knowledge; it is not the purpose of political science, for 
example, to know the good, but to make men good. (p. xxi)
At the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle emphasizes 
that ethics is a practical science: its purpose is not merely to 
understand the nature of the good but to make humans good. If 
Pirsig understood Aristotle’s distinction, he would certainly 
approve Aristotle’s placing rhetoric in the practical sciences. 
Practical sciences are very much concerned with Truth, Beauty, 
and Goodness.
It is now time to examine Aristotle’s understanding of the 
relationship between reason and the good. The Nicomachean 
Ethics opens with the assertion:
Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action, is 
thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good 
has rightly been declared to be that at which all things 
aim. (1094a 1-4)
Aristotle then goes on to explain that different activities aim at 
different ends, and that the final end which we seek by pursuing 
diverse intermediate ends is the chief good. Thus Aristotle con­
tends that all our activity, intellectual and otherwise, is subordi­
nate in a certain sense to the good; whatever we do we do for 
the sake of the good.
Aristotle explains that it is generally agreed that the chief 
good which all humans seek is happiness, but that it is not gen­
erally agreed wherein happiness lies. Different Greeks argued 
that happiness consists in wealth or honor or pleasure, but 
Aristotle’s contribution lies in his attempt to argue that the 
highest happiness consists in reasoning and, in particular, 
philosophic contemplation. The whole thrust of the Nicomachean 
Ethics develops out of Aristotle’s contention that the function of 
man is activity guided by reason and that the good and happy man 
who performs his function well.
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Now if the function of man is an activity of soul which 
follows or implies a rational principle, ... and we state 
the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to 
be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational 
principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and 
noble performance of these, and if any action is well per­
formed when it is performed in accordance with the appropri­
ate excellence: if this is the case, human good turns out to 
be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there 
are more than one virtue in accordance with the best and 
most complete. (1098a)
To this basic account of the human good Aristotle adds the 
further conditions that the human good includes virtuous activity 
throughout a complete life (1098a) and that the happy life requires 
a certain amount of external goods (1099a). When I discuss 
Aristotle’s view of human good, I will speak only of its main 
thrust, that human good (or happiness) is activity of the soul in 
accordance with virtue, but the reader should keep in mind that 
this form is abbreviated.
The statement, “Human good is activity of the soul in accord­
ance with virtue,’’ may not strike anyone as tremendously insight­
ful, but I believe it becomes more significant as one sees what 
Aristotle is getting at. The Greek word for virtue is “arete” and 
arete is better translated “excellence.” Thus, human good is 
activity of the soul in accordance with excellence. The excell­
ence of the soul depends on the soul’s function. As the passage 
at 1098a makes clear, Aristotle believes that the function of the 
human soul is activity which implies a rational principle. The 
human soul performs its function best when it manifests two 
kinds of activity involving rational principles: intellectual 
activity and moral activity. When a soul reasons well and acquires 
truth, it possesses intellectual excellence. When truth is applied 
to action and a human uses reason to control his or her desires, 
excellence is present.!!
From my brief remarks about Aristotle’s ethics, I believe the 
relationship between the good and reason is apparent. The good 
is the final end of all human activity. Humans agree that the final 
end at which they aim is happiness. Aristotle contends that the 
highest happiness is produced by intellectual and moral virtue. 
These virtues or excellences of the soul are present in a soul 
which performs its function well, i.e. a soul which reasons well. 
Thus, according to Aristotle, the greatest good and reason are 
interdependent. The good is higher than reason, however, for we 
reason for the sake of the good.
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Far from separating reason and the good both Plato and 
Aristotle argue for their interdependence, and far from subordinat­
ing the good to reason both Plato and Aristotle subordinate 
reason to the good. Sarah is right: “Quality is every part of 
Greek life.” But reason is also an important pemt of Greek life. 
Plato and Aristotle gave different accounts of the relationship of 
reason and the good, and yet both are convinced that the soul 
which embraces reason will live a happier and better life than 
the soul which rejects reason. Pirsig seems to be suggesting 
that in order to reach the highest good, he has to reject reason or 
to expand its normal domain. He seems to be suggesting that by 
moving into insanity he approaches a higher goal than reason 
permits. But look at the quality of his life prior to his being 
institutionalized. If that is the life which goind beyond the 
bounds of reason produces, I prefer not to be insane. I see no 
evidence whatsoever that insanity produces quality.
That is not to say, however, as Plato and Aristotle did not 
say, that reason and quality are identical. I believe Plato and 
Aristotle had it just right: reason and the good are interrelated, 
and reason helps to produce a quality life. Pirsig seems to 
believe that he has to leave the Western tradition in order to 
gain insight into how to achieve peace of mind. It is a shame 
that his understanding of the Greeks is so shabby for Greek 
philosophy would take him a long way in the direction he wishes 
to go. Aristotle tells us that eudaimonia (happiness or well-being 
of the spirit) occurs when humans function well — particularly 
when they reason well since rational activity is the particular 
function of man. I suggest that Pirsig owes a debt to Aristotle 
when he says:
The study of the art of motorcycle maintenance is really a 
miniature study of the art of rationality itself. Working on a 
motorcycle, working well, caring, is ... to achieve an inner 
peace of mind.l^
In order to work well at maintaining a motorcycle one must 
function according to rational principles. Humans who function in 
accordance with rational principles will function well. As a 
result they will achieve peace of mind, eudaimonia.
Perhaps what makes me maddest about Pirsig’s book is that 
everything I find in it of value, I find the roots for in Greek 
philosophy — and yet Pirsig has the gall to characterize Plato 
and Aristotle as villains ultimately responsible for the lack of 
care associated with modern technology. I hope this paper has
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demonstrated that Pirsig gives the Greek philosophers a bad rap. 
Neither Plato nor Aristotle would ever advocate doing what is 
reasonable even when it isn’t any good. That wouldn’t make any 
sense to them. Reason is a capacity of mind whose function is 
to promote the good. For Plato reason is either (1) what appre­
hends the Good or (2) what enables one to reach a further mental 
state which apprehends the Good. Then reason is used to help 
create quality in everyday life. For Aristotle reason is that which 
most effectively helps us attain the ends which we seek. Plato 
and Aristotle did not subordinate the good to reason; rather, they 
were among the first who pointed out the important role of reason 
in creating quality lives. If there is a villain in Zen and the Art 
of Motorcycle Maintenance (and I think that there is), he is not 
Plato or Aristotle. He is the slanderer.
INFORMAL FOOTNOTES
All references from Pirsig are from Robert M. Pirsig, Zen and the 
Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry into Values (New York; 
Bantam Books, 1976). Page numbers appear in the text of the paper 
throughout.
All references from Plato are from TAe Collected Dialogues of Plato 
edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, 1961. The Aristotle 
references appear in Introduction to Aristotle edited by Richard 
McKeon, 1947.
'’• Scholars divide Plato’s work into early, middle, and late dialogues. 
Socrates is the main character in the early and middle dialogues, 
but the early dialogues are thought to reflect his views whereas the 
middle dialogues are thought to present Plato’s views. In the late 
dialogues Socrates is sometimes the main character, sometimes a 
minor character, and sometimes he does not appear at all. The 
Republic is a middle dialogue, and the Philebus is a late dialogue. 
References to Plato and Aristotle will be given via Stephanus 
numbers, the numbers which occur along the margins of most 
editions. Stephanus numbers refer to early manuscripts, and their 
use makes it easier to compare translations.
See Paul Shorey’s footnote in the Loeb edition of the Republic, 
1963, page 105. Many of you may be unfamiliar with the Loebs; they 
arc put out by Harvard University Press, and they present the Greek 
text on one page and an English translation on the opposite page.
The line should be drawn vertically because of its connection to the 
Cave where up and down are important. The top section should be 
largest because the top represents the greatest degree of reality.
Plato initially says that the bottom portion of the line represents the 
visible world. The visible world is eventually broadened in the Cave 
allegory to include all the sensible world.
My description of the Cave is but a poor shadow of the original. I 
encourage everyone to read Plato’s Sun, Line and Cave images at 
Republic 506b-520e. The passage is really quite short and well 
worth your time.
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9- See John Mansley Robinson. Av Introduction to Early Greek Philo­
sophy, 1968, page 229.
1*^- Greek notions of arete have been discussed in detail by Professor 
A. W. H. Adkins — Professor of Classics and Philosophy at the 
University of Chicago. He presents a valuable brief account of his 
findings in Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece. 
Book 1 of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics provides a general intro­
duction. Books II-V characterize moral virtue, and Book VI discusses 
intellectual virtue. Book Vll Discusses pleasure, and Books Vlll 
and IX analyze friendship. Book X brings the Ethics to a culmina­
tion with a final account of the good life. Those of you who wish to 
explore Aristotle’s Ethics can get an overview by reading Books I, 
11, VI, and X.
12. Pirsig’s prefatory remark presented inside the front cover.
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William T. Hamilton
TAKING PLEASURE WHERE YOU FIND IT
Why are you reading this? Why, for that matter, are you attend­
ing this seminar, when you could be playing handball, sleeping 
late, or, like Good King Wenceslas, gathering winter fu-el?
Probably one of your motives is a sense of duty, that virtue 
so dear to the puritan west, of deferring pleasure until the Just 
Reward, which comes precious because it comes late. Attending 
these seminars is an officially sanctioned and therefore unques­
tionably responsible use of the Intertefm and hence a useful thing 
to put in the blank on the Faculty Annual Report which asks you 
to account for your educational use of this period, which the 
Otterbein establishment insists is not to be considered a vaca­
tion. And, since most of you are now professors, you were 
probably good students in school and college, and, as we all 
know, good students always read their assignments. Your sense 
of duty no doubt goes a long way towards answering the simple- 
minded questions I began with.
I hope, however, that it doesn’t account entirely for your 
presence in the seminar, nor for your having read this far into 
this paper. I think that some part of the motivation is a hope, 
probably slight and diminishing by now, for “quality.” Maybe, 
just maybe, there might be something good down the line, if not 
on this page, perhaps on the next — a joke, an insight, something 
that would make one or two moments of reading distinguish them­
selves by their quality from other moments.
In the course of his attempt to define — or rather describe — 
the undefinable, Robert M. Pirsig associates “quality” with a 
number of concepts and intuitions. The one that interests me the 
most as a potential insight into the problems of teaching writing, 
however, is his association of quality with pleasure (see particu­
larly Chapter 19). “Pleasure” in turn he defines with a disarming 
simplicity: “what you like.” Stated that way, the concept of 
quality seems trivial, especially when you consider the vast 
array of things we think are wrong with the way our students 
express themselves on paper. Think of the dangers that face the 
professor who announces to his class that the papers he likes 
best are going to get the A’s and B’s, while the penalty for dis­
pleasing him on paper is going to be a D or F. What if a student 
claims that her D paper gave her (and, to make it even more
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perilous, let us say her roommate as well) a great deal of pleas­
ure, and the teacher’s dislike of it is simply a reflection of his 
own eccentric tastes? What possible defense does the teacher 
have against the student’s charge that he is relying on purely 
subjective criteria?
It is my current opinion (which means that I may be ready to 
change it at any moment under the right kind of challenge) that 
our only chance of solving the “Writing Problem” is to restore to 
the process of writing and to the teaching of writing this sense 
of quality-as-pleasure. I am further convinced that this is not a 
task that English teachers alone can hope to accomplish, that, 
for reasons I hope to establish, we are all teachers of writing, 
whether we teach English or nursing or philosophy. To meet this 
challenge, we need to come up with a convincing escape from the 
subjectivity trap, or, to put it differently, we need to find ways 
of pulling our students into the trap with us. One of the best 
things about Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance is that 
Pirsig suggests some ways of pulling it off: ways of resolving 
the apparent difficulties of confessing to our own subjectivity, 
ways of involving the students as writers in events that are 
characterized by quality-as-pleasure, and finally specific ways 
of teaching quality when we teach writing. To follow Pirsig’s 
terms, we need to find ways of persuading the student to engage 
in a “caring” relationship with his work (see Chapter 24).
Let us begin this task with a touch of quality. The following 
sentence, extracted from a freshman theme written at the Univer­
sity of Washington twenty years ago, was proudly displayed on 
the bulletin board in the English office:
“The main difference between Christians and atheists
is that Christians believe in the Afterbirth.”
(If you didn’t find that funny, please read the sentence again. If 
you still don’t find it funny, I think I’ve lost you. Seek quality 
elsewhere, and let me know where you find it.)
With those of you who are still with me, I want to assume that 
this is a perfectly marvelous sentence, absolutely brilliant or 
perfectly inept depending on its context. I think it has three 
possible contexts, each readily distinguishable from the others 
in terms of quality:
Context 1:
As it stood, on the UW bulletin board. Here, the readers —
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mostly English teachers or advanced English students - got 
considerable pleasure from watching this student slip on his 
verbal banana peel and from participating vicariously in the 
delight of the freshman composition instructor who mined this 
gem from the barren waste that usually results from assigning 
this sort of topic to a group of freshmen (“Compare and contrast 
Christians and Atheists, Russia and the United States, High 
School and College, or Up and Down. 500 wds. minimum”). For 
our purposes, this is the least interesting of the possible con­
texts: there is probably no way we can improve the quality of our 
lives by asking each of our students to make at least one enter­
taining rreudian slip during the term.
Context 2:
In an essay in which the student deliberately plays with the 
words afterlife and afterbirth. In this context, the reader shares 
the writer’s sense of play, his sense of the infinitely varied 
possibilities of our shared language. We’ve only got one sentence 
here, but if this hypothetical student keeps this up, reading his 
paper, with its associations of the heavenly mysteries and barn­
yard realities, is going to be the highpoint of our evening of 
paper grading. We are going to share this writer’s pleasure in 
language.
Context 3:
Almost certainly the real one — the context of a theme by a 
miserably inattentive student who has no understanding of what 
he’s writing about and little confidence in his ability to choose 
words. The momentary pleasure of finding the slip soon gives 
way to despair: what can I do with a student who knows so little 
about his subject or his language that he falls into such an 
error? It’s like listening to a piano student who never practices, 
or watching a mechanically inept professor assemble a rotisserie: 
no pleasure here, only pain.
We evaluate the sentence differently depending on the context 
in which it appears, that context depending largely upon the 
intentions of the writer who presents the statement to us. We 
evaluate it, of course, for its quality (that seems to be a neces­
sary tautology as I try to work out what’s going on here), and 
that quality is a matter of the pleasure or displeasure we take.
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I’ve been relying heavily on the pronoun we in the last few 
paragraphs. 1 need now to defend that pronoun: it’s my main 
defense against the student’s charge that my grading standards 
are unfairly subjective. Let me, a, la Pirsig, resort to a bit of 
autobiography. 1 am confident in using the pronoun ^ we in my 
evaluation of the sentence because I ve shared the afterbirth 
anecdote with dozens of people since I first saw the sentence 
twenty years ago. A very few people didn t get it or thought it 
was disgusting. Most have reacted to it with pleasure. I belong,
I discover, to a language community which shares my evaluation 
of this utterance. I’m writing (I think) to a part of that community 
now. If my evaluation is subjective, it is certainly shared by a 
lot of people. We can’t point to the objective standards of quality 
by which we evaluate it, but neither can we still believe that our 
evaluation is eccentric, since it seems to be widely shared. 
Perhaps our standards are intersubjective, a term I kept expecting 
Pirsig to use, especially in Chapter 19, where he convincingly 
(to me, at any rate) demonstrates that quality is neither objective 
nor subjective. Our standards are intersubjective in the sense 
that they derive from our belonging to a community which, in a 
broad way, seems to agree about them. I think Pirsig is right in 
maintaining that to call our love or admiration for Beethoven, 
Tolstoy or Picasso purely subjective (and therefore somehow 
unreal) in simply silly.
Assuming that we can now safely say to a class of writing 
students that we are going to evaluate their work on the basis of 
the pleasure we take in reading it, how do we get our students 
involved in this pleasure-seeking community? I think Pirsig is 
highly instructive here, not only in his specific classroom experi­
ment, flawed as he admits it was, but also in the general approach 
his book takes to establishing the character of quality. I think 
one of the ways of analyzing the writing problem is along the 
lines of the classical/romantic split Pirsig identifies. Let me 
return to the student who insists that she and her roommate both 
thought the paper I gave her a D on was pretty good. (This, I’m 
sure you all realize, is hardly a hypothetical case.) I have found 
that such defenses are seldom coherent. The student can point to 
a sentence or two which she thinks constitutes the central idea 
of the paper; she can, if pressed, find a few details or facts that 
might be construed as supporting that idea, and she may be able 
to prove that she read the assignment on which the paper was 
based. But the defense is almost certainly one that relies on the 
surfaces of the paper and the thought that went into it. She 
thought that Sons and Lovers was about premarital sex, she’s 
against premarital sex, and here — right here — is where she
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said so.
What our student cannot do is identify underlying form in the 
paper. She can’t point to where she chose one word because it 
belongs to the same kind of analysis or structure of feeling as 
these other words she chose. She cannot show how she prepared 
the ground for her freshest insight, or attached one sentence or 
paragraph to another with skillful transitions. There was no 
strategy, no technique, to the writing decisions she made. And 
further conversation with her is likely to reveal that a major part 
of her resentment at the low grade is based on her sense that I 
take a technological approach to her writing, and she doesn t 
understand the technology. She’s in the same position as the 
professor trying to put together the rotisserie — she’s cut her 
thumb on the blasted thing, though she tried to follow the 
directions.
She’s right. The problem is a technological one, and I know 
the technology. I take pleasure in writing (when it’s going well) 
because I know how to do it; or, I know how to do it because I 
take pleasure in it. To apply Pirsig’s terms to the phenomenon,
I can experience quality events in my writing because I know how 
to care about the process. Events and caring are active phenom­
ena: I’ve learned how to please myself. (Not always, of course; I 
can sympathize with writing students because I often face the 
intractible: the writing problem where my capabilities in the 
technology seem to be inadequate. As Pirsig suggests, this is 
the time to drink coffee, take a nap, or, if it’s really intractible, 
go fishing.) What I hope to come up with is an essay or a poem; 
because I understand something about the underlying form, I know 
what to do, how to perform, to loosen the screw or mend the 
sentence.
It follows, I think, that instruction in writing must be instruc­
tion in caring. We must help the student to perform competently, 
but that means that we must design the instruction so that he 
experiences quality events in his writing. Most of our students 
are skillful in something: playing the tuba, kicking a football, 
arranging a bouquet. One way to begin may be to ask them to 
examine the underlying form of such skills. We take pleasure from 
what we do well, but if we look back at the processes by which 
we became competent at those things, I think we can identify 
stages at which we had to work very hard and experienced 
considerable discomfort because we didn’t understand the moves. 
As we become more accomplished, we are able to care: we can 
refine our skills, attend to more parts of our performance, develop
not only competence, but style and flair.
I think the writing problem most of our students have is the 
result of the fact that they have had very few pleasurable experi­
ences in their use of language. At least they seem to have had 
few such experiences with adults outside of the family. To con­
verse with a freshman, at least on first acquaintance, is to be 
sprayed with a shower of “likes” and “reallys,” “you knows” 
and “he goes.” To read his paper is an even more painful 
experience: even if he can spell and punctuate with some sense 
of the conventions, he writes as if he were walking through a 
minefield, conscious that each step may be his last, that his 
teacher may at any moment find the fatal comma fault, lack of 
agreement, misplaced modifier, or unsubstantiated generalization. 
Again, no pleasure, only pain. You can’t care in a minefield, only 
worry, and they’re not the same thing. You can only fear a tech- 
> nology you see little hope of mastering.
The first thing we have to do is to clear that minefield. If the 
student perceives (and he usually does) that his teacher is watch­
ing mainly for errors, not successes, his writing strategy is going 
to be the negative one of trying to avoid errors. Again, this is 
anxiety, not caring. I don’t mean we should stop marking errors: 
for one thing, I couldn’t stop myself from marking them. I have 
little control of my red pen when I see a sentence fragment, and 
ultimately we want to make the avoidance of error a part of 
caring. But we’ve also got to show the student that we are 
pleasure-seekers, watching for and responding to positive quality 
events: a word well-chosen, a familiar fact seen in a new light, 
a sentence that matches its thought neatly, even a footnote at 
just the right point and impeccably punctuated. Our marginal 
comments ought to be copious, and they ought to show that we 
are engaged in his thought process, that we are entertaining it, 
not merely poised to pounce on him when his thought deviates 
from ours. (What a rotten sense of power Stephen Daedalus s 
instructor must have felt when he wrote in the margin This 
paper has heresy in it!”) We are trying to establish a community 
here, trying to show him we share and take pleasure in his 
insights, assuming the best about his writing as long as we 
possibly can. Sometimes a certain duplicity may be required: I’ve 
had some success pretending to believe that a student chose a 
word or advanced a proposition with more skill than was in fact 
involved. Especially in a conference with a student, I can get 
him to refine an idea in rewriting he didn’t know he had, until it 
does in a real sense become his idea, with all the pleasure that 
comes with a sense of discovery — a sense, I think, we don’t
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The sense of community that the student achieves from having 
his paper read by a sympathetic, pleasure-seeking professor is 
only part of the caring-about-quality we need to establish with 
and for our students. They are going to write (we hope) largely 
alone, away from that intersubjective community that emerges 
when writer reaches reader. Our student writers need to start 
caring as soon as they sit down with that awesome piece of blank 
paper in front of them, and we need teaching strategies that will 
affect that performance from the outset.
1 have been impressed with two quite different proposals for 
the teaching of writing, both of which seem to me quite Pirsigian. 
1 suspect an effective college-wide attack on the writing problem 
might be devised borrowing from both. Both of them are highly 
critical of the current cry that all we need to do is to get Back to 
Basics. 1 agree; a sustained attempt to “teach grammar” is 
simply a way of building a better minefield.
The first approach is described in a highly readable little 
book called Writing and Learning across the Curriculum, 11-16, a 
study compiled by Nancy Martin and others of several imaginative 
programs in Britain. The key words are “across the curriculum.” 
The approach sounds simple-minded: we learn to write by writing 
about what we’re interested in. Many of my ideas here about 
adopting a pleasure-seeking rather than a mistake-hunting stance 
towards paper-marking were influenced by my reading of this book 
a year or two ago. Martin and her colleagues are writing about 
secondary education in Britain; given our sense that American 
college students can’t write very well, we can hardly dismiss the 
book as too elementary for our purposes. And the suggestion that 
writing should be incorporated with learning across the curriculum 
may turn something we’ve thought was a serious problem from the 
liberal arts perspective into an opportunity: our concern that our 
students are too narrowly career-oriented. If our students care 
deeply about nursing or accounting, let us assume that they’d 
like to learn to communicate that interest. Perhaps that enchant­
ment with the mysteries of double-entry bookkeeping might lead to 
a really good essay about it. I’d go further: if a student shows 
the slightest interest in anything, assign a paper!
often give a student the chance to feel. However we do it, the
goal IS to clear that minefield, build that community, establish
the sense that we are working toward the common goal of pleas-
ure. ^
It is not, of course, necessarily going to be an English
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teacher who uncovers that interest. Thus, again, writing across 
the curriculum. I have no patience with the argument that chemis­
try or business professors can’t teach writing. If you care enough 
about good writing to complain bitterly when you discover ugly 
bits in bluebooks and termpapers, you have the essential regard 
for quality that will enable you to help a student learn to eare as 
much as you do: admit that you belong to the community. For one 
thing, you can help combat one of the most pernicious results of 
our division of the curriculum along disciplinary lines; the 
students’ often-confirmed perception that written English is a 
language only English teachers care about. That makes it as 
difficult to teach written English as it is to teach Japanese in an 
environment where the student knows perfectly well he is highly 
unlikely ever to need to use the language naturally. Writing and 
Learning is full of humane, optimistic, practical advice about 
making assignments, responding to papers, and creating a sus­
taining, caring educational atmosphere; I recommend it highly.
The second approach, described by Richard A. Lanham in 
Style: An Anti-Textbook, is to take a frankly epicurean delight in 
language itself. Lanham agrues that composition instruction has 
suffered from a moralistic emphasis on “clarity,” in which we 
urge the students to “Be Clear” with the same futile fervor of a 
preacher urging them to “Be Good.” Lanham argues, persuasively 
I think, that few of our utterances are motivated solely by clarity. 
The prose that pleases us (as writers and readers) is much more 
active and affective than that, full of the desire to express and 
flatter ourselves, to adorn our shopworn thoughts for public pur­
poses. Lanham maintains that the subject matter of a writing 
class should be language itself, its ambiguities, its rhythms, its 
mysterious ability to accomplish (and sometimes to baffle) our 
complex intentions. Instead of inveighing against jargon, he 
urges us to study it, to translate one jargon into another, to learn 
what our language sounds like, to play with it, to pun with it, 
perform with it. I suspect that there is enough rhetorical tech­
nology in this book to make it more useful (or at least more 
accessible) to English teachers than to others, but Lanham too 
implies ways in which the whole faculty might get involved. 
What Lanham is urging is that we consider style “opaque” - 
that is, that we stop trying to read and write as if all that 
mattered to us was some fact or concept that the language con­
veys, not the language itself. We do react to the style (hence the 
frequency of such terms as ‘ elegance even in scientific dis­
course): let’s look at it more closely. If at least once a week in 
every course on campus, students were forced to slow down in 
their mad rush to accumulate knowledge and to examine the
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aual't which that knowledge was conveyed to them, the
tow T ^ language itself, we’d have gone a long way 
r s s owing them how to care about, how to take pleasure in, 
tneir own utterances.
ou an I read a lot; most of us write a lot, even if it’s 
os y memos and reports. Presumably one of the reasons we’re 
oing this is that we take pleasure in books, in words on a 
page not just from the philosophy or chemistry or pedagogy 
a we think we 11 find in or around or under those words, 
ertain y most of us suffer pain from the inept, ugly writing our 
u ®nts sometimes shamefacedly present for our inspection. Let 
us ta e courage from Pirsig: let us confess that, embarrassing as 
1 as old-fashioned and pre-Socratic and rhetorical as
you will, we know what we like.
00 much has happened to us as a language community to 
composition problem by a return to Basics. It’s a neat 
P oy or college professors and state legislators to blame elemen­
tary and secondary English teachers for the abysmal prose many 
young adults write today. If kids watch television instead of 
rea ing, call longdistance instead of writing to Granny to thank 
er for the sweater that didn’t fit, and play the guitar instead of 
siting a poem when they fall in love, no amount of sentence- 
iagramming is going to fill the gap. I don’t have a plan for the 
public schools; what I have tried to propose is an attempt to 
rescue the victims when they get to college. It must be a college- 
wide effort, however, an effort to share with our students the 
pleasure we take in language well used and to help them learn to 
care about the language we enjoy in common.
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Larry E. Cox
DICHOTOMIES, DELUSIONS AND DEPRESSION; DELIVERANCE
“What is this man, that we pay so much attention to him 
and this man’s son that we cry for him.’
Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance^ belongs in a 
select genre of literature, one in which personal adaptation and 
crisis is the essence of the work and the novel is its form. It is 
essential in this genre that the work be largely autobiographical, 
the material bubbling up from the unfinished nature of a person 
in an immense struggle for integration and pleasure. Other than 
Zen, the major work in this area is the often-compared, Moby 
Dick. It would be a provocative and difficult task to disucss 
what other works should in fact gain admission to this genre; 
for while nearly every novel plays on this motif as an enhance­
ment of another, few seem to adopt it so starkly as the major 
form.
The book’s immense appeal aside from its genius of form is 
its authenticity in depicting a struggle for integration that most 
of us recognize as the deep resonance of a well-struck chord. To 
those who have adopted higher education as the way to search 
for answers to the serious predicaments of personal and social 
integrity, the metaphor of resonance may seem yet not close 
enough. Rather it may seem as though Pirsig and the reader are 
playing the same chord simultaneously on somewhat different 
instruments. Does this intuitive harmony suggest that Pirsig’s 
character somehow represents a more general adaptive difficulty 
present in our current culture?
Rollo May, an existential psychiatrist, suggests that by 
attending to those persons who become disorganized in a particu­
lar culture we can predict the general personal and social 
problems that will, with time, predominate. The notion is that 
persons particularly sensitive to a given stress respond most 
adversely thus becoming harbingers of things to come for the 
general populace. If this is probable, then Pirsig’s dilemma and 
the vicarious struggle most readers report call for an honest 
assessment of Phaedrus/Pirsig.
iRobert M. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: An 
Inquiry into Values (New York: Bantam Books, 1976). All quotations 
from this book are designated by page number in the body of the paper.
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In this essay I will attempt a clinical assessment of the 
personality revealed in the book. Since a complete clinical 
analysis would be nearly as lengthy as the book, I will neces­
sarily be sharing only a sample of the salient material. I 
the process to you as a provocation to your own analysis. While 
I offer It with a modesty to which any experienced clinician with 
scores of analytic misjudgments and cul-de-sacs must confess, I 
likewise offer it with a confidence gained from intuiting accur­
ately on numerous occasions.
Z,en is not an attack on reason. It demonstrates the difficulty 
a person dedicated to “pure reason” has integrating the non- 
rational aspects of his person - particularly the emotional 
aspects. As Pirsig says of Socrates dialogue of the One, “• • • 
the seeker, trying to reach the One is drawn by two borses, one 
white and noble and temperate, and tbe other surly, stubborn, 
passionate and black. The one is forever aiding him in h'® 
upward journey to the portals of heaven, the other is forever 
confounding him” (p. 382). Dichotomies such as this, and the 
process of creating such dichotomies as a major personal style 
of understanding, create immense adaptive strain. In the healthy 
personality such dichotomies are viewed as polarities and syn­
thesis or integration achieves the necessary balance. For 
example, persons who conceptualize themselves and others in 
terms of strength and weakness often choose to identify with 
strength or weakness predominantly. When this habitual identifi­
cation with strength or weakness is threatened — when the strong 
person must recognize weakness or the weak person must do 
something calling for strength, crisis is imminent. For the person 
comfortable with elements of each within, synthesized and demon­
strated in everyday affairs, crisis is often averted and personal 
vitality evident.
Dichotomizing often leads to the creation of delusions. Dichot­
omies implore us to allegiance. We must decide — to be or not to 
be, to sell or not to sell, to kill or not to kill. While there are 
positive elements to such definition, nearly always the decision 
suffers from lack of awareness of contextual realities. As often 
as I have shared decisive moments with clients deliberating 
suicide, 1 am even more awestruck than ever, at the sharp focus 
on a single issue such a struggle represents. Life has come down 
to a single intellectual choice, to go on or to end it. To go on 
represents probable suffering and misery; to end it means relief 
and in some sense probable pleasure. Reality is relatively unim­
portant at that moment; the decision will more than likely be 
reached on the basis of delusion, some belief concocted and
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accepted at that moment.
Phaedrus moves from dichotomy to (p. 339-340) delusion in 
such a way.
He had become so caught up in his world of Quality meta­
physics he couldn’t see outside it anymore and since no one 
else understood this world, he was already done for.
I think he must have felt at the time that what he was saying 
was true and it didn’t matter if his manner of presentation 
was outrageous or not . . .
This was it. He really believed ... It was a totally fanatic 
thing. He lived in a solitary universe of discourse in those 
days.
Few persons reach this level of delusion. Instead some flock to 
others who share their belief system. While this is nearly the 
same thing if the belief system is quite homogenous, there is a 
different reality about consensus. While being angry towards 
those outside of the belief system you can nevertheless share 
pleasure with those inside.
Since the world is rarely as simple as our delusions of belief 
systems would indicate, most delusional people experience 
eventual depression when the walls separating the dichotomies 
begin to leak. It’s as if some self-correcting force exists inde­
pendently and chisels away at weak spots in the wall. Attention 
then must be directed almost exclusively at the wall, its repair 
and maintenance. Since there is no growth in that, productive 
activity ceases and despair takes over. This is evident in 
Phaedrus’ definition of the mythos (p. 345).
The mythos grows this way. By analogies to what is known 
before. The mythos is a building of analogues upon ana­
logues upon analogues. These fill the boxcars of the train of 
consciousness. [Notice the parallel to the development of a 
delusional system.] The mythos is the whole train of col­
lective unconscious of all communicating mankind. Every 
last bit of it. [What a force to have on the other side of the 
wall.] The Quality is the track that directs the train. What 
is outside the train, to either side - that is the terra 
incognita of the insane. He knew that to understand Quality 
he would have to leave the mythos. That’s why he felt that 
slippage. He knew something was about to happen, (p. 344).
Phaedrus had earlier declared that “to go outside the mythos is 
to become insane.” That definition of reality and the accompany­
ing fear led Phaedrus into despair, then to frenzied activity of
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him anfi f attacks on all those forces which threatened
''■m, and finally to total depression.
Despair
grows now (p. 325).
\t> r ^jrived at the University of Chicaffo already
a wor of thought so different from the one you or I 
understand (p. 331).
Hostility
Hostility is really his element . . . down from the 
mountains to prey upon the poor innocent citizens of this 
intellectual community (p. 386). [All of whom to Phaedrus 
were absorbed in the mythos.]
lines are defined quickly. And the analogy to a classic 
a e or survival among lower animals is striking.
PI, doorway there are some footsteps, and then
ae rus suddenly knows — and his legs turn rubbery and 
IS an s start to shake. Smiling benignly in the doorway 
stands none other than the Chairman.
• Courtly, grand, with imperial magnanimity (p. 379).
e perceives the other students as having seats in the arena, 
e student whom the chairman had previously ridiculed is seen 
seat to the beating up of Phaedrus. The attack 
Will begin, he thinks, with an attempt to “destroy his status 
ialectically and when he finished off he will be asked to 
shape up or act out.” As the real battle wages Phaedrus, dis­
guised in a beard, begins to gain courage. He is well into the 
dialogue of the class before the Chairman recognizes him — 
gleam in his eye shows he recognizes who his bearded assailant 
IS. The struggle continues. The Chairman commits a blunder in 
interpretation and Phaedrus seizes the opportunity and “raises 
his hand, palm flat out, elbow on the table. Where before his hand 
was shaking it is now deadly calm” (p. 383), Phaedrus delivers 
his blow, his whole survival at stake, lie bides his time then 
strikes again. “The Chairman falters and hesitates, acts afraid 
of his class and does not really engage them” (p. 384). The 
student on the sideline now enters the fracus, seething in pent 
up anger. Phaedrus delivers another brutal attack and the fight 
ends. Hut victory is sweet for a very short time. There is a lack 
of authenticity in his overstated hostility and Phaedrus knows it. 
Ihe next day we find him “making one last attempt somehow to 
be nice at the next session of the class but the Chairman isn’t 
having any.” Unlike the battle of the lower animals where 
dominance is clearly established the victory here brings great 
despair.
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Meanwhile at the Navy Pier the students are fascinated with 
Phaedrus. They are eager to hear this “strange bearded figure 
from the mountains.” If simple recognition had been his goal this 
clearly would have held him in good stead but the issue he waged 
was much different. To have given into such wooing of popularity 
would have been to give in somehow to the mythos.
Phaedrus “is no shepherd either and the strain of behaving 
like one is killing him ... his days as a shepherd are coming to 
an end too. And he wonders more and more what is going to 
happen next.” The last spiral toward the bottom picks up speed. 
Note the passivity and spectator quality that characterizes him 
in the previous quotation. The small flicker of remaining hostility 
is now directed towards the classroom. “It is not his nature to 
talk and talk and talk for hours on end and it exhausts him to do 
this, and now having nothing left to turn upon, he turns upon this 
fear.” He comes to the classroom and sits in silence. Class after 
class.
Psychotic Depression
Thus is ushered in deep depression with its characteristic 
symptoms. Sleep time has dwindled to nothing. The city closes 
in on him. He wandres aimlessly for three days and finally ends 
up back in the apartment staring at the wall. He is no longer 
responsive to others. His thoughts are slowing down. His percep­
tion of his own body undergoes bizarre changes. Cigarettes burn 
themselves out between his fingers with no indication that he 
feels them. He sits in his own urine. Yet even in such a state 
the climax comes with his realization that “his whole conscious­
ness, the mythos, has been a dream and no one’s dream but his 
own, a dream he must now sustain at his own efforts. Then even 
‘he’ disappears and only the dream of himself remains with him­
self in it.” (p. 391).
I don’t believe I have ever read a more adequate description 
of depression and particularly of the demise of the fragmented 
ego that supports this sort of consciousness. It is an accurate 
picture, one that occurs again and again but a view which usually 
occurs in the perspective of the clinician or aware family-member 
who sees the symbolism behind the obvious behaviors. Here we 
have a striking description of the progressive changes in con­
sciousness that in some eerie sense reverse the order of the way 
consciousness develops in the infant, culminating in a unique 
moment of unbirth described in what I consider one of the two or
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three most poignant passages in the book.
never betravpr?**K^?^’ fought so hard for, has
now makes itse’lf c” eaJ to dT'^ has never once understood,
Clear to him and his soul is at rest.” (p. 391).
Deliverance:
nicks nr!'*' of its unique form the story
back at the ^P' rather
iournev P’ ' We 11 call the man on the motorcycle
inteerItio^"wh^ journey is a search for an illusive self- 
deliisin I oi^phasis on dichotomy is tempered and his
nnlarJt f^^^'t'es minimal (perhaps the beginning sense of 
emerging) integration appears only as a very distant 
possibility. Pirsig describes himself in fact as
saved liis^ ® recanted, and thereby in everyone’s eyes
down insid 'll! ' 'jeryone s eyes but one who knows deep 
down inside that all he has saved is his skin.
I survive mainly by pleasing others. You do that to get 
and’ .1.° ^‘Rdre out what they want you to say
nnsaiKr" much skill and originality as
fp. 3%)! " convinced, you get out
But I believe his behavior was chosen for other than the pure 
deception of others. He is trying on the other polarities. He 
continues;
If 1 hadn’t turned on him I’d still be there, but he was true 
to what he believed right to the end. That’s the difference 
between us, and Chris knows it. And that’s the reason why 
sometimes [ feel he’s the reality and I’m the ghost.
The prospects of reintegration are very awesome to Pirsig. 
Recognition of Phaedrus brings the renewed threat of insanity, 
but the desire for integration, perhaps the need for integration, 
makes it impossible to leave Phaedrus alone. What an awesome 
position. Ibw frightening and all-encompassing is the dilemma. 
E.arly in the journey (p. 62) Pirsig has a dream which clearly 
indicates his level of fear of Phaedrus and paints a picture of 
Pirsig’s defense against it.
In the fog there appears an intimation of a figure ... I am 
about to say something, to call to it, to recognize it, but 
then do not, knowing that to recognize it by any gesture or
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action is to give it a reality which it must not have. But it 
is a figure I recognize even though I do not let on. It is 
Phaedrus.
Evil spirit. Insane. From a world without life or death.
The figure fades and 1 hold a panic down . . . tight . . . 
not rushing it . . . just letting it sink in . . . not believing 
it, not disbelieving it . . . but the hair crawls slowly on the 
back of my skull ... he is calling Chris . . .
While this behavior indicates unreasonable fear it is also a part 
of the healing process. He must let Phaedrus through but he must 
do it in manageable bits. Note in particular the movement away 
from delusion — “not believing it, not disbelieving it,” thus 
trying to experience the phenomenon for what it is.
Pirsig has also begun to apply the principles of Zen he has 
garnered from his time in the Orient. He has learned that a here 
and now time orientation is critical to successful adaptation. 
This is a concept emphasized in most current psychotherapy. 
Persons predominantly oriented toward the past or future cannot 
experience and understand the ^present. Pirsig develops this 
insight in his comparison between ego-climbing and selfless 
climbing (p. 206). While
to the untrained eye they may appear identical . . . what a 
difference. The ego-climber is like an instrument that’s out 
of adjustment. He puts his foot down an instant too soon or 
too late. He’s likely to miss a beautiful passage of sunlight 
through the trees . . . He looks up the trail trying to see 
what’s ahead even when he knows what’s ahead because he 
just looked a second before . . . He’s here but he’s not 
here. He rejects the here, is unhappy with it, wants to be 
farther up the trail but when he gets there will be just as 
unhappy because then it will be “here.” What he’s looking 
for what he wants, is all around him; but he doesn’t want 
that because it is all around him. Every step’s an effort, 
both physically and spiritually, because he imagines his 
goal to he external and distant.
As the parallel journeys of Pirsig and Phaedrus roll on, Pirsig 
is aware of Phaedrus’ obsessiveness and resolves to be different
(p. 217).
He (Phaedrus) wasn’t interested in any kind of fusion of 
differences between these two worlds. He was after some­
thing else — his ghost. 1 (Pirsig) differ from him in that I’ve 
no intention of going on to that end. He just passed through 
this territory and opened it up. 1 intend to stay and cultivate 
it and see if 1 can get something to grow.
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Productivity — growth, Pirsig is no longer focused on th®
I’o the careful reader his growing strength is evident but somehow 
masked by the parallel account of Phaedrus who, at this juncture, 
is in the stage of despair. He is more ready now to allow th® 
image of Phaedrus to become distinct. The difficulty of t e 
integration is clear. Phaedrus is the one of Quality and Pirstg 
awakes from another frightening dream to see that
He’s waking up. A mind divided against itself . . . me . • • 
I’m the loathsome one ... I always knew he would come 
back . . . It’s a matter of preparing for it . . . (p. 325).
Phaedrus is so much with him now, almost indistinguishable an 
the expectation of the accompanying insanity is nearly too much. 
But again this is a different journey. Pirsig, taking in 
beauty around him, capturing the newness of his existence, seems 
to shout a growing awareness in the form of a question. 
can I love all this so much and be insane? 1 don’t believe it- 
Both Phaedrus and Pirsig then agree, are unified in the recogni­
tion that “the mythos is insane.’’ “The mythos that says the 
forms of this world are real but the Quality of this world is 
unreal, that is insane.”
That. That now. That ties it all together. It feels relieving 
when that happens (p. 346).
But Pirsig is not easily convinced. Reality is fuzzy. He can t 
quite accept this level of integration. It is somehow still role­
like and ill-fitting. But the scene is now set for the final integra­
tion, this one centering on the most cherished concern of both 
Phaedrus and Pirsig — Chris. (How I would love to stop and deal 
with the development of this relationship, but I will suggest only 
the drama of the relationship in the finale and urge you to go back 
and mine the beauty that is there.) Both Phaedrus and Pirsig 
have frequently called out to him in caring unutterable groans.
It is near the end of the trip. Chris has become nearly 
unmanageable. Pirsig is angry, afraid and then struck with a deep 
awareness (p. 345).
I can imitate the father he’s supposed to have, but sub­
consciously, at the Quality level, he sees through it and 
knows his real father isn’t here. In all this Chautauqua talk 
there’s been more than a touch of hypocrisy. Advice is given 
again and again to eliminate subject-object duality, when 
the biggest duality of all, the duality between me and him, 
remains unfaced. A mind divided against itself.
But with the recognition of the division, Pirsig still sees no way
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to undo the division. The intellectual bed is made. Reason has 
done its part. It is left for emotion to pull down the covers and 
welcome the struggling parts to rest together. As Pirsig shares 
his most intimate fears with Chris, the boy stands imploding 
against the most terrifying possibility of loss in the universe, 
one he knows so well in a not too distant memory. He shrieks 
with a shriek so congruent with the pain he feels that it pene­
trates to the very soul of his fathers (p. 401).
I don’t know what to do now. I have no idea what to do.
It’s all over. I want to run for the cliff, but fight that. I have 
to get him on the bus and then the cliff will he all right.
Everything is all right now, Chris. That’s not my 
voice. / haven't forgotten you . . . How could I forget 
you . . . We'll be together now . . .
The integration is complete. The voice validates the integra­
tion Pirsig has been searching out. Growth is again possible. 
The storm has passed. Chris asks a critical question “Were you 
really insane” and the answer comes out like the clean smell 
after the rain. “No” . . . Chris’s eyes sparkle. “1 knew it” he 
says.
I would like to believe at this point that Pirsig is alive and 
well and living in the Azores, or anywhere. All my attempts to 
discover his whereabouts have turned up nothing. His publishers 
have no address and there are no disciples in the publishing 
house who seem to care. Apparently the rumor that he committed 
suicide is untrue. Perhaps it was created by some perverse spirit 
who wanted to dash our belief in integration against the dividing 
wall of dualism. I feel at this moment somehow repentant that I 
could have believed such a rumor. While my clinical realism, 
grown out of the soil of prevalence, incidence and prognosis data 
reminds me of how hard it is for such integration to occur in such 
a personality, there is some deep internal sense that Quality will 
tip the seemingly uneven scales in the direction of integrity.
In Pirsig’s latest writing in Esquire in 1977, Pirsig is still 
together. He has exchanged motorcycle for sailboat but he’s still 
dealing with the topic of depression. The integration theme is 
stronger here — he’s integrating everything in sight (p. 68).
This self that one discovers (when sailing for long periods 
of time) is in many ways a person one would not like one’s 
friends to know about; a person one may have been avoiding 
for years, full of vanity, cowardice, boredom, self-pity, 
laziness, blamingness, weak when he should be strong.
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aggressive when he should be gentle, a person w o wi 
anything not to know these things about himself ^ ^ 
same fellow who has been having problems with cruising 
depression all this time. I think it’s in the day-after- ay, 
week-after-week confrontation of this person that the mos 
valuable learning of virtue takes place.
But if one will allow time enough ... a certain 
standing of one’s self will break through . • • f i
you are bored or exicted, depressed or elated, successtu or 
unsuccessful, even whether you are alive or dead, all t is 
is of absolutely no consequence whatsoever.
This ending while perhaps more cynical and more Sartre-like 
very similar to his major advice, his psychotherapeutic pre 
•iption in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.
So the thing to do when working on a motorcycle, as in any 
other task, is to cultivate the peace of mind which does not 
separate one’s self from one’s surroundings (including is 
other selves). When that is done successfully then every­
thing else follows naturally” (p. 290).
Paul L. Redditt
THE LOTUS AND THE WRENCH *
AN ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF THE INFLUENCE OF 
ZEN BUDOHISM ON ROBERT M. PIRSIG
The title of Pirsig’s book Zen and the Art of Motorcycle 
Maintenance would seem to invite if not demand a comparison of 
Pirsig’s thought with Zen Buddhist thinking. Accordingly, the 
thesis of this study is that Pirsig’s thought can be partially 
explained and evaluated from the perspective of Zen fduddhism. 
Before one even begins that explication, however, a disclaimer 
immediately following the title page of the book must be 
addressed. Pirsig writes;
What follows is based on actual occurrences. Although much 
has been changed for rhetorical purposes, it must be 
regarded in its essence as fact. However, it should in no 
way be associated with that great body of factual informa­
tion relating to orthodox Zen Buddhist practice. It’s not 
very factual on motorcycles, either,1
Pirsig explicitly denies that what follows in his book is factual 
about Zen or motorcycles, despite the title of the work. We have 
then a book which purports to be fact but not factual about its 
title. But if the book is not “factual” about Zen or motorcycles 
as scholars or technicians understand “factual,” it does never- 
the less deal with the “fact” of persons, motorcycles, and Zen 
in that existential crucible of experience, the college of hard 
knocks, in which Pirsig has tried, tested and “proved” his 
“facts.” Pirsig thus assumes the right to speak to us of Zen and 
motorcycles, of romance and technology; he assumes the right to 
speak to us of the art (not the technology) of motorcycle mainte­
nance. In short, Pirsig denies the very dichotomies which he 
thinks tear the fabric of our society. He speaks instead from a 
vision which unifies all dichotomies. This vision, tested both in
*The title of this paper is derived from the recurring image of a lotus 
(a Buddhist symbol) with an open end wrench protruding from it. This 
symbol appears on the cover and at the beginning of each chapter in the 
Bantam edition of Zen and the Art oj Motorcycle Maintenance.
IRobert M. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance; An 
Inquiry into Values (New York: A Bantam Book, 1976). All quotes from 
Pirsig are from this edition and are hereafter cited in the text of the 
paper by page number.
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the Church of Reason (his term for the university setting), in the 
Cuckoo’s Nest (Pirsig was once admitted to a mental hospital), 
and on the back of a motorcycle, is more Eastern than Western, 
more Zen than Christian in its emphasis on monism. Perhaps, 
then, it will further our understanding of Pirsig if we test Pirsig’s 
Zen “facts” against that factual body of Zen Buddhist thought 
and practice.
In the pursuit of Pirsig’s Zen (if there is such a thing as an 
idiosyncratic Zen), I propose the following steps; first we shall 
note his initial acquaintance with Eastern ideas and review how 
Pirsig describes Phaedrus’ (Pirsig’s name for himself before his 
mental collapse) salori or enlightened breakthrough to his vision. 
Our next three steps will follow him along the way of Zen, artic­
ulating Pirsig’s insight with regard to the insufficiency of 
reason, the unity of knowledge, and the importance of the present. 
Our fifth step, unfortunately, will land us in a pitfall (as judged 
from a Zen perspective) that Pirsig did not avoid. Finally we will 
conclude by taking stock of ourselves as we assess the implica­
tions of Pirsig’s work.
/. Initial encounters with Eastern thought
For a book employing the name Zen in its title, Pirsig’s essay 
makes surprisingly few direct references to Zen Buddhism or to 
Eastern thought more generally. Among those references, how­
ever, are several that indicate Pirsig’s early contacts with 
Oriental philosophy. During Pirsig’s early adulthood (i.e. after 
being expelled from the University), he served in Korea with the 
United States Army. His contact with things oriental — sliding 
doors, slate roofs, and open marketplaces — filled him with 
emotion. In addition he met and conversed with Korean laborers. 
But most importantly he read F. S. C. Northrup, The Meeting of 
East and West, which caused Pirsig to see the dichotomized 
existence of Western man. Northrup proposed that, instead of 
thinking in dichotomies. Westerns would do well to learn to think 
in continua. I'hat is, the either/or emphasis of Western dialeetieal 
thinking should be replaced with the both/and emphasis of 
Eastern thinking. Pirsig’s second contact with the East included 
living and studying in India just long enough to be completely 
repulsed by the Indian notion that the phenomena of this world 
are actually only temporary, hence illusory, appearances of the 
underlying one. Thus a possible source for learning about unified 
vision of knowledge was rejected by young Phaedrus because of 
his conviction of the reality of war and atrocity.
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Precisely how and when Pirsig narrowed his Eastern focus 
and began to study Zen and to what extent he pursued that study 
he does not tell us. When, however, he comes to describe 
Phaedrus’ breakthrough, his discovery of Quality, Pirsig’s 
language and even the structure of his essay take on overtones of 
the Zen experience of enlightenment called satori. Two passages 
in particular attract my attention. Chris and Pirsig are climbing a 
mountain overlooking Bozeman, Montana where Phaedrus had 
taught rhetoric at Montana State College. Pirsig is interweaving 
Phaedrus’ discovery of Quality, the concept which unifies all 
dichotomies in Pirsig’s thought, with his narrative of his return 
to Bozeman. Phaedrus had come so far as to discern three prin­
ciples behind the world: mind, matter, and Quality (p, 232). 
Phaedrus examines this “Trinity” closer:
I don’t know how much thought passed before he arrived at 
this, but eventually he saw that Quality couldn’t be inde­
pendently related with either the subject or the object but 
could be found only in the relationship of the two with each 
other. It is the point at which subject and object meet.
That sounded warm.
Quality is not a thing. It is an event.
Warmer.
It is the event at which the subject becomes aware of the 
object.
And because without objects there can be no subject — 
because the objects create the subject’s awareness of him­
self — Quality is the event at which awareness of both 
subjects and objects is made possible.
Hot,
Now he knew it was coming.
Tliis means Quality is not just the result of a collision 
between subject and object. The very existence of subject 
and object themselves is deduced from the Quality event.
The Quality event is the cause of the subjects and objects 
which are then mistakenly presumed to be the cause of the 
Quality (pp. 233-4).
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Here is the heart of Phaedrus’ discovery I et j n r.
. f J- ir ni / dwell first onthe event o the discovery itself. Phaedrus had pursued Quality
as a thing. He came to realize that it is an event; it is the reali
zation of the contindua Northrup wrote about PtmoJ > i • i •
.1 1 .• 1 L j •. "aearus thinking,the analytical process, had run its course and intuitive insight
had emerged. Now Phaedrus reversed the direction • i -
1 j t Ai 1 his thinking;he reasoned from, not to. Quality. As 1 understand Pirsig Qualit
is not the object of intellectual pursuit; it is the event or the
vista from which all intellectual pursuit begins It ,i,, . , , 11 • 1 1 . 11 IS not the con­
clusion of the syllogism but the major premise. Because there is
Quality there are subject and object, mind and matter. Phaedrus 
had searched for Quality until it found him, and he “saw” for the 
first time. What he saw was that there is no seer without a seen; 
there is no seen without a seer; there is only the process of see­
ing, only the continuum and not the dichotomy.
Pirsig reinforces his presentation of this breakthrough by 
means of the structure of the story he writes. Just at the point 
Pirsig tells of Phaedrus’ insight, his solving of the dilemma, 
Chris climbs above the treeline of the mountain they are climbing 
and shouts: “Blue sky!” They race to the summit and there — 
from their new perspective — the mountain, the forest, and the 
valley lie below them, and they see clearly the whole picture, 
the whole lay of the land, for the first time.
Zen, however, does not put any stock in living on mountain 
tops. As D. T. Suzuki once put it: “F'irst you’ve got to get on 
the camel; then you’ve got to get off the camel.” Pirsig recog­
nizes this: “...there are no motorcycles on the tops of mountains, 
and in my opinion very little Zen. Zen is the “spirit of the 
valley, not the mountain. The only Zen you find on the top of 
mountains is the Zen you bring up there” (p. 240). So Chris and 
Pirsig descend the mountain, but the Chautauqua continues as 
Pirsig recounts in more detail Phaedrus’ realization of his 
insight.
Then, on impulse, Phaedrus went over to his bookshelf and 
picked out a small, blue, cardboardbound book. He’d hand- 
copied this book and bound it himself years before when he 
couldn’t find a copy for sale anywhere. It was the 2400- 
year-old Tao Te Ching of Lao Tzu. He began to read through 
the lines he had read many times before, but this time he 
studied it to see if a certain substitution would work. He 
began to read and interpret it at the same time.
He read (from the opening chapter of the Tao Te Ching)*:
The quality that can be defined is not the Absolute
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Quality.
That was what he had said.
The names that can be given it are not absolute names.
It is the origin of heaven and earth . . .
Phaedrus read on through line after line, verse after verse 
of this, watched them match, fit, slip into place. Exactly.
This was what he meant. This was what he*d been saying 
all along, only poorly, mechanistically. There was nothing 
vague or inexact about this book, it was as precise and 
definite as it could be. It was what he had been saying only 
in a different language with different roots and origins. He 
was from another valley seeing what was in this valley, not 
now as a story told by strangers but as a part of the valley 
he was from. He was seeing it all (pp. 246-8).
* (Citation by the author of this essay.)
To be sure Pirsig speaks in this passage not of a Zen text, 
but of the Tao Te Ching, the seminal text of philosophical 
Taoism. I'here is, though, a sense in which Zen Buddhism is 
Indian Buddhist meditation filtered through Chinese Taoist 
thought. If Pirsig could substitute the word “Quality” for the 
word “'I'ao” in the text, a Zen Buddhist would be pleased to 
substitute the term “Buddha Nature,” the underlying Reality 
which resolves all dichtomies in Zen monism. Pirsig’s text was 
Taoist, but his thought had been appropriated from the Tao Te 
Ching Buddhists centuries before. Phaedrus’ experience, then, 
is cast by Pirsig as a Zen enlightenment, the granting of a new 
insight that (so Zen Buddhists say) allows one to see the world 
and everything in it for the first time. The contents of this Zen 
vision are not transferable by words, only by experience: Never­
theless Zen Buddhists from time to time attempt to give us 
glimpses of that new vision. At least three very typical com­
ponents of that vision appear in Pirsig. To those components let 
us now turn our attention.
II. The insufficiency of reason
The positing of Quality as the a priori category has as its 
first consequence (or perhaps its first cause) the insufficiency of 
reason. In his dialogue with DeWeese, Phaedrus complains that 
analytical reason, dialectic reason, is often held to be the whole 
truth, but in fact does not prepare us to deal with the whole of 
our experience (p. 165). Dualistic, rational thinking will always 
get stuck (p. 277); indeed analysis can never deliver the whole
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(p. 244). Thus when Phaedrus’ colleagues asked him for an 
analysis of Quality, they asked for the impossible. Not only, 
however, is an analysis of Quality impossible, but the whole 
scientific or reasoning process founders upon itself. Phaedrus 
coined this discovery as a new kind of Parkinson’s law: “The 
number of rational hypotheses that can explain any given phe­
nomenon is infinite’’ (p. 107). This is one of the reasons, I 
suppose, that the scientist puts his hypotheses in a form to be 
falsified since they can never be verified. Pirsig claimed that 
his new law is nihilistic, a catastrophic logical disproof of the 
general validity of all scientific method (p. 108). It is likely 
nothing of the sort since science deals in probabilities not 
absolutes and in falsifiability not verifiability. Phaedrus’ law 
does, however, force us to note the limits of reason.
Zen Buddhism, too, calls upon its adherents to note the limits 
of reason. The famous koans, questions or riddles put by the 
master to his disciples, have as their purpose to draw the intel­
lect to its logical, analytical limits in order that more basic 
means of appropriating truth can emerge. Indeed, Zen is con­
vinced that Buddha Nature is not a thing or a concept; it cannot 
be appropriated logically; neither can it be described orally and 
passed down from master to disciple. Pirsig himself gives us one 
of his most explicit lessons in Zen when he speaks of the 
dichotomies of yes and no, this or that, one or zero. He reminds 
us that English does not have a word for a third possibility that 
is neither yes nor no. lie employs the Japanese word Mu, as do 
Zen Buddhists. Mu does not mean maybe or perhaps or even 
nothing, but no thing. It is a designation for that which is no 
thing, which fits no category (neither yes nor no). Mu thus also 
represents Buddha Nature or Quality, which simultaneously is no 
specific thing but the ground of possibility for all things.
III. The unity of knowledge
If in Pirsig’s system reason is insufficient because of its 
dichotomizing and reductionist (yet proliferating) characteristics, 
genuine knowledge must by implication be united. Pirsig makes 
the point over and over ad infinitum, ad nauseam. He comments: 
“The Quality he was teaching was not just a part of reality, it 
was the whole thing’’ (p. 243). And again: “Any philosophical 
explanation of Quality is going to be both false and true precisely 
because it is a philosophical explanation. The process of philo­
sophical explanation is an analytical process, a process of 
breaking something down into subjects and predicates. What I 
mean (and everybody else means) by the word quality cannot be
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broken down into subjects and predicates. This is not because 
Quality is so mysterious but because Quality is so simple, 
immediate and direct” (p. 244); and finally “He was no longer 
talking about a metaphysical trinity (subject, object. Quality) but 
an absolute monism. Quality was the source and substance of 
everything” (p. 245).
Zen Buddhism makes this same point. Everything that is is 
Buddha Nature. One Zen anecdote will make the point. A dis­
ciple asked the master: “What is Buddha Nature?” “That,” 
responded the master, gesturing to a pile of cow dung.
Pirsig speaks directly to the religious import of Phaedrus’ 
discovery:
The first step down from Phaedrus’ statement that “Quality 
is the Buddha” is a statement that such an assertion, if 
true, provides a rational basis for a unification of three 
areas of human experience which are now disunified. These 
three areas are Religion, Art and Science. If it can be shown 
that Quality is the control term of all three, and that this 
Quality is not of many kinds but of one kind only, then it 
follows that the three disunified areas have a basis for 
introconversion (p. 251).
And of course, Pirsig thinks he demonstrates the connection of 
all three to (Quality. He turns to the history of religions to explain 
the connection between religion and Quality. He notes that myth 
precedes analytical descriptions; thus he derives the typical 
dichotomy: word versus myth. “The term logos, the root word of 
“logic,” refers to the sum total of the early historic and pre­
historic myths which preceded the logos” (p. 343). Quality, 
however, lies outside the mythos, but so does insanity: “to go 
outside the mythos is to become insane...” (p. 344). Pirsig will 
not, however, conclude that to find Quality is to go insane, so 
where does Quality lie if it is outside the myth but also not 
within the realm of insanity? Quality lies behind the myth and is 
its generator.
That’s it. That’s what Phaedrus meant when he said, 
“Quality is the continuing stimulus which causes us to 
create the world in which we live. All of it. Every last bit 
of it.” Religion isn’t invented by man. Men are invented by 
religion. Men invent responses to Quality, and among these 
responses is an understanding of what they themselves 
are (p. 345).
Pirsig argues that since Quality cannot be explained man employs 
analogies. Quality is the guide that directs the build-up of anal-
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ogies, the track upon which the train of mythos runs. And where 
lies insanity? “What is outside the train, to either side — that is 
the terra incognita of the insane” (p. 345).
For our purposes we may leave aside Pirsig’s connecting of 
Quality to Art and Science and content ourselves with the obser­
vation that he was arguing for the unity of knowledge based upon 
the event of perceiving Quality.
Pirsig suggests that one result of the Quality event is 
gumption produced by the vision of Quality. Gumption is a reser­
voir of stamina and enthusiasm for one’s actions. Pirsig also 
suggests that there are blocks or traps interfering with the clear 
perception of Quality and thus reducing gumption, though not 
Quality itself. He does something very non-monistic and non-Zen 
when he divides (analyses) gumption blocks into two categories 
— externally caused set backs and internally caused hang ups. 
Zen holds that what happens to us (externals) and what we do 
(internals) are part of one whole. Nevertheless I wish to focus 
for a moment on what Pirsig calls hang-ups, because they are 
what Pirsig writes about at great length. One type of internal 
gumption trap is value traps like rigidity in a changing situation, 
ego protection in the train of error, anxiety about failure born of 
low self-esteem, boredom when the ego isn’t being stroked, and 
impatience when tasks take longer than anticipated. To a Zen 
Buddhist these all arise from a common source, a focus on self 
(individuals or the many) instead of Self or Buddha Nature (the 
One). Pirsig has again used a Zen concept but substituted his 
own terms.
IV. The importance of the present
The idea of the unity of knowledge is not unique to Zen and 
Pirsig; all monistic systems speak of a unity of knowledge. Zen, 
however, offers to Pirsig an advantage that Indian monism lacks.
In India monism this world is illusory and ultimately meaningless; 
only Brahman (God) is Real. Pirsig repudiated that type of 
monism while studying in India (p. 136). Moreover, if the world is 
unreal for a Hindu so is the succession of events in the world; 
consequently time is meaningless. By contrast with Hinduism, 
Zen Buddhism appreciates this world. If one is to find Buddha 
Nature, one finds it in places, events, people, yes, even in cow 
dung; one does not uncover Buddha Nature lurking behind its 
covering, the phenomenal world. Continuing, if the individual 
phenomena of the world are potential sources for discovering 
Buddha Nature, so each moment becomes pregnant with its
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possibility of revealing the unifying insight. Consequently, the 
present is the moment of importance; the present is all we have. 
Note how Pirsig restates this Zen conviction: “The past cannot 
remember the past. The future can’t generate the future. The 
cutting edge of this instant right here and now is always nothing 
less than the totality of everything there is’’ (p. 277).
V. An incomplete conversion
We have now finished our review of three of the Zennish 
elements of Pirsig’s vision: the insufficiency of reason, the 
unity of knowledge, the importance of the present. It has been 
argued above that this vision grows out of a Zennish enlighten­
ment, though I do not wish to argue that Pirsig actually achieved 
satori in a way that would be acceptable to a Zen master. Indeed 
the time has come now to distinguish Pirsig from Zen or to point 
to certain (Western?) pitfalls he did not avoid.
Specifically I will point to only three aspects of Pirsig’s 
vision that I think a Zen master would decry; these aspects are 
intended as illustrative and not exhaustive. In the first place, 
Pirsig never seems to surrender his technological notion that the 
world — Nature — is here to be manipulated. He says, for 
example, that steel is shapeless (p. 94), and implies that iron 
ore is valueless until it takes form in the hands of the craftsman, 
until it is rescued from its natural shapelessness and transferred 
from potential to actual object by the external workings of mind 
and hand. Or again when Pirsig and Chris climb the mountain 
outside Bozeman, the mountain remains a thing to be conquered 
and the power of its avalanches seems alien and fearful. Suzuki 
suggests that the Zen attitude of the mountain climber is not that 
of conqueror; rather the mountain climber befriends the mountain. 
Zen sees mankind as part of Nature, albeit its most developed 
aspect, but awe-smitten by its grandeur and conscious of his 
dependence upon it. The closest Pirsig comes to a Zen apprecia­
tion of nature is his description (p. 4) of the freedom inspired by 
motorcycle riding. Probably Pirsig’s failure (from a Zen perspec­
tive) in this regard is caused by his failure at a second point. He 
knows, of course, that a lack of ego is demanded by Zen and he 
builds it into his system. “An egoless acceptance of stuckness 
is a key to an understanding of all Quality, in mechanical work 
as in other endeavors’’ (p. 279). Yet neither Phaedrus nor Pirsig 
could accept stuckness; rather they/he were/was stuck with the 
determination to solve, to conquer. Pirsig fairly bursts with pride 
as he tells us no Westerner before Phaedrus uncovered what 
Phaedrus learned (p. 231); a more Zen approach would be to
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confess that all of the sages of all the time have known it. 
Finally, Pirsig could never break himself of his Western habit of 
analyzing. In fact he writes a book over four hundred pages in 
length analyzing the human predicament and attempting to prove 
that Phaedrus was right; two pastimes (analyzing and proving) 
Phaedrus’ discovered showed to be self-defeating.
Implications of Pirsig’s study for modern Americans
We have followed, if not dogged, Pirsig’s footsteps long 
enough. We have interpreted, analyzed and evaluated his system 
from an approximate Zen perspective. But now it is time to draw 
meaning for ourselves from his efforts and our studies. I would 
make three tentative suggestions here. First it seems to me 
fundamental that intellectuals avoid the **paralysis of analysis*^ 
to which Pirsig points his finger. Indeed, Pirsig is but one voice 
among many crying that message. Pirsig puts the matter tersely:
The true system, the real system, is our present construc­
tion of systematic thought itself, rationality itself, and if a 
factoiy is tom down but the rationality which produced it is 
left standing, then that rationality will simply produce 
another factory. If a revolution destroys a systematic 
government, but the systematic patterns of thought that 
government are left intact, then those patterns will repeat 
themselves in the succeeding government (p. 94).
Second, Pirsig’s vision of Quality as a solution to Western 
dichotomies has not found wide acceptance in the papers pre­
sented here except in a piecemeal fashion. Nevertheless, he does 
at least intimate that there is a holistic solution and drives us to 
seek it. I would wish that our civilization had passed the time 
when it attacked problems in the most direct method possible 
without regard for side effects; unfortunately we continue to take 
a DDT approach to most pesky problems. One aspect of Pirsig’s 
solution which bears mention is his handling of the question of 
valuing. Operating within a monistic system, he is faced with the 
problem of judging some things as better and others as worse. In 
his review essay Norman Chaney raises just this question: “If, 
as Pirsig suggests. Quality is the underlying principle which 
alone is the ground of all things, then how can he maintain that 
some things are better in Quality than others?’’ To be sure Pirsig 
does leave himself open to this attack by arguing (as Phaedrus) 
that some student papers participate more in Quality than others, 
or that the paintings of the greats exhibit more Quality (or 
quality) than do the paintings of imitators and incompetents. He 
does, however, offer one example that gives us a glimpse of how
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he solves this monistic dilemma. He says;
In nondualistic maintenance gumption isn’t a fixed commod- 
It’® variable, a reservoir of good spirits that can be 
added to or subtracted from. Since gumption is a result of 
the perception of Quality, a gumption trap, consequently, 
can be defined as anything that causes one to lose sight of 
Quality, and thus lose one’s enthusiasm for what one is 
doing (pp. 298-9).
Holding gumption as Pirsig’s paradigm, we can now suggest that 
he means papers and paintings differ in their perception and 
hence illumination of Quality which is everywhere present. The 
question, then, is not whether Quality itself is better or worse in 
papers and paintings, but whether the artist has perceived Quality 
and thus can reveal it to others, who must themselves have eyes 
to see. In any case it is important that Pirsig is willing to say 
that judgments can be made even by non-specialists on a variety 
of topics and what is more can be made on the basis of some 
firm — however indefinable — footing.
Most important it seems to me is Pirsig’s recognition that our 
society is divided along romantic/technological lines. Pirsig’s 
vision attempts to overcome the tension latent in dichotomies by 
denying the basis of dichotomies like romantic and technological, 
analysis (or logic) and synthesis (or myth). It seems to me there 
IS another way to move and that is deliberately to station our­
selves at the midpoint between the extremes and to generate our 
meaning and direction from the tension between the two. Perhaps 
after the metaphysical trappings are dropped that is all Pirsig is 
saying.
I wish to sketch this possibility briefly with Western examples 
before I stop. Albert Camus in his essay The Myth of Sisyphus 
faced the limits of reason and called the world absurd. The one 
question for philosophy then, he says, is whether to commit 
suicide, and Camus decides against that defeatist course of 
action. Instead he counsels walking along the dizzying precipice 
of meaning, looking down at the chasm of absurdity on the one 
hand and the chasm of physical or intellectual suicide on the 
other, defying them both. Similarly the man of faith is called to 
walk not by sight but by faith, recognizing all his human limita­
tions including logical limitations. His epistemology is neither 
anti-rational nor a sub-category of logic. He may act apparently 
irrationally seeing hope where others see holocaust, seeing 
victory where others see only defeat or a Cross. Nevertheless he 
walks, aware of a profound mystery which he can never fully
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define, aware of the limits of his knowledge and yet willing to 
think and to act. Or finally, we may look to the creative impulse 
in man. In the creative act, the creator is willing to tamper with 
convention or ritual, to give up security to take risks for things 
even more important than survival itself. Though the tension is 
great the creative product emerges, and the creator is created in 
the process.
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Robert Price
ROBERT FROST VISH S O i l ERBEIN
Now, while the critics who “carry praise or blame too far” 
are harrying the literary reputation of the late Robert Frost back 
and forth in an inevitable limbo, the time seems appropriate to 
pull from the files a few notes on a pleasant visit the poet made 
to the Otterbein College campus nearly a quarter century ago.
The eighty-year-old Frost had already reached the high level 
of platform popularity he was to enjoy increasingly, on both the 
national and international stages, during the next few years. 
With academic audiences especially, he had long been basking 
in a glory of professional esteem and personal reverence that he 
seemed to enjoy to the fullest. “The best audience the world 
ever had,” he told “Meet the Press” the year after his appear­
ance at Otterbein, “is the little town-and-gown audience you 
find in America. None of the old poets had anything like it.’’^ 
Although word went around after his visit to Westerville that he 
had found another near-by campus audience somewhat annoying 
because of thoughtless student manners, he gave every evidence 
of having found his reception at Cowan Hall on Tuesday evening, 
November 15, 1955, easily in line with all his expectations.
Mrs. Cleora Fuller of the English Department, who was then 
spending her summers at Bread Loaf, Vermont, had provided a 
contact with Frost’s business manager, Mrs. Theodore Morrison 
of Cambridge, from whom it was learned that the poet was being 
booked for a series of fall appearances on Ohio campuses. He 
would make his headquarters with his close friend and former 
student at Amherst College, President Gordon Chalmers of 
Kenyon College at Gambler. 'I’hough literary notables did not 
rank high as popular entertainment in Westerville, the local 
artists and lectures association (not yet under Otterbein College 
management) was persuaded to take on Frost for a fall number. 
Dr. Chalmers, we learned, would accompany his friend and watch 
over him throughout his Ohio stay. At Otterbein, it was arranged 
that President and Mrs. J. Gordon Howard would extend the 
evening’s hospitality.
I’hough students in those years had to buy their tickets to the 
artists series (it was not yet a paid-for benefit under the student 
activity fee), they supported Frost’s coming enthusiastically 
and, along with many Capital University and other out-of-towners.
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packed Cowan Hall to its SRO limits. To many of them, Frost, 
along with Carl Sandhurg, was the most famous living American 
poet. Echoes from anthologies and recordings in preparatory 
schools had taken care of that. Also, the campus English Depart­
ment had done some conscious conditioning, and a chapel panel 
the day before Frost’s appearance had discussed the poet’s 
importance, his work, and some of the campus amenities attend­
ing the visit of a world-renowned writer. The result was a very 
enthusiastic standing ovation when Frost and President Howard 
made their stage entrance. In fact, the rounds of applause con­
tinued so fully throughout the evening that it was difficult to 
realize afterward how few of his “pieces” Frost had actually 
got around to reading!
“I could feel it! I could feel it!” Frost replied with an 
obvious glow when someone remarked afterward that he had really 
had the students with him. This relish for warmly sympathetic 
responses some of Frost’s post-mortem critics have been inclined 
to denigrate, pointing it out as a symptom in his lengthening 
years, of his compromises with what they have called cheap 
showmanship. Frost’s defenders point out, on the other hand, 
the poet’s frequent warnings about confusing art with act, about 
the often conflicting voices we hear in ourselves, about the 
inevitable ironies in human make-up generally.2 Whether in 
compromise or not, the showman who visited Otterbein appeared 
to have learned long since that student audiences enjoy hearing 
the recognizable and in his own case would have been much 
disappointed if they could not hear him reading “Birches” and 
“Mending Wall.” They liked his low-key, down-East dryness and 
wryness couched in his special gravelly voice. They liked the 
pictures of nature that freshened many of his lines, whether or 
not they sensed the insecurity and often cruel ironies that care­
ful readers find in them. Not many in the Cowan Hall audience, I 
am sure, felt much of what Irving Howe has recently called 
Frost’s “comfortless explorations of human consciousness.’’^ 
The whole issue of Frost’s platform popularity has been well 
summed up, perhaps as well as anywhere, in the recent words of 
Donald Davie;
We get the poets we deserve — on the platform at any 
rate, though a truer and more honest poet may still survive 
on the printed page, behind the ingratiating and devious 
presence that sells himself to us through the microphone.
The poetry scene is more our fabrication, as readers and 
listeners, than it is his, as author and performer.'^
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At Cowan Hall, Frost stuck mainly to his well-known poems, 
the familiar lines and his informal vernacular catching the 
audience’s enthusiasm immediately. “I’m going to say ‘Birches’ 
to you,’’ he said. “Don’t know whether you have them in Ohio — 
at least down here.” (Students insisted what they heard was “I 
gonna say ‘Birches’ to y’.” His transitions during the hour were 
mainly “I’ve a mind to read this one to you” or “I’m going to say 
this poem to you.”) When he got to the line, “It’s when I’m 
weary of considerations,” he paused, repeated “weary of con­
siderations,” then explained: “That’s the line that means more 
to me now than when 1 wrote it.” At Bread Loaf the following 
summer he would elaborate: “It just means you’re getting weary 
of all things that pair off — loneliness, togetherness, lone- 
wolfness. I’m sick of having to consider the lone-wolfness and 
the togetherness. Those horrible words. Somebody manufactured 
one and I manufactured the other !”5
“Mowing” he said was written when he was nineteen. “It 
was one of my earliest convictions about poetry that the fact is 
the sweetest dream that labor knows. It sums up my whole 
philosophy as a poet, and I should have stopped there!” He 
always kept two scythes around the place — “a brush scythe and 
a mowing scythe. . .1 would as soon give up playing tennis as 
give up mowing.” As for the line, “One that went before me. . .,” 
that was when the mowing would be done, early morning. Then 
in the middle of the morning, I would come along to turn the hay. 
I did a lot of it when a boy.”
As for “A Peck of Gold,” the family lived in San Francisco 
for eleven years. . .he was born there. When they moved back 
East they “got thrifty.” If they dropped a slice of bread, butter 
side down, “they picked it up saying, ‘We all must eat our peck 
of dirt’. . .In New England they say ‘dirt,’ in California they say 
something different.”
“Two Tramps in Mud Time” was about some tramps he had 
known. He used to live near the road. . .especially during the 
depression. He had lived through three. “Maybe they ought to 
put that in my obituary: ‘He lived through three depressions.’ ” 
There used to be a lot of mud in the spring. People were practi­
cally bound in the house. A buggy would sink to the axle. These 
days, people are beginning not to know what mud is. “Now that 
the world is getting so concreted down, maybe there ought to be 
a footnote defining mud."
Reading “Mending Wall,” Frost stopped at the line, “I let my 
neighbor know behind the hill,” to comment: “It was really him
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that called me. That’s poetic license — objectivity.” He 
repeated: ‘‘When 1 said ‘1,’ i meant ‘he’. . .That’s objectivity.” 
About the poem’s theme, he added, ‘‘Over in New York, they’re 
mightily concerned over walls” (i.e., at the U.N.). The same 
point was to stir international comment a few years later when, 
as a cultural representative from the U.S., Frost read this poem 
in Soviet Russia.
His words led somehow to governments in general and he 
remarked, ‘‘They tell me the Democrats are gaining in Vermont — 
1 don’t know about anywhere else.” Instead of voting every four 
years, he asked, why not have an emperor and kill him off every 
forty years?
A college professor had told him once that he would be best 
remembered by a line from this poem, “Good fences make good 
neighbors.” But it wasn’t his. It was.just an old Yankee saying 
he had borrowed. During an autographing session in the wings 
following the reading, Frost good-humoredly objected to signing 
his name to these borrowed words, when a student presented 
them on a slip of paper. “Go get something I wrote,” he directed.
He introduced “A Drumlin Woodchuck” as what to Westerville 
ears sounded like “a Vermonty poem,” but Reginald Cook 
insists that Frost’s word at this spot was normally “Ver- 
montly.”6 “That’s individualism,” Frost declared of the wood­
chuck’s devices. The burrower’s “little whistle” in the poem? 
“People wonder where I got it. 1 tell them to go out and listen.
I pride myself that 1 have heard it.”
However, he was not a nature poet, he insisted — not neces­
sarily. “Most all of my poems have a person in them.” One of 
the best known of such is “The Pasture.” It reflects two differ­
ent days on the farm, he said. His publisher had placed that 
little poem first, as an introduction, in an early collection, and 
it had been so used ever since. Its refrain, “You come too,” he 
thought might well be used as the title for a separate volume of 
poems.
“The Road Not Taken” reminded him that some one once 
asked to take a picture of him standing before a blown-up photo­
graph of a parting of the ways. They caught him just as he held 
up two fingers to symbolize the fork in the road!
Now he would read a sonnet, he said, and gave his oft-quoted 
definition to the effect that a sonnet is a poem that goes for
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eight lines, then takes a turn for better or worse. He read the 
popular one-sentence sonnet, “The Silken Tent.” Of the compar­
ison between a lovely lady and a silken tent caught in a summer 
breeze (“loosely bound/ By countless silken ties of love and 
thought”), he explained that this represented “freedom in bond­
age. . .the truth that sets men free.”
The sonnet gave him an easy pause for some comments on his 
craft as a poet. He wrote verse instead of prose, he said, 
because he expressed himself more naturally in it. Originality? 
“Tm not original — some one else wrote it first. . .Most of what 
I’ve written. I’ve observed.”
When people brought him their poetry to judge, he liked to 
read it over, or else have them read it to him twice, but he could 
tell more quickly by looking at it. “If it is free verse, I tell them 
to take it to Sandburg!”
He had two tests for verse. One was meter. The other was 
whether or not the author had crowded or stretched the lines to 
make the words fit — “like an accordian — in — out — in — out.” 
The poem should follow a natural sentence structure. It should 
not be stretched or cramped.
As for rhyming, there are only a few pages of rhymes in 
Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary — “That’s all the rhymes there 
are in the language. . .It frightens me to look at them.”
Poetry shouldn’t be just “spoiled prose.” For him, it was 
“always blank verse, never free verse. . .Let a sentence fall 
naturally. ”
Toward the close of his reading. Frost picked up a manu­
script and announced he would read a poem on science he had 
just written. Every one else was writing on this subject, so he 
thought he would too. He then read a series of quatrains contain­
ing a few of the consciously outrageous sort of rhymes that 
turned up now and then in his later, funning style. This poem, 
which he used later as that season’s Christmas poem, was to 
appear eventually, though considerably revised, under the title 
“Some Science Fiction” in his next collection. In the Clearing, 
1962.^ It poked fun at himself for “not keeping pace,/ With the 
headlong human race.” Also, at the space scientists who “only 
smile/ At how slow I do a mile.”
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But I know them what they are 
As they get more nuclear 
And more bigoted in reliance 
On the gospel of modern science.
I m glad you got a new poem written this summer,” Dr. 
Chalmers remarked later at President Howard’s.
Oh, I didn’t write that this summer,” Frost said. “I wrote it 
this winter.” And then, ‘‘How long before we make the moon a 
state!”
In conclusion. Frost turned to stars. He always took a walk 
before retiring at night, he explained. He liked to read at night, 
but he would have to clear his mind of ‘‘books and house.” So 
he walked down the road and back — ‘‘seven-tenths and a half 
each way!” One of his companions on the walk was the Dog 
Star — Sirius.
I’ve been thinking about what people turn over in their minds 
when they are alone,” he continued. What do people fix their 
thoughts on when they’re going to sleep at night? Verse is a 
good thing. He knew a man once who said verses all the way to 
Europe and back and never repeated.
What do you turn over in your mind when you are alond? I 
want to give you a poem to turn over in your minds.” This was 
his final reading — ‘‘Find Something Like a Star.”
In the wing. Frost greeted admirers and autograph-seekers 
with quiet good-humor, signing books, tear-sheets, slips of paper 
and photographs, usually with a personal question or a dry quip, 
until at last Dr. Chalmers, who was watching over his guest’s 
welfare with concentrated earnestness, signaled a stop with 
Let’s break it up now — let’s break it up.”®
As was his custom. Frost had requested a simple post-lecture 
repast of soft-boiled eggs, toast and milk. So, at President 
Howard’s, while a small company waited for another brief chat. 
Frost joined Mrs. Howard in the kitchen somewhat to her pertur­
bation, Dr. Howard bas reported in Small Windows on a Big 
World.^ How could she discuss poetry with America’s most 
famous poet! But Frost, in the unassuming folksy way he could 
easily drop into, merely said, ‘‘Sit down and tell me about your
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church,” and there was no further worry.
The short drawing-room session that followed turned out to be 
mainly a typical Frostian monologue. Chalmers, long practiced in 
managing his guest, knew just what questions to ask in order to 
bring out the kind of literary and personal continuity such groups 
wanted to hear. He kept the flow at a good pace.
Hadn’t Frost just come from an appearance in behalf of 
Poetry Magazine in Chicago? Yes, he had helped raise S40,000 
for Poetry. But he wasn’t very enthusiastic about the magazine’s 
future. They hadn’t discovered a significant new poet in fifteen 
years. There was one thing they could do, though; they could 
pay their contributors more than twenty-five cents a line!
Not that he questioned the magazine’s historical importance 
or scanted his own debt to it — a point that he did not dwell on. 
Poetry, founded in 1912 by Harriet Monroe, had been a central 
symbol of the twentieth century’s “renaissance” in American 
verse. It had started the “little magazine” movement that 
flourished on college campuses especially, and of which Otter- 
bein’s Quiz and Quill (1918) is believed to be the longest-lived 
Ohio survivor. Miss Monroe’s revolutionary liberalism had 
admitted to her pages such new and as yet unrecognized experi­
menters as Carl Sandburg, Amy Lowell, T. S. Eliot, and Vachel 
Lindsay. She had indeed introduced Frost to American readers 
by printing Ezra Pound’s long and generous review of A Boy’s 
Will, published in London in 1913.
Poets now in the Fifties were having an increasingly difficult 
time getting support from first-class periodicals. Frost pointed 
out. Of the long-recognized top three, Scribner’s had perished. 
Harper’s and the Atlantic still survived, but he wondered how 
they did.
Louis Untermeyer’s new anthology was mentioned. Yes, but it 
left out Edgar Lee Masters. That was too bad. There should have 
been at least something from Spoon River.
T. S. Eliot? Hadn’t Frost once raced him in a reading? Yes. 
That had been at Ferris Greenslet’s in Cambridge. When asked 
to read a poem. F rost had demurred saying that instead he would 
write one while Eliot was reading his. He did.P*
When the talk turned to Frost’s early years in Britain, where 
he had first won recognition from a distinguished literary com-
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1munity, he talked mainly about the Georgian poet Wilfred W. 
Gibson, whom he had met in London in 1913. Frost had not kept 
a favorable feeling toward Gibson and spoke rather disparagingly.
Such negativities toward fellow writers have come up for much 
critical comment since Frost’s death. His distaste for Gibson, 
biographer Laurence Thompson says, dated from Frost’s earliest 
years in England. Gibson’s ballad-like poems were enjoying con­
siderable popularity in both Britain and America. Frost first 
called on him at his London quarters while awaiting publication 
of his own first volume, and Gibson later reviewed the book for 
the London Bookman. The Poetry Society, whom Frost was 
coming to know at this time, included not only Gibson but such 
other well-accepted poets as Rupert Brooke, Walter de la Mare, 
John Drinkwater, and Lascelles Abercrombie.
In April, 1914, the Frosts were invited to Gloucestershire to 
live with the Abercrombies. Here, the Gibsons were near neigh­
bors. In the rather close associations that ensued, says 
Thompson, “a cumulatively resentful jealousy” developed 
toward both his host and ‘‘the daily caller, Gibson. . .Gibson had 
a jocose way of annoying Frost by reading to him letters of 
praise he got from America and then calling Frost’s attention to 
bad grammar and misspelled words in the letters.H
Although Gibson memorialized these visits pleasantly enough 
in The Golden Room,” referring to ‘‘Frost’s rich and ripe 
philosophy,/ That had the body and tang of good draftlight 
cider,” Frost had obviously not reciprocated. At Howard’s he 
minimized the value of Gibson’s verse — “a little volume every 
year” — and expressed special distaste for what was doubtless 
a humiliating drawback for any Englishman of obscure origins 
attempting to get on in a class society — the fact that two of his 
sisters had been in household ‘‘service”!
During the evening’s final exchanges. Frost had occasion to 
mention the fact that his ‘‘best friend in England” had been a 
Welshman — meaning, of course, the poet Edward Thomas. ‘‘Not 
Dylan Thomas,” he added quickly. ‘‘I never met him — a very 
different sort. I didn’t care for his personality. But if his poetry 
is good, it will live!”
The ultimate test. No one was more genuinely aware of it 
than Robert Frost.
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Gail L. Miller
FREE-RIDING WITH PUBLIC GOODS: A MARKETING DILEMMA
The marketing efforts of charities, conservation groups, 
churches, or other organizations that “sell” a collective benefit 
are highly visible. Advertising in particular is used heavily. How­
ever, any assumption concerning the applicability of marketing to 
many non-business situations must proceed with care. Unique 
differences in the product form, the method of pricing or the 
manner of delivery may foster consumer behavior which was not 
anticipated or experienced with traditional product marketing. 
Public or collective goods present such a dilemma, because one 
may receive the benefits of some product without individual 
accountability and contribution.
This “free-rider” situation illustrates perfectly rational maxi­
mizing behavior. However, because of the need for common 
action and contribution, serious consequences result in the long 
run where free-riders dominate and destroy any inclination for 
contributory behavior. The desire for individual gain may lead to 
serious abuse of some common resource and destroy the utility 
for all, thus the free-rider presents an undesirable and potentially 
dangerous threat to community activities.
What contribution can marketing offer to managers that sponsor 
public or collective goods? Economic theory identifies the free­
rider. However, an examination using the marketing framework of 
product, distribution, pricing, and individual demand presents a 
familiar approach for practitioners.
Public Goods
A public or collective good is something that can be used 
simultaneously by many consumers without diminishing the 
supply of that good.l A municipal park, or a local school facility 
are two common examples. Of course public goods may have 
capacity limitations; however, the good is shared by the users.
The sharing of some benefit producing service can be termed 
a commons. From the previous example, the park and the school 
are indivisible products which are available to those with the 
right of access. Because of the shared nature of the product, 
decisions about product use become political as well as econo-
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mic. Thus public or community agencies have control over the 
management of public goods.
The nature of the public good must be contrasted with the 
more traditional free market, or private good. This contrast per­
mits the development of the marketing model for public goods.
Free-Market Goods
Much of what we associate as marketing proceeds from the 
individualistic exchange model. An individual experiences a need 
for some product which offers potential satisfaction. The pur­
chase, through exchange, entitles the buyer to discretionary 
control over the consumption and the benefits. Only by this 
initiative will the person have any reasonable assurance of 
satisfying the need. No one is going to give him the product 
without some payment. Thus the individual must compete with 
others in the free-market for the product.
Free-market exchange pre-supposes a closed pricing-benefit 
system as well. Because the individual buyer receives the “full” 
benefit, he ought to pay the full price. Although some minor 
benefits or costs accrue to others (externalities), society feels 
that they are negligible.
Marketing as presented in most textbooks and articles assumes 
a free-market situation where individuals 1) have discretion over 
the purchase, and 2) they pay the full cost with the expectation 
of receiving the full benefit. Product planning, advertising, 
pricing, and distribution strategies are formulated in line with 
these assumptions.
With public goods, these two assumptions are not present and 
a different structure for the marketing of the product emerges.
The Marketing Model for Public Goods
Public goods satisfy consumer needs in the same fashion as 
free-market goods. Needs reside with individuals. The term 
“public good” misleads the reader if one imagines some service 
or product satisfying a reified group need. The benefits of a 
public good accrue to individuals. The connotation of aggrega­
tion or collective being arises because of the presumed uniformity 
or widespread presence of the need by large numbers of indivi-
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duals, and the co-operative means of responding to the need by 
the members of the community. These considerations underly 
decisions about the product, pricing, distribution, and discretion 
in use.
1. Product Form. One characteristic of a public or collective good 
is the indivisible form of the resource or system that produces the 
benefit. Individuals do not own a whole capable of producing the 
benefit, as in the case of a car or television set. The community
owns” the park, school, church, or other institution, and indivi­
duals share in the responsibility for maintaining the physical 
plant, and they share in the receipt of the benefits.
2. Pricing of Social Goods. People often think of social goods 
such as schools, parks, or national defense as free. They are not 
free in a macro-economic sense; however, certain individuals may 
not have any real cost because of some form of subsidy.
The pricing mechanism does not follow a full costing approach 
for the direct recipients of the services. The product is presumed 
to offer external benefits that transcend even the direct benefi­
ciaries. Where the community becomes the beneficiary, then the 
community picks up the tab. The actual assessment of individuals 
to pay for the service may employ income, wealth, social position, 
and to some extent use as a criteria. Since the product provides 
benefits to all, the contribution system may feature widespread 
or universal payment, but not in direct proportion to the actual 
benefit arising from use of the commons.
Price ceases to act as an allocator of the service. Provision 
of the good is based on the valuation of benefits by social 
leaders. This feature may encourage over-use and abuse, and 
social planners have no real economic tools remaining that can 
control demand.
3. Distribution. The important concept of distribution of a 
collective product is that of access. A good, elevated to the 
public level, offers benefits that are of universal importance. 
Thus access to the benefit becomes a legitimate right for citizens 
of that community. Certain membership or citizenship require­
ments may exclude some from being potential beneficiaries. 
However, once the access requirements have been met, indivi­
duals may not be controlled according to the amount of benefit 
consumed.
The actual distribution of collective goods depends on the
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physical nature of the benefit producing system. Since they often 
consist of services, they confront the inseparability which is 
present with the delivery of many private services.
4. Individual Choice. Demand characterizes an individual’s 
perception of need and expected value from a particular good or 
service. Free-market goods allow individual discretion based 
upon an evaluation of the exchange (i.e. money price and product 
benefits). Public goods regarded as a necessity may limit indivi­
dual discretion. A law may force choice of the good, or community 
pressure may influence behavior as well.
Other than ministers and some state employees, we must 
“buy” the social security program. Without compulsory contribu­
tion (or taxation) many would not choose such a program. The 
universal appeal of the program legitimizes laws or coercive 
methods forcing compliance.
Public goods exhibit the same possible states of demand as 
free-market goods.2 Some may experience no demand, however 
political decisions concerning the value (of Social Security, 
National Defense, etc.) force contribution. At the other extreme, 
the good may be in such demand that overuse threatens the 
service facility. Again, politically provided products may not 
utilize price as the allocator, but must rely on other methods that 
control usage.
The Abuse of the Public Good
The free-market system allows benefits to accrue to those that 
pay for them whereas the public good delivery system separates 
contribution and consumption. Management of demand becomes 
more complex because the pricing system does not follow user 
demand in a direct fashion.
Overuse of the good arises where the supply of the common 
resource is not adequate for the demand. The commons possesses 
finite limits. “Free” goods, such as the ocean as a dumping 
ground, or the Colorado River as a water supply become scarce 
resources that require some mechanism allocating the usage.
Voluntary reduction of usage by all users represents a collec­
tive effort that may reduce the abuse, but free-rider behavior can 
destroy the benefits and incentive for collective action. The 
“tragedy of the commons” refers to such a failure. The tragedy
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allegorically presents a common grazing area that becomes over- 
grazed. Even with obvious impending destruction of the resource, 
individuals may not act voluntarily to reduce consumption without 
the collective action of all. Where 1) an individual has access, 
2) the commons remains indivisible, 3) and no formal mechanism 
of legal or social compliance exists, the temptation to forego the 
sacrifice in consumption is inviting.
The free-rider response arises as an individualistic response 
to a problem that requires collective action and sacrifice. The 
free-rider seeks short-term gain, and because of the delivery 
system, he actually benefits from non-compliance.
An Illustration: Why Should I Turn Down the Thermostat?
The free-rider situation and the potential for destroying 
common action for the common good is illustrated by the Winter 
1977 gas crisis. Even though natural gas is marketed as a private 
good, the available supplies were treated as a commons. Even 
private goods in short supply may be viewed as public goods 
when the benefits are essential for survival.
Public agencies and the utilities campaigned intensively to 
reduce consumption so the common supply would provide some 
measure of utility for all users. Some industrial and commercial 
users were denied access, but all private users retained the right 
of consumption.
Compliance required individual sacrifice of comfort for the 
collective welfare of all. Everyone believed that in fact a crisis 
was at hand, and the response in most areas was quite gratifying. 
However, after several weeks of discomfort, people questioned 
the need for the sacrifice, and the consequences of “moving my 
thermostat higher.” Thus the conservation efforts became a 
victim of the free-rider response.
The Free-Rider: Darth Vader or Typical Citizen?
The portrait of the free-rider conjures associations of villainy. 
He refuses to make any contributions, but is quite willing to 
receive the benefits, either directly or indirectly. Who is the 
free-rider?
Unfortunately, his identity isn’t as obvious as Darth Vader of
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Star Wars. At one time or another most of us are free-riders. The 
response is only natural and logical. Apathy, non-concern, or 
outright rejection of appeals for common action against some 
real or imagined social problem are common free-rider responses. 
Such a response occurs when the individual fails to believe that 
the issue warrants his or her individual commitment, and we are 
constantly reminded of collective needs ranging from gas conser­
vation to saving the bowfin whale.
Others may voice concern, but still fail to act because they 
feel that their behavior may have very little impact on the situa­
tion. The diffusion of responsibility because of the shared, 
collective nature of the product reduces interest in making an 
individual sacrifice.
Individual opportunism also spurs free-rider behavior. The 
situation presents a good opportunity to increase one’s assort­
ment of benefits. Even if the threat to the commons is recognized, 
some individuals seek additional benefits in the present.
Overcoming the Free-Rider Response
The delivery system and decisions about product-form create 
the opportunity for free-riders. Piecemeal attempts at advertise­
ments directed to individuals may have little effect if the struc­
ture of the free-rider situation remains unaltered. The solution 
lies in three directions, all of which change the structure of the 
free-rider situation.
1. Increase compliance with the collective norm. Persuasive or 
authoritarian methods may force greater compliance. Individual 
discretion or choice is controlled by the addition of power vested 
in the hands of some agency. In the case of real, immediate 
threats police or other social agencies enforce the usage of the 
commons. This method is expensive and open to abuses such as 
extortion, graft, and black-market activities. Social compliance 
effected through attitude change and ultimately behavioral change 
may be more desirable. Persuasion through models, opinion 
leaders and face-to-face techniques employing referent power or 
expert power bases may bring about more voluntary acceptance 
of sacrifice or collective behavior.
The persuasive alternative appears to be the approach taken 
by promotional campaigns for any public good. While persuasion 
may be effective with some individuals, authoritarian methods
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may be more effective in the long run.
2. Revoke the right of access. The benefits of the commons may 
e ’'®vo ed or reduced through political processes. The commons
may e open to users only at certain times. In this way, demand 
controlled and better allocated. Many public tennis courts 
or 1 under 16-aged players the right of access after 4 p.m. in 
an attempt to allocate the benefits to other user segments.
3. Eliminate the commons. The form of the product changes from 
an indivisible whole, to some divisible portion for each user.
ationing, giving each customer the right to some amount, 
removes the commons and creates an individualistic quasi- 
market situation.
Changing the basis of provision, from collective agency 
sponsorship to user sponsorship, provides another alternative. 
Taxpayers may sell the community golf course and change the 
nature of the good from public to free-market. School districts 
face disgruntled non-parent taxpayers quite willing to shift 
education from a public good to a user-procured private good.
The shift to more individualistic methods of exchange may 
involve changing the pricing mechanism to reflect actual use. 
Gradual increases in user fees for community services, such as 
the swimming pool, or other recreational facilities, reflect a 
change in the concept of the product form’s commons as well as 
that of access.
Summary
The political nature of decisions on product form, pricing, 
access, and choice confound the formulation of effective strategy 
that deals with the free-rider. A complete analysis based on the 
marketing model of the public good offers ways that reduce the 
undesirable behavior. Social planners and managers must realize 
that any real solution rests with the political and social policy 
concerning the provision of the public good.
As a society creates such goods, and legitimizes access, 
without introducing divisibility and user pricing, free-riders 
materialize and damage programs intended to provide for the 
welfare of all.
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Albert E. Lovejoy
CONTEMPORARY COMMUNAL SOCIETIES
Sabbatical leaves come and go with delightful seventh term 
regularity for fortunate tenured faculty. Plans for the sabbatical 
activity are submitted to the Personnel Committee and are 
usually accepted. If the leave falls in the spring or fall term, it 
can, with proper planning and money in the exchequer, be 
extended to a six-month stint by the addition of the summer term.
Thus it was that my spring term sabbatical, 1976-77, material­
ized into a half-year odyssey with Eunice, my wife, accompanying 
me in classic ethnological fashion. Together we savored the 
experiences of living with a number of communal groups.
Eunice was enabled to go with me thanks to the willingness of 
the State Library of Ohio to grant her a six-month leave of 
absence. Thus one could do this mad, mad thing and incidentally 
try to keep me from the most heinous consequences of my propen­
sity for getting lost, lonely, and loquacious at the most inappro­
priate times. She adapted to communal living even more smoothly 
than 1 did. In fact, at the end of our utopian adventure her re-entry 
into the world of bureaucratic hierarchies, mile high stacks of 
paper, and wait-rush-wait office routine was considerably more 
traumatic than my own. After all, these communal visitations 
were for me a preparation for teaching Integrative Studies 10-4, 
“Contemporary Communal Societies,” so I knew why I was there, 
what I should try to learn from the experiences, and what I would 
do with such information upon my return! Hers was a more nearly 
experiential trip where the communal participatory democracy, the 
relaxed “flow” of events, and the reverence-for-nature attitudes 
were real elements of a rather successful philosophic integration 
into communalistic, natural, and ecologically balanced living 
patterns.
The cost of living communally was surprisingly low. Often, 
for example, fees were requested in this manner: “the cost is 
_____ dollars or whatever you can spare, to be paid now or when­
ever you can afford it.” Usually work in the communal setting 
compensated for our board and room. Meals were sometimes 
spartan and usually vegetarian, while lodging was often in a 
simple room simply furnished or a bit of the great outdoors in 
which we set up our Alpine tent.
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Just as setting up a tent is simple so is setting up an itinerary 
of visits when one is tuned into the communities network and 
when one has such a gracious and generous mentor as Dr. John A. 
Hostetler of Temple University. Of course Eunice, as planner and 
organizer par excellence, took care of many details that really 
spelled the difference between a mediocre sojourn and an exciting 
adventure!
Specifically where did this sabbatical leave take us? First, it 
took us to the Philadelphia Life Center so that I could learn from 
Dr. John A. Hostetler of Temple University’s Sociology-Anthro­
pology’s Department; second, to the Twin Oaks’ Experience, ten 
days in a tent-in-the-woods just outside Louisa, Virginia; third, 
to a communities’ conference at Dandelion Community in Enter­
prise, Ontario; fourth, to a brief but intensely informative and 
heart-warming stopover at the Society of Brothers’ Woodcrest 
commune in Rifton, New York; fifth, to three mind expanding, 
mystical, and energetic weeks in the Village House of the Anthro- 
posophical community, Kimberton Hills (Camphill Village, U.S.A.) 
in lovely Kimberton, Pennsylvania; sixth, to a health and com­
munity weekend workshop at nearby Yellow Springs, Antioch 
College’s Outdoor Education Center where we were led by the 
indefatigable Jane and Griscom Morgan; seventh and finally, to a 
long weekend stay at “The Farm” outside Summertown, Tennes­
see, probably the largest and most widely publicized community 
in North America. This last visit ended the last of August and 
within a few days we were back at work, just as if nothing had 
happened to our minds and bodies!
The Philadelphia Life Center
On February 7, 1977 1 received a gracious letter from Dr. 
Hostetler containing details of Temple University courses (none 
in the communal societies area), library use, housing possibili­
ties of a communal type in the Philadelphia area, etc.
After some preliminary correspondence with a Quaker commune 
that had moved from Philadelphia, I called Sandra Boston of the 
Philadelphia Life Center on March 10 and she indicated that after 
she had received our credentials, she would call back in a few 
days about the possibility of our staying there. It seemed hopeful, 
but no definite commitments had been made. On Saturday, 
March 19, when I was about to call Sandra, at the gentle yet firm 
insistence of my wife, a call came to us from Maurine Parker who 
was in another Life Center house, suggesting that we could stay
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at Tabula Rasa” at least from March 24 to April Srd. This 
good news for it meant that (1) we would be in a communal living 
situation, but also with a small group of people in a big old bourse 
not radically different from our own; (2) we’d be within reasonable 
commuting distance of Temple University (little did we realize 
that a mass transit strike would last about seven of our ten 
weeks in the City of Brotherly Love); (3) we would have an urban 
communal living experience of an inexpensive sort while was 
reading in the field of communal societies and auditing a course 
on the Amish at Temple University.
But an interesting thing happened on the way to the ends- 
means schema! The means (living in one of the twenty houses ot 
the Philadelphia Life Center) to fulfilling the end, (study at 
Temple University) became the end as time went on and therefrom 
hangs a tale. The tale is that when one lives in a house that has 
only four to six members (populations of communal societies are 
typically in flux) and that house has the reputation of being well 
organized and the cleanest in the Philadelphia Life Center, much 
time, effort, and imagination must be expended there. For example, 
once a week, usually on Sunday, a meeting would be held on 
house problems, relationships problems, new member problems, 
M. N. S. (Movement for a New Society) problems, etc. These meet­
ings were usually about three hours in length. Every week the 
house had to be thoroughly cleaned — an afternoon s chore. Not 
that the cleaning itself would take that long, but the tea, the divi­
sion of tasks once everyone had arrived, and the doing of these 
chores would usually occupy the better part of a Wednesday after­
noon. Then once a week there was F ood Co-op work to do. There 
were collective meetings to attend (e.g. WOW-Wonderful Older 
Women for Eunice and Men Against Patriarchy, for me). Another 
period of time, usually a weekday evening, was devoted to family 
togetherness” and activities. Then of course every member of the 
household had to cook at least one dinner (for four to ten people) 
each week, and take his/her turn at washing and drying the 
dishes, making up dry-to-liquid milk, preparing granola, and 
baking bread, not to mention taking telephone calls and messages, 
going to emergency meetings, etc. Now and then work parties 
would be organized for such chores as putting on the window 
screens.
These house responsibilities, which we dared not treat lightly, 
did take time and energy which in a different setting would have 
provided more time for reading, writing, and cultural enrichment. 
However, if participant observation, as a sociological method, 
means what I think it does, it means being involved in the activi-
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ties you want to study and learn about. As a matter of fact, there 
was a good bit of time for reading, some of which will appear in 
the bibliography appended to this report.
Maurine Parker who “owned” Tabula Rasa and who was a 
very spry and mentally alert lady in her late sixties, contributed 
to my reading by loaning me materials on the Life Center, M.N.S., 
the Gray Panthers, and theories of anarchy! She was the very 
prototype of concerned, dedicated, gentle yet steely firm Quaker 
liberal — a most congenial fellow spirit! We were really sorry yet 
glad, a few weeks later, to see her leave to work with surviving 
radiation patients at the Japanese hospital in Hiroshima! She is a 
rare, loving, radiant, sensible mystic and a wonderful human 
being!
She was particularly helpful to Boonlert, our Thai housemate, 
a man (late thirties) who had a young family back in Thailand, 
but who had come to America as an assistant to a Buddhist monk 
who was teaching at Swarthmore College. He himself was a 
Buddhist monk and a more pleasant, hard working, thoughtful 
person you could scarcely find. He talked to us of his homeland, 
gave us travel brochures, and in general was helpful and brotherly 
in a most gracious fashion. We met several Thai people through 
him — people who enriched our lives markedly while we were in 
Philadelphia.
On March 25th we were invited to attend an M.N.S. Network 
meeting. These meetings occurred every month and were held to 
enable all the collectives, coalitions, etc., to report on work 
done and plans for the future. It was a vibrant group of dedicated 
social activists. These meetings, like our house meetings, began 
by the choosing of a facilitator, a recorder, and a time-keeper. 
An agenda was developed by those present and each item in it 
was allotted a reasonable amount of time. If as the item was 
being discussed, it was apparent that more time would be needed, 
additional time might be contracted for if the group was willing. 
This is part of the philosophy of participatory democracy and 
rotating loci of leadership. The international flavor of the Life 
Center population was quite apparent at this meeting and as our 
time at the Life Center lengthened, we realized that there is 
indeed a world-wide network of young people engaged in Movement 
for a New Society work, young people who are very well informed 
about what is going on in each other’s countries.
The next day, Saturday, March 26th, we were privileged to be 
invited to attend the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Friends at
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the meeting house on Third and Arch Streets. It was a banner day 
for me since my M.A. thesis was on the Quakers. The Philadel­
phia Yearly Meeting is, I believe, the oldest and most renowned 
of all such groups in North America. The world-wide concerns 
discussed were interesting and inspiring. We felt very much at 
home there.
A few days later we experienced our Orientation Weekend at
Stonehouse.” There were some thirty of us from the eastern 
United States who were going to learn what the Life Center stood 
for and how it managed the Movement for a New Society.
By March 27th we felt we were on a rather firm footing at the 
Life Center. This was soon borne out when at a “clearness 
meeting it was mutually agreed that we might stay there until 
the end of May.
One of the ways of furnishing Life Center houses was by 
‘trashing,’’ collecting cast-off furniture that neighbors had put 
out on the curb for the trash pick-up and then repairing it to the 
extent necessary to make it serviceable. Once I went on a trash­
ing expedition with Maurine, but unfortunately when we got to the 
spot where she had seen a useable discarded living room chair, 
it had apparently been “trashed’’ by someone else.
It might be noted that most of the houses of the Life Center 
were in an area of West Philadelphia teetering on the brink of 
rapid deterioration. Nearby streets were littered with broken 
glass, cans, bottles, abandoned articles of clothing and had the 
appearance of alienated inner city-ness. The only store that was 
well stocked and always bustling seemed to be the State Liquor 
Store. It was an area where, a year before we arrived, a woman 
had been stabbed to death as she tried to enter a Life Center 
house. She was stabbed by a man who was aggrieved over what 
he considered to be the unjust imprisonment of his brother. One 
walked in groups and cautiously at night. Maurine, for example, 
had been robbed twice near Tabula Rasa.
Realizing what the physical environment of the Life Center 
was like makes it easier to understand its nonviolent movement 
for a new society motivation. Some of these “causes’’ to which 
individuals (usually two or three in a group) in the Life Center 
devoted their attention and energy, were probably directly or 
indirectly inspired by the Shakertown Pledge, [see Appendix B] 
They included: a vegetarian and quite inexpensive catering ser­
vice; a coalition of those favoring alternative transportation
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(namely bicycling); the freeing of southwest Africa’s Namibia; 
simple living (clothing, eating, housing, and transportation); 
population planning in the world; alternative energy sources 
(solar, wind, tidal, geothermal); WOW, a sort of local affiliate of 
the Gray Panthers; Men against Patriarchy, a men’s liberation 
group; a group of people interested in land trusts, an alternate 
way of owning property; groups interested in freeing political 
prisoners throughout the world; re-evaluation counseling; justice 
for welfare recipients; an end to police brutality, especially 
toward people of minority status; a group interested in racial 
justice for all in the Union of South Africa; peaceful resolution 
of the North Ireland situation.
Since people would often become over-involved in these 
worthy causes, there was a real appreciation of the possibility of 
“burn-out.” This was guarded against by not letting anyone 
become over-extended into too many revolutionary activities. And 
even in the heat of collective meetings, brief interludes were 
taken up by an occasional “light and lively,” a kind of playful 
calisthenic of impromptu character. In other words, there seemed 
to be a sensible and sane feeling that revolution-making must at 
the same time that it is intense and over driven, be happy and 
relaxed from time to time.
Since we came to the Life Center as people who were in 
accord with its goals philosophically, but who had not been able 
to “do” revolution, we had a few opportunities for street theatre, 
picketing in behalf of the United Farm Workers, and also leaf­
letting, and placard holding in favor of banning the B-1 bomber. 
These experiences were all in downtown Philadelphia, usually on 
busy intersections at rush hour. I can report that the social 
psychology and social stratification elements of such work are 
simply fascinating. I must also report that it is hard work and 
there are times when you feel more secure because there are 
plain-clothes police monitoring such demonstrations, though we 
really experienced no fearful encounters.
The Life Center experience indirectly enabled us to meet 
some very interesting domestic and foreign communards, many of 
outstanding ability and sensitivity. Yet we were aware that not 
all of our neighbors were favorably disposed toward us. For 
example, some neighbors were upset because we did not call in 
Mayor Rizzo’s tough cops when our Food Co-op was robbed. 
Instead we took turns “guarding” our co-op on the evenings when 
orders were picked up. One tended to see the wisdom of the inner 
city shibboleth that in numbers there is safety.
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Being at the Life Center also served as a base from which we 
could visit other communal groups, take side trips, explore the 
historic-cultural aspects of the Philadelphia area, and go to 
academic meetings. The tolerance of our communal family was 
indeed great enough not to be strained by these Establishment 
types of pleasures and obligations.
In summary, let me say that a typical day at the Life Center 
went something like this: Arise between 8-9 usually, self help 
breakfast, go to our places of work or learning, lunch out, back at 
the house between 4:45 and 6:00. In spite of our regular duties 
there was usually a relaxed atmosphere about the place; there 
were opportunities for many meaningful conversations and nearly 
every day there was some time for writing and reading. It amazed 
us that Windsor Avenue in West Philadelphia where Tabula Rasa 
was located was much quieter than 172 West Main Street, Wester­
ville!
After we had gotten settled into “Tabula Rasa” in the Phila­
delphia Life Center, I made an appointment to see Dr. John A. 
Hostetler of Temple University. Eunice and I had a pleasant chat 
with him on Friday, March 25th, during which he invited me to sit 
in on the last four weeks of his seminar on Amish culture. He, 
incidentally, is of Amish background from the Lancaster County 
area. His family went west, possibly encouraged by local Amish 
feeling that they (his parents) were “too proud” of their cattle. 
At any rate, he is well known for his books on the Amish and the 
Hutterites. He tried to get me a Temple University Library card, 
but we were both frustrated by the red tape involved. (After 
getting a letter from John Backer, attesting to my character and 
probity, I finally obtained a card several weeks later.) Dr. Hos­
tetler took us to the special library collection of urban and 
community materials and introduced me to the personnel there 
after inviting me to use it. Then he gave me the key to one of his 
offices in Gladfelter Hall where he has an awesomely large file 
of both published and unpublished materials on communal living. 
In all the time 1 was at Temple I did not finish my reading of 
these materials about communal societies all over the world! As 
one can see. Dr. Hostetler’s aid was generous, sincere, and most 
helpful and I could not possibly have accomplished one quarter of 
what I did without it. From time to time, as I would see him in 
the Amish seminar, he would suggest that Eunice and I visit 
communal groups near and far, groups which he felt would wel­
come us and which we would be interested in seeing. His 
suggestions were most helpful and wherever he sent us, we were 
most hospitably received. Parenthetically let me say that one of
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the outstanding experiences of the Amish seminar was a field 
trip to the Lancaster county area where we visited a one-room 
Amish schoolhouse for several hours, saw Amish cemeteries, 
homes, a furniture-making shop, a health food store, a Mennonite 
historical and contemporary book store-visitor center, and a 
restaurant with authentic Amish food. Dr. Hostetler’s invitations 
always included Eunice, but since she was doing volunteer work 
at the Philadelphia Regional Library for the Blind and Physically 
Handicapped, as well as participating in WOW and other M.N.S. 
activities in the Philadelphia Life Center, she could not always 
accept them.
A sample of my readings in Dr. Hostetler’s files included such 
manuscripts as these: Earl W. Fedje, “The Community of True 
Inspiration, the Amanas;’’ Elizabeth D. Beck’s “Keil’s Com­
munes; Bethel and Aurora;’’ John Groutt and Thomas 0. Karst’s 
“Brotherhood of the Spirit;’’ James H. Schall’s “A Conceptuali­
zation and Explication of the Phenomena, the Communal Self and 
the Individual Self;’’ Jon Raz’ “Camphill Villages and Canadian 
Alternatives;’’ Elaine M. Wolf’s “The Community Doukhobors of 
British Columbia;’’ Suzette Eifrig’s “The Society of the Ephrata 
Cloisters;’’ Alan M. Kalish’s “The Essenes;’’ Louis Persico; 
“The House of David;’’ “The Japanese Commune Movement;’’ 
Mark Kotkin; “Socialization and Commitment on the Kibbitz: The 
Past Decade.’’ Unfortunately forty-two manuscripts remained that 
I did not have time to read.
Other activities at Temple included reading the campus news­
paper, strolling about this working class campus (many American 
Black, Asiatic, and Middle Eastern students), having lunches in 
the Student Union or occasionally from one of the mobile soft 
pretzel and hoagie food vans that were clustered near the Temple 
classroom buildings area.
Though connected with the Dental College (Sociology wing) 
and the Educational Psychology Department of Temple, the 
Robinsons whom we got to know were not exactly a fringe benefit 
of my working at Temple. Rather they came into our lives through 
Boonlert, our Thai Tabula Rasa House mate. Mrs. Robinson was 
of Chinese-Thai background, while her husband was a white 
Californian. They proved to be a remarkable couple who lived in 
a racially integrated Quaker housing area in the center of down­
town Philadelphia. It was they who were responsible for our 
being able to hear Eugene Ormandy conduct the Philadelphia 
Symphony the last night of the season when Isaac Stern was the 
violin soloist! With his father and their fifteen year old Thai
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housemaid, the Robinsons are a delightful family.
On another occasion we had a very warm and familial Friday 
evening with a Temple University Social Work professor and his 
family. This invitation came from meeting his wife at a Unitarian 
church we visited. They were an interesting, creative, alert, and 
energetie family!
Another evening was most pleasantly spent with a former 
student from Lynchburg College (now a child psychiatrist), and 
her recently acquired family. This was an occasion made possible 
not because I was at Temple, but because we were in Philadel­
phia where they lived and worked. Her husband is a neurosurgeon 
as well as a professor at the University of Pennsylvania Medical 
School. Estherina is handling her new role as wife to a youthful 
widower and as a mother figure to his three sons, three male cats, 
and magnificent male Collie with poise and good humor.
Occasional after-class chats with several of Dr. Hostetler’s 
seminar students and conversations with graduate students in the 
communal societies program, students who would come by to 
consult with him from afar, were stimulating and helpful.
More formal occasions which increased my understanding of 
communal life and other societal systems were these:
March 31 — At Temple’s Ritter Hall I heard a panel of experts 
discuss “Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Asia.”
April 16 — A University of Pennsylvania conference entitled 
“China Day Workshops.” My selection was “Mental Health 
Care in P.R.C.” Also in the afternoon I saw these films: 
“Communes,” “Away with All Pests,” and“The East Is Red.” 
April 26 — At Temple I heard an address, followed by a question- 
answer period by Dr. Allen, a black Philadelphia council- 
woman, who had recently returned from a tour of several large 
Chinese cities.
May 22 — We attended at International House near the University 
of Pennsylvania, a People’s F’estival of M.N.S.
In conclusion let me say that being on the Temple University 
campus for a little over two months was most useful. As an 
inveterate “people watcher” I found this great working-class 
institution of higher education an inspiring and comfortable place 
to be. The free lectures, the seminar on Amish culture, the rather 
fine library to which I gained access after no little bureaucratic 
travail, and tbe professors (and their families) whom I got to know
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personally made my time there quite pleasant and instructive. 
And of course Dr. Hostetler’s wonderful hospitality, generosity, 
and communal wisdom were of immeasurable assistance. He 
embodies all that is sincere, energetic, and open about Anabap­
tist-descended folk and, I might add, none of the rigidity, self 
righteousness, or clannishness sometimes attributed to such 
salt-of-the-earth people.
Walden II Experience
Even in our last several weeks in the Philadelphia Life 
Center we were formulating plans, visiting, and writing letters 
concerning at least two more communal society visits. The first 
of these was the ten-day Walden H experience at the Twin Oaks 
community in Louisa, Virginia. This stint ran from June 3rd 
through the 13th and was an interesting experience in both posi­
tive and negative ways. Living in a tent under fairly primitive 
conditions made it difficult to do writing, so I suspended journal 
entries for that period.
This experience in community building “from scratch” took 
place in a woodsy area on Twin Oaks land. Twin Oaks people 
furnished the twenty-one of us with a very large tent with a wood 
cook stove and an electric refrigerator of uncertain vintage. There 
was also cold water about two hundred yards from the canvas 
hogan and piles of scrap lumber here and there. Those of us who 
had tents, set them up on a knoll beyond this huge hogan. There, 
we, with nineteen people whom we had never seen before, started 
to build a community. Our leaders were “Shadow,” a member of 
another Walden H type community. East Wind in Missouri, and 
Piper, who was a present member of Twin Oaks, but in the pro­
cess of leaving. The twenty-one of us came from all over the 
U.S. and Germany (a young lawyer), ranged in age (eighteen to 
probably sixty), and represented occupations as diverse as farmer 
to Wall Street psychotherapist. Prior to our first meeting we were 
sent questionnaires asking what jobs we wished to do once our 
community building began. Eunice got into the planner-manager 
bag while I, recalling the military enlisted man’s axiom, don t 
ever volunteer for anything!” did not opt for a responsibility more 
demanding than stoking the wood cook stove. Before our arrival 
several early birds had laboriously constructed an outdoor privy — 
much to the relief of us city slicker types!
In the early days of the ten-day period two things became 
apparent: (1) our leaders. Shadow and Piper, quite disparate in
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sgCf personality, and Skinnerian orthodoxy, j®*'
with one another; (2) the regular members of Twin Oaks were 
almost equally divided about the desirability of having such an 
experience-nuisance on their land. However, in about three dap, 
after we had earned “work-credits” on their farm by picking 
vegetables, trellising seven hundred tomato plants, manning their 
telephone switchboard, sorting out their scrap metal, cutting some 
of their trees, etc., their attitude seemed to soften and they 
invited us over for an evening or two of non-competitive volley- 
ball and for a tour of their facilities. It was really neat to see 
Nathan, who had worked with us in scrap metal sortmg and was 
a “strong dude,” work very gently and caringly with the pre­
schoolers from the Nursery. Another interesting sight was the 
community clothing room where on one occasion some of us 
measured waists of pants and sorted out clothes in more or less 
compatible sizes. We became almost childish in horsing 
around in some of the weird outfits we found and put together 
there!
On our tour of the main Twin Oaks facilities we saw living 
quarters, kitchen, nursery, storage buildings, hammock-making 
area, and the sewage plant. On the bulletin board we noted that 
a rare and incurable venereal disease, herpes, was a problem in 
the Twin Oaks population at that particular time. Also we were 
told that the famous Twin Oaks hammocks, which most of us were 
trying to learn how to weave, were so much in demand that mem­
bers were working on them day and night depending on their 
personal work style preferences. Herein lay a moral dilemma. 
Should a communal society live off the product used mainly by 
the leisure class elements of the straight society?
In our ten day community building process, we got to know 
each other reasonably well through group work projects, square 
dancing and camp fire discussions in the evenings, as well as at 
meal time, and during seemingly endless planning sessions during 
the daytime. It seemed to me that the planner-manager mode of 
governance, positive reinforcement, work credits, and other 
doctrinaire Skinnerian prescriptions had weakened or virtually 
disappeared by the end of our brief period together. It was 
revealing to us that our young German lawyer fellow communard 
argued most vehemently for full democratic procedures! Unlike 
some of our other community experiences, there was not universal 
sincere sorrow at parting at the end, but we did grow quite fond 
of several of our fellow communards. I must admit, however, that 
I went into this experience with negative feelings about the 
supposed benefits of Skinner’s behaviorism as exemplified in his
90
novel. The dryness of the weather (Virginia was in a drought 
weather cycle of several years’ extent), the frustration (for me) of 
trying unsuccessfully to learn hammock making, and the friction 
in our leadership left me fairly unregretful about moving on, but 
this is by no means an indictment of Walden 11 type communities. 
Somehow I missed the fervor of the idealism of our M.N.S. revolu­
tionaries at the Philadelphia Life Center! Perhaps the transition 
from almost solid middle-class living to primitive woodsiness was 
too sudden and too brief for me to assimilate easily and happily.
The Communities Conference at Dandelion Community 
in Enterprise, Ontario, June 24-26
Since Dandelion, a small, four-member Walden II type commun­
ity, was hosting a conference for over one hundred people, it 
came as no surprise to us that several of our Twin Oaks Experi­
ence friends should be there, in fact should have active roles in 
setting it up and running it. There were, among other activities, 
workshops, usually held outdoors, on the reward system, values, 
starting a community, economics, agriculture, sexism, re-evalua- 
tion counseling, health, aging in community, types of commun­
ities, communication and conflict resolution, group process, 
spirituality in community, children in community, government and 
decision making. As at Twin Oaks, so here there were other 
community representatives, showing slides of their communities 
and in other ways trying to recruit new members. The economic 
base of the Dandelion Community rests on their tin works. They 
make flowerpot holders, candle holders, small lamp shades, etc,, 
from old tin cans that people turn in to the local grocery store. 
Using acetylene torch artistry, the four of them do this work. By 
taking their wares to craft fairs between Montreal and Toronto, 
they manage to gross about S40,000 per year. Recently they have 
constructed a new tinnery building which also can serve as a 
display center, a square dance hall, a community conference 
assembly room, and a general storage or gathering place. They 
were also considering getting into the rope chair making business. 
The three young men and a young woman, who constituted the 
entire membership of Dandelion, seemed to be dedicated, ideal­
istic, practical, and extremely hard working, but not too hung up 
on the planner-manager format, labor credits, or other Skinnerian 
techniques. Their tin operations, some small farming chores, 
some occasional construction and renovation work, and some 
hosting of community conferences would seem to be quite enough 
to keep the four of them rather busy the year ’round.
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Seeing our friends from Twin Oaks, both members of that 
community and “experiencers,” gave us the feeling, later 
strengthened, that communards travel about a good deal and are 
aware, through the grapevine, newsletters, etc., of communal 
activities all over North America. In this respect they somewhat 
resemble that formidable Anabaptist communal group, the Hutter- 
ites, who are enthusiastic travelers and visitors to fellow 
believers’ colonies scattered over northwestern America. This 
conference was as well organized, as expertly led, and as 
smoothly run as any professional conference 1 have had the 
pleasure of attending. Eunice and I attended different “seminars 
in order to squeeze the maximum value from the weekend s 
activities. My lingering impression remains: energy, dauntless 
idealism, ingenuity, and a relaxed accepting attitude toward 
people as well as a real affection for fellow communards are the 
hallmarks of many of the rank and file members as well as the 
leaders of the communitarian movement. It is interesting to note 
that in none of these communities we visited were we aware of 
illicit drugs being used. They were in fact specifically not wel­
come. There was almost no use of tobacco and usually the diet 
tended to be vegetarian, for philosophic and practical humane 
considerations. Alcoholic beverages were also discouraged. It 
was hoped that people would ‘‘get high on community.” Certainly 
one of the aims of the Conference was realized in our case, 
namely “to broaden awareness and understanding of intentional 
communities in general.”
The F’ederation of Equalitarian Communities (which included 
Aloe (North Carolina), Dandelion (Ontario), East Wind (Missouri) 
and North Mountain and Twin Oaks (both Virginia) all supported 
and helped in staging and carrying out this Conference. We left 
on Sunday afternoon feeling that it is indeed true that human 
beings can be loving, trusting, mutually helpful, and non-material- 
istic in an almost first-century Christian simplicity and faithful­
ness.
Stopover at the Society of Brothers, Rifton, New York
In the case of our Bruderhof visit we must give Dr. Hostetler 
the credit for his encouragement. His “sponsorship” of us, we 
feel, helped insure a most heart-warming and informative visit. 
Arriving at about 2:30 p.m. on Wednesday, June 30th, we had tea 
with Robert and Olwen Rime who were surrounded by some of 
their children and grandchildren. It was indeed a bucolic and 
happy scene, watching the grandchildren feed a pet rabbit some
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of the apple leavings and chatting with these pleasant, confident, 
optimistic folks. Vir. were shown oiir room in the visitor cottage. 
On our bedroom door was a very artistic and colorful placard pre­
pared, we feel sure, by some of the children, which read, “Wel­
come Dear Lovejoys!’’ The fresh flowers and bowl of fresh fruit 
in the room itself made us feel quite at home, in fact like extra­
ordinarily fortunate visitors in this idyllic spot! After freshening 
up a bit, we began a tour of the Hof with Robert Rimes as our 
guide. Flower beds were abundant and beautifully cared for; the 
vegetable garden was extensive (we were informed that the j oung 
people were the main gardeners). We saw family apartments and 
community buildings, the book room (publications of tbe Plough 
Press). While we were in the Sewing area we were privileged to 
meet Emmy Arnold who at ninety-three years of age was the 
bright and energetic widow of Eberhard Arnold, the founder of the 
Society of Brothers. When she said that she had met me before, I 
was caught between the feeling that I represent a type in her long 
list of personal recollections and the mystical sensation that 
perhaps we share a kind of spiritual kinship, the origins of which 
are hidden to me by the overlays of education and worldly con­
cerns. We continued on, seeing the building where the children 
are communally cared for and where they try out the community 
playthings for which the Society of Brothers is so well known.
The main economic bulwark of the community is the wood 
working factory where sturdy attractive, durable play equipment 
items are made. They were just about ready to close up the shop 
as we went through. It is interesting to know that they “field 
test” each new item on their own children to be sure they enjoy 
it, are not exposed to risk ot injury in using it, and cannot easily 
break the new piece of play equipment. Ihe teenagers not only do 
the gardening, but they also care for the few animals here. It was 
pretty obvious that even though we had left the frantic world 
outside this Christian enclave, these people exhibit a steady 
industriousness and attention to duty. The division of labor would 
seem to be along traditional male/female lines. But production 
work is not everything because on every hand we could see 
beautiful and arlisticallv creative handwork, attesting to a love 
of color, design, and what is naturally beautiful. In the early 
evening we attended the communal meal at which about two 
hundred and fifty adults dined with quiet but efficient attention 
as someone read an inspirational passage of Bruderhof history 
over the dining hall public address system. We were greatly- 
impressed by the dispatch with which the women had prepared and 
served the meal and also by the quiet efficiency with which the 
men removed the table settings and cleaned up after the meal.
9.3
Before the meal started we all sang a hymn in old German, and 
though the language was unfamiliar, somehow I had the sense of 
being able to understand the message in it and of being able to 
sing it with feeling! During the dinner Eunice and I were intro­
duced to the assemblage as friends of John Hostetler s and that 
seemed to be the se al of approval par excellence \ The supper was 
delicious and eating it in near silence lent a peculiarly sacra­
mental atmosphere to the occasion. During the evening we were 
offered and gladly accepted the opportunity to talk to a young 
couple about any phase of the Society we were interested in. We 
stayed with this young psychologist and his wife until about 
11:00 and then retired to our pleasant room in the guest house.
The next morning we were awakened early by children and had 
breakfast with another young family with five young children. 
They, the adults, that is, had lived as children in Paraguay 
before the group moved northward to the United States. The 
mother was being helped to clothe, feed, and prepare the children 
for nursery school by a young girl (probably fourteen to seventeen 
years old) from the community. This couple were old-timers com­
pared to the recent converts of about a year, whom we talked to 
the night before. In honor of our presence at their breakfast they 
were permitted to serve coffee. That made us feel quite special!
In concluding this narrative of a very brief but meaningful 
encounter with a Beatitude Place and People, I must admit that 
we have never been so warmly received nor have we ever felt so 
trustingly loved by any other group in our whole lives. When they 
asked us whether we might be interested in becoming members, 
we very truthfully could say yes, but that there were certain prior 
responsibilities which we had to discharge first.
Living at the Village House of Kimherlon Hills 
in Kimberton, Pa., July 10-Aug. 1
Kimberton Hills is an Anthroposophical farm with a number of 
families living in separate dwellings on a beautiful three hundred 
fifty acre manorial estate. The mission of these mystical folk is 
to provide family love and care for mentally retarded young 
adults. Since there was no room for us on the farm itself, it was 
determined that we might live at the Village House where a 
couple, somewhat younger than we, were looking after three 
severely mentally retarded young adults. As a matter of fact this 
couple spent most of their waking hours guiding, directing, and 
supervising these three and had been doing so for about a year.
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Their gratitude at having us come there for three weeks was on 
several occasions expressed by their saying that we had saved 
their sanity. We took this to mean that they needed other adults 
to share their responsibility and to talk to them after the three 
young folks had retired for the night. We grew very fond of them 
and of their three young charges. On weekends (Saturday after­
noons and Sundays) when we were not needed for farm work, we 
spent time with them, playing with a frisbee or a small football 
or enjoying picnics or public concerts in nearby parks. I might 
add that two of these young adults could be of some assistance 
in simple kitchen and other household chores, but one of them was 
so severely retarded that he required almost constant attention, 
even to the point of encouraging him to eat his meals at the table.
We would go out to the farm, about five miles from The Village 
House, and work in the lower garden in the morning and the upper 
garden in the afternoon. Though the work was arduous the pace 
was relaxed and humane. We seldom began before 8:30 or 9:00, 
stopped for lunch at 12:00, or soon after, and then after our noon 
meal was over at 1:00, we had an hour in which to chat, read, or 
nap before returning to work. As with farm people the world over, 
so too our Anthroposophist hosts ate well and plentifully. Our 
work day ended between 5 and 6 p.m. and during some of the 
hottest weather was followed by a dip in the Manor House swim­
ming pool — a refreshing interlude before driving back to the 
Village House for supper. Sometimes we worked in the gardens 
singly or with co-workers or Villagers, a distinction not univer­
sally approved since it designated ‘‘normal” family folk and the 
mentally retarded young adults respectively. In truth it wasn t 
always easy to tell the differences, especially among those who 
were ‘‘high functioning” people. One week, for example, one 
such co-worker had the responsibility for the upper garden which 
was probably half the size of a football field. We, Eunice and I, 
worked under her able supervision and wished very much that 
she, who was quite interested in dairy farming, could visit us 
here in Westerville during the State Fair, but unfortunately it 
could not be arranged. Evening activities included story telling 
by a master storyteller (a retired school teacher from New York 
City), folk dancing, an educational film, and an athletic event 
such as a game of softball. Quite often we would take two or 
or three of the young people from the Village House out to wit­
ness or participate in these special events. They looked forward 
to such occasions with considerable enthusiasm.
At Kimberton Hills we learned to know some really warm, 
dedicated, modern saints. One woman, in particular, impressed
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me as a very remarkable person. Allegedly she and her mot er 
had barely survived starvation in post-World War II Germany. Her 
philosophy is that the meaning of life can be found in suffering. 
She is a devoted wife, mother of five young children, mistress of 
the Manor House with mentally retarded adults in her family, 
supervisor of the food processing plant, and one of the small 
group of religious leaders on the farm. When she was one of the 
three to lead their brief but magnificently solemn and reverent 
worship service, I could almost imagine seeing a translucent h^alo 
hovering over her head! I was not at all surprised to see how 
instinctively the Villagers and co-workers seemed drawn to her. 
She called the Villagers **God’s children” and really meant it!
What did we learn at Kimberton Hills? We learned of a remark­
ably kind, constructive, and nurturant way in which one class of 
people may gain their full potential in love and service by being 
in “normal” families in a relaxed noncompetitive, yet meaningful 
agricultural setting. The therapeutic effect of working with the 
soil and with living plants and animals is good for us all, but 
particularly helpful to those mentally retarded young adults who 
have completed their schooling, but who are not ready for the 
hurly-burly of urban-industrial-technological living. We, Eunice 
and I, also gained a new respect for both Villagers and co­
workers. Anne Frank’s Diary was perhaps right after all; deep 
down I still believe people wish to be good and do good things 
for their fellow beings, when the circumstances encourage this.
We also had a chance to work harder physically than we have 
ever worked before, and at our age this helps develop empathy for 
those billions of human beings in the world whose daylight hours 
are crowded with hard, grinding toil. Our days were work-filled 
for three weeks but were softened by pleasant meals, good con­
versation, exciting weekends, and welcome sleep. We grew to 
love this beautiful section of Pennsylvania’s rich agricultural 
land at the same time as we were growing so fond of our Kimber­
ton Hills community folk.
Most of all we grew to admire and respect a group of people 
who feel that it is their divine duty to educate and care for 
mentally retarded folks with all the love, care and encouragement 
(yes, and respect too) that Christian brotherliness suggests. We 
realize that not everyone needs to be a star or a great success to 
feel good about himself and to reach a state of self actualization.
It is most refreshing to live in an atmosphere where material 
things need only be adequate, where wages and salaries are 
entirely superfluous, and where the mark of greatness is seen in 
one’s servanthood!
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Through one of our favorite persons at Klmberton Hills we 
heard about the Health and Community Conference to be held 
August 19-21 in the Outdoor Education Center of Antioch College. 
We learned at this meeting that there is much the individual can 
do to take responsibility for his or her own health. Interestingly 
a young idealistic doctor, a resources person at the Conference, 
discovered in southern Ohio in his first year of practice that most 
people were not willing to do this. They just wanted him to patch 
them up or cure them whenever they needed assistance, but never 
did they entertain the thought of doing their own health mainte­
nance !
We were confirmed in some of our own health beliefs. For 
example, we can become sensitive to the messages our own 
bodies send us about our general state of health; we can to a 
large degree control the nutrition we get. One thing we can do to 
cut down on the consumption of so-called junk foods is to strive 
to avoid eating highly refined substances. We can develop a safe 
and sane exercise regiment and stick with it. We can get the 
number of hours of sleep necessary for our optimum functioning 
and overall well being. And if we practice harmful habits (use of 
tobacco, liquor, and other artificial substances), we can cut down 
on our use of them, or better still, eliminate the use of them 
altogether.
All of the above can be more easily accomplished when we 
have community support and consensus among those people whose 
good will and wisdom we value. If we can individually and cor­
porately develop the habit of thinking (visualizing) good health, 
we are more likely to enjoy it. Along with such positive thinking 
may go the practice of yoga, meditation, or other forms of mind- 
body relaxation.
So in conclusion, we felt we gained several benefits from this 
conference. One was the opportunity to meet Jane and Griscom 
Morgan who with prophetic perseverance keep Community Services, 
Inc., alive and well. They are trying to beam a message to 
Americans, I believe, that says in effect that people count, that 
they can cooperatively help each other, and that in the long run 
human beings will survive as a species and their civilization will 
endure if they work with Nature and their own human potentialities 
instead of against the natural order and in competition with or in 
opposition to their own community building heritage. 1 think they 
are essentiallv correct, but I’m not at all sure that we 11 heed
The Health and Community Conference in Yellow Springs, Ohio
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their wisdom in time to prevent some real disasters to our planet 
and its life forms.
It was also pleasant to meet other people, basically interested 
in cooperative community living, who are optimistic, idealistic, 
and “high” on their fellow persons!
Three memorable days at the Farm in Summertown, Tennessee
Having had battery trouble on the way to Summertown, Tennes­
see, we didn’t arrive there until about 10:30 p.m. on August 27. 
We stopped at the Gate House as every visitor does and talked 
about how we had heard about the Farm, our correspondence with 
people there, and why we wished to visit for a few days. After 
half an hour or so of pleasant conversation with a young woman 
who with several other people was assigned to Gate House duty, 
we with other visitors were escorted into a parking lot from which 
point we took our camping gear and set up our tent near the 
Visitor Center. It seemed that nearly thirty to fifty people had 
come to visit that day. At least as far as averages go, this would 
be about right since the Farm has about sixteen thousand visitors 
a year, we were told. According to I.R.S. records the Farm is 
listed as a “monastery” and the members do take vows of poverty 
when they join. They live simply, eating a radically vegetarian 
diet which excludes dairy products. After breakfast the next 
morning we were given some advice on Farm mores. We males 
were admonished not to go “running after any of the ladies,” for 
example. Then a list of jobs that needed doing was presented and 
we volunteered for them. Eunice’s was helping to prepare a meal; 
mine was re-sacking grain in a dark, hot, airless storage silo. 
Watermelons were in season so we really enjoyed eating them in 
our several days there; they were a nice supplement to a fairly 
bland, largely soybean, diet. They live and eat what is in season 
in order to be as self-sufficient as possible. It seemed that 
almost all work assignments were done as group efforts and this 
fact made even arduous, unpleasant tasks pleasant, sociable and 
interesting. The next day, Sunday, we went to the worship service 
on the side of a sloping hill. Though we did not arrive in time for 
the beginning of the meditation period, we did get there before it 
ended. After that a rather familiar service began. Stephen Gaskin 
married two young couples and then gave a sermon, pretty much 
about his recent gig with the F’arm band in the Bronx where the 
Farm’s Food Mission, “Plenty,” a sort of world-wide welfare 
organization, has a station now. His talk was practical, moralis­
tic, down-to-earth, slightly sentimental, and given in the Farm’s
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inimitable ungrammatical style. It was obvious that most of the 
hillside audience held him in the highest respect and affection. 
During the rest of the day we strolled about the Farm and chatted 
with other visitors'at least one of whom we had seen at the 
Dandelion Communities Conference.
On Monday we extended our contract at the Gate House to stay 
until Tuesday morning. Then we proceeded to our respective 
jobs; mine was labeling, tying up, and placing in pasteboard 
cartons small bags of yeast; Eunice’s work assignment was pre­
paring red peppers for freezing. Again the work was done with a 
group of other visitors with minimal supervision by regular Farm 
people. Much of the time we had background music (rock and roll) 
as we worked. This job was less laborious, and since I had never 
done production work before, it proved to be a kind of stimulating 
challenge. However, I halfway wished I had chosen the garbage 
detail since this presumably would have given me a chance to see 
the full physical layout of the Farm and many more of its people, 
spread out over fifteen hundred acres.
In the evening we chatted with other visitors outside the 
Visitors’ Tent. Illumined by tiny low-wattage bulbs fed by a 
storage battery, the tent was almost a depressing place to be, at 
least for me. In fact, for that last evening we loaned our Coleman 
lantern to the insiders to help them see each other more dis­
tinctly as they talked around the table. We made arrangements to 
give a young Colorado girl, “Serage,” a lift to Loveland, Ohio, 
where she was going to study weaving for awhile. On our way 
back from the Farm we stopped at the Farm store in Columbia, 
Tennessee to make several purchases. One was a bushel o 
peaches which gave our crowded Subaru a very pleasant odor all 
the way home.
What can we conclude about the Farm? It is probably the most 
widely publicized and biggest of the new communal societies. 
Stephen Gaskin is still very much in charge — virtually a charis­
matic leader! When a visitor entertains thoughts of becoming a 
member, he or she must have a personal interview with Stephen. 
The usual procedure is for the would-be member to become a 
“soaker” for several weeks before making a definite decision. 
This means that he or she would literally “soak up the culture 
of the Farm and its people for awhile before making a definite 
commitment. But even as Stephen is the leader, he is also aware 
of the dangers inherent in one-man rule and in recent years he 
has been trying to absent himself from the barm frequently enough 
that others will have the opportunity and the desire to pick up the
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reins of power. The Farm’s emphasis on a strict vegetarian diet 
(no dairy products even!) has encouraged nutritionists to monUor 
their health. The fact that the Farm Press has done we as 
brought much needed revenue on more than one occasion.
Farm Band still does free gigs as a vehicle of propagandizing t 
mission of the Farm. It seems to keep a steady flow of interest 
and potential members coming, while some communal s^ocieties 
have been adamantly against outside contacts. The Farm s me i 
cal, fire-fighting, CB radio, and outside-the-Farm construction 
crews have also enhanced their good relationships wit t eir 
neighboring Tennesseans. With their official status as a religious 
non-profit organization it seems quite fitting that the Farm as 
satellite communities in the United States and abroad. It has a
purpose beyond mere self-survival or self-aggrandizement. 
Despite the Farmese English, one catches “vibes” of sincerity 
and selfless commitment to a world with enough food and material 
things to go around. It’s a work-oriented (assuming that love and 
faith are made manifest in one’s work) community. As with some 
of the other communal societies, it may be a halfway house for 
pilgrims on their way to greater self realization and for some it 
is a dream that many great faiths have held: that all men may 
become as one, united into one loving community!
Summary of the whole experience
At the outset I must confess that the work of the sabbatical 
leave turned out rather differently from some of the points set 
forth in my proposal to the Personnel Committee. There were no 
courses being offered in communal societies during the time I 
could spend at Temple University, but auditing the seminar on 
Amish Culture for four weeks was a very useful experience. The 
Old Order Amish are not communal in a strict sense, but in many 
ways their Anabaptist clannishness gives them a co-operative 
and mutual aid aspect characteristic of groups that are fully 
communal.
Living at the Philadelphia Life Center was a real plus as far 
as a community living experience was concerned, though it did 
cut down somewhat on reading and full involvement time at 
Temple. The necessary trade-off was beneficial in the long haul, 
I believe. This turned out to be our longest stay at any commun­
ity, but it was not our most intense involvement or our most 
meaningful necessarily. The three weeks at Anthroposophist 
Kimberton Hills and the day-end, four-day visit at the Society of 
Brothers, however, were intense and meaningful.
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Since none of the communities had many “old old” middle- 
aged or elderly members,! did not really have a change to observe 
how communal groups integrate or care for such members, and 
where there were noticeable elderly people (fifties to nineties), 
they all seemed to be vigorous and completely involved (even, if 
on a reduced intensity basis) members of their communities. So 
the problem I was initially hoping to observe simply did not seem 
to be present! My hypothesis would be that, even if they were 
mentally or physically unable to pull their weight, they would 
still be cared for and respected. I think one can see evidences of 
this both in Israeli kibbutzim and in pre-literate groups who, for 
the most part, look after their elderly members with concern, 
respect, and kindliness.
Instead of the two communities I thought I might live with, in 
my original proposal, the reality of our opportunities meant that 
we spent different periods of time with six different communal 
groups with different opportunities for participant observation. 
The diversity of these groups, half were spiritual while the other 
half were secular in orientation, was contrasting but they were 
all intensely serious and sincere about what they were doing.
What were the practical benefits to me as a teacher and to 
Otterbein as an institution of higher education? Surely the differ­
ent ways of organizing a community and motivating its members 
will be items in my teaching of social organizations and social 
control in Introductory Sociology. The same thing can be said for 
knowledge I gained that will be helpful in teaching Cultural 
Anthropology, Sociology of the Family, Social Problems, and 
Sociology of Religion. They (the knowledge and insights gained) 
are especially helpful in Integrative Studies 10-4 (Contemporary 
Communal Societies). Although my teaching responsibility does 
not include these, it increased my understanding of Social 
Control, Social Organization, the Sociology of Institutions, and 
Urban Sociology.
In sum, the reality of the Sabbatical was not just a working 
out of our plans, but rested heavily on the feelings and exigencies 
of those groups that were willing to have us come as guests of 
their communal life.
The one person to whom I owe the most gratitude is undoubt­
edly Dr. John A. Hostetler of Temple University who typifies all 
that is excellent in the dedicated academician and all that is 
inspiring in those who feel that “there has to be a better way.
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1Appendices A, B, C, D, E
A. Notes on methodology
My reading in Dr. John Hostetler’s extensive collection of mainly 
unpublished materials was incomplete due to lack of time or my poor 
organization of the time 1 had. However, I did cover enough material to 
become convinced of the extent, and depth of communal societal experi­
ments in the world today. It (communal living) is a phenomenon that 
transcends time, language, religion, race, socio-economic class, and 
culture. The co-operative processes in social life, as Prince Peter 
Kropotkin demonstrated many years ago in his Mutual Aid, are just as 
important as the social forces of competition and aggressive individual­
ism.
My work in the special section of the Temple University Library 
devoted to all kinds of communal literature (mostly occasional and 
periodical) was severely limited to scanning some journals. Again I got 
the flavor of a lot of activity of a systematic and of a haphazard type, 
reflecting the longevity of some communal groups, much of it done on a 
financial shoestring.
Our visits to several communities (especially Kimberton Hills and 
the Society of Brothers [Bruderhof] were greatly facilitated through Dr. 
Hostetler’s kind generosity and trust. These two groups, by the way, 
turned out to be tremendously rewarding and our contacts with them 
remain unbroken. These and the other four were not randomly selected 
nor were they studied with the systematic rigor and comparative method 
used by some participant observers, but we lived their lives as closely 
as our guest status and as our abilities permitted. Usually I was able to 
make general journal entries and occasionally Eunice and I compared 
impressions and reactions.
Earl ier in this paper I should have alluded to the distinctively bad 
odor in which research social scientists are held when they seek “to 
study’’ communal groups, so we tried to avoid offense, not by deceiving 
our hosts, but by honestly stating our purpose and begging their kind 
indulgence so that I might learn what I could of communal living in order 
to more faithfully relate it to my l.S. 10-4 class and other relevant 
classes.
Thus with a fairly naive simplistic approach we made no use of 
schedules, questionnaires, surveys, or other research techniques. We 
vowed that no book would come out of these experiences, though we had 
the impression that communards felt a healthy skepticism on this point. 
Somehow academicians and publishing are a twosome like ham and eggs, 
or should I say, granola and yogurt, to many of them. Perhaps this is 
because almost all of them are in the publishing business themselves 
on a small or moderate scale.
Our pro-community or anti-community biases could easily enter our 
relations of our experiences, using the loose methodology we used. 
About our only defense here is honest open reporting of such positive 
and negative attitudes, letting the readers decide where we slipped into 
the role of advocate or adversary.
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B. The Shakertown Pledge
This pledge of austerity, ecological mindedness, and radical Chris­
tian brotherliness was decided on by some religious retreat center 
directors at Harrodsburg, Kentucky some years ago and somehow typifies 
much of the thinking and living of the people we knew at the Philadel­
phia Life Center. Since it is rather lengthy, let me give a brief summary 
condensation of it here:
1. 1 declare myself to be a world citizen . . .
2. I commit myself to lead an ecologically sound life . . .
3. 1 commit myself to lead a life of creative simplicity and to share 
my personal wealth with the world’s poor . . .
4. 1 commit myself to join with others in reshaping institutions in 
order to bring about a more just global society in which each 
person has full access to the needed resources for their physical, 
emotional, intellectual, and spiritual growth . . .
5. I commit myself to occupational accountability, and in so doing I 
will seek to avoid the creation of products which cause harm to 
others . . .
6. 1 affirm the gift of my body, and commit myself to its nourishment 
and physical well being . . .
7. 1 commit myself to examine continually my relations with others, 
and to attempt to relate honestly, morally, and lovingly to those 
around me . . .
8. 1 commit myself to personal renewal through prayer, meditation 
and study . . .
1 have the complete Shakertown Pledge text on file for anyone who is 
interested in seeing it in its entirety.
A somewhat similar statement comes from Communanity, no, 10, 
(April 1975) pp. 5-6:
Declaration of Planetary Citizenship
I recognize my membership in the human community.
I recognize my allegiance to mankind while 1 reaffirm my alle­
giances to my own family, community, state, and nation.
As a member of the planetary family of man, the good of the world 
community is my first concern.
Therefore
I will work to end divisions and wars among men;
1 will work for realization of human rights-civil and political, eco­
nomic, social and cultural — for all people;
1 will work to bring the actions of nations into conformity with the 
needs of the world community;
1 will work for the strengthening and improvement of the United 
Nations:
— to give the United Nations the authority to act on behalf of 
the will of mankind;
— to curb the excesses of nations;
— and to meet the common global dangers and needs of the 
family of man.
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c.
Many Christian intentional communities have found their inspiration 
in the following New Testament passages from Acts (Revised Standard
Version).
4:32-35:
Now the company of those who believed were of one heart and soulf 
and no one said that any of the things which he possessed was his own, 
but they had everything in common. And with great power the apostles 
gave their testimony to the resurrection of the Lord Jesus, and great 
grace was upon them all. There was not a needy person among them, for 
as many as were possessors of lands or houses sold them, and brought 
the proceeds of what was sold and laid it at the apostles’ feet; and dis­
tribution was made to each as any had need.
2:44 and 45:
And all who believed were together and had all things in common; 
and they sold their possessions and goods and distributed them to all, 
as any had need.
D.
Even “speculation” may be too solid a word for a social scientist to 
use in thinking about the future of communal living arrangements. How­
ever, if some scientists are reasonably correct in their assumptions 
about resource use and exhaustion, it may be that the simplicity and 
ecologically frugal elements of communal living will become not only 
ethically approved but quite practical as well.
As one examines the attitudes and behavior patterns of various com­
munities, he or she sees an interesting list of dichotomies, such as the 
following:
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“Noimal** society Communal society
Materialistic Non materialistic
Complex Simple
Rational Intuitive
Conventional Non-con ventional
Judgmental Non-judgment, accepting
Closed, suspicious Open, trusting
Forceful, aggressive Peaceful, compromising
Competitive Co-operative
Nationalistic (ethnocentric) Planetary (family of man)
Technological Pre-technological
Bureaucratic Primary, face-to-face 
relationships
Structured Letting the “flow” occur
Affluent Poor, having only the essentials
Status from work role Status of a human being
Nuclear family The group family
Formality Informality
Consumption Relaxed production
Big Small
Individualism “We” thinking
Profit motive Use and helpfulness motive
Hierarchal structure Horizontal structure
Style Basic usefulness
High on food chain Low on food chain
Parochial loyalties World-wide loyalties
Religion institutionalized Religion lived each moment
Rank and title conscious One’s first name and being are 
sufficient
Suspicious Trusting
Life often meaningless Life is meaningful at all times
This list is patently slanted to show the communal life to advantage 
in terms of such values as Christian brotherliness, radical democracy, 
personalistic relationships, and a kind of nostalgic return to Innocence 
and Childlikeness.
Finally, 1 suppose I would be willing to quote Norman J. Whitney on 
what he calls “traits of a successful commune.” These ingredients 
make for a good communal future for any such group, 1 would assume;
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1. Loyalty to a selfless leader. ,
2. Religious rituals all inclusive of the membership, young and old.
3. Co-operative discipline (moderate).
4. Economic resources sufficient for simple living.
5. Sound socialization/education of children and newcomers. 
Probationary period for new members.
6. Loyalty to a social theory (within reason).
7. Predominance of group and family loyalty.
8. Balance found between intimacy and separateness.
9. Sufficient separateness from outside world to work out ideals 
along with a vital concern for the outside world.
10, Optimum size for face-to-face relationships and survival as a 
group in the face of a hostile outside world.
E.
This bibliography relates mostly to communal societies, but there 
are occasional other areas of sociological interest represented. They 
were all read during my sabbatical leave March to September 1977. Some 
are incomplete in terms of facts of publication because of where I read 
them or because they are written and published by people who are not 
concerned about such niceties.
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Tom Bromeley
THE THINKING MAN’S ECONOMIC SYSTEM *
Perhaps some of you in the room will remember the L & M 
commercial of a few years ago in which a young man in his 
twenties — obviously a neurosurgeon or a nuclear scientist — is 
being interviewed. The interviewer says — Pardon me, Sir. You 
are obviously a thinking man. Could you tell me what cigarette 
you smoke? The man answers — Of course. I smoke L & M’s. The 
interviewer continues — Do you think everyone should smoke 
L & M’s? After a thoughtful pause, the young man answers — I 
think each person should think for himself.
If I were interviewed and were asked to name my favorite 
economic system, I would (as you might guess) emphatically 
endorse capitalism and the free enterprise system. If my inter­
viewer continued and asked if I thought that all societies should 
live under this system, I would have to answer as the young man 
did — I think each society should think for itself.
Economic systems, unfortunately, don’t categorize as easily 
as cigarettes, but we can put them into some broad classes. 
Mostly the definitions deal with the means of production and 
distribution:
In capitalism, they are privately owned and operated for profit.
In fascism (a sort of variation on a theme), they are owned 
privately, but are rigidly controlled by the government - prefer­
ably a good, solid dictatorship.
In socialism (which communists consider the halfway house 
between capitalism and communism), they’re owned by the state 
and operated for the benefit of society.
And, finally, in communism, not only the means of production 
and distribution, but all property is owned by the state.
If capitalism, the thinking man’s economic system, is not for
* This essay is an edited version of a public address delivered by the 
author at a symposium on Free Enterprise sponsored by the University 
of Pittsburgh.
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everyone, for whom would it work?
It seems to have worked best in the developed, industrialized 
countries of the world where populations are relatively well 
educated or informed and where the possibility for the production 
of surplus exists. It needs a relatively free and unregulated 
governmental atmosphere in which to operate best.
Where would it be likely not to work? It probably wouldn’t 
work well in a West African tribal society. It almost surely would 
not have done the job in Soviet Russia — a nation that came out 
of feudalism about the same time our country was giving up 
slavery. I just doubt that capitalism, democracy and free enter­
prise would have meant a lot to people who had been living near 
subsistence for centuries. I think it would not work in today’s 
China. I doubt that Bedouin tribesmen in the Sinai Desert of 
Israel have the possibility of producing enough surplus to make 
capitalism work.
How about the other end of the spectrum - communism? It has 
produced some startling results in emerging nations. No denying 
that it has worked a modern industrial miracle in the USSR and 
it’s starting to produce in China. To be sure, the people of those 
countries have paid a fearful price — not to the economic system, 
but to the political system which makes it work. They were, of 
course, paying a fairly high price under the systems which 
communism replaced.
Paradoxically, the more communism succeeds in turning a 
country into an industrialized nation, the more it drifts toward 
capitalism because it has increasing need of the incentives and 
the productivity that characterize that system.
If we’re talking about cigarettes we can pretty well separate 
them into Luckies, Camels, Chesterfields. We can smoke them, 
taste them, compare them, and decide which we like best. In try­
ing to compare economic systems, though, there are several 
things that cloud men’s minds.
FIRST, it’s hard to think about economic^ systems without 
relating them to a political or social system. It s hard to imagine 
free enterprise and capitalism thriving in a totalitarian state just 
as democracy is probably a hostile environment for communism.
A SECOND problem in comparing economic systems is that we 
seldom have a chance in real life to see one in its pure state. As
109
we look around the world, we see something of a hodgep g 
economic systems.
England . . . capitalistic? Yes. Mixed with a large do 
socialism. Major industries like steel, railroads, some ot the co 
mines owned by the government. A hybrid deal not familiar to us 
• . . the government an actual financial partner in ot erwis p 
vately owned companies . . . like the automobile producers. A 
socialist government itself a capitalist?
The United States. Shining example of capitalism. The 
office? Amtrak? Serious talk of nationalizing the railroads, the 
oil industry? A touch of fascism in privately owne ut very 
closely regulated industries like electric companies, the tele­
phone company.
USSR. Bastion of communism. More than one-thir o its 
agricultural industry operating under the free enterprise system 
as it did before the revolution. It is too important, and too ^8* 
for the planners to dare to tamper with it. It’s now possib e to 
invest surplus money in savings banks and earn interest **■ 
without working. Your children can inherit your money and worldly 
goods when you die in Russia. (Clear characteristics of capital­
ism and, of course, they will ultimately result in the dreaded 
concentration of wealth.) A thriving black market exists in auto­
mobiles and other scarce consumer goods even though there are 
stiff penalties for participating in it.
A THIRD confounding thing is that there are usually a lot of 
other variables and it just isn’t easy to isolate the economic 
system. For example, I’m afraid that we can’t give all the credit 
for the enormous productivity of this country to our economic 
system. Our geography and climate probably have something to do 
with it; the way our country was settled contributed; the fact that 
we have huge natural resources surely must play some part.
But, after allowing for all the difficulties of studying compara­
tive economic systems, measure it any way you wish ... we still 
have to conclude that this system, capitalism and free enterprise, 
has continued to produce the largest total gross national product 
and the largest gross national product per capita and per produc­
tive laborer of any country and of any system anywhere in the 
world at any time.
When we look at living systems, what we see are systems in a 
constant state of flux and movement and change. Maybe some of
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our classical theories need to be reconsidered in the light of a 
couple of centuries of experience and empirical data .
Maybe capitalism will not go its predicted way of increasing 
concentration of wealth in the hands of a few until it explodes of 
its own pressure into a violent revolution and overthrow of the 
established society.
Is it possible that we are seeing an economic system evolving 
in ways different from those envisioned by the early theorists? 
Let me propose to you an hypothesis.
One of the presumed merits of a socialistic system is that the 
benefits of production and distribution accrue to society rather 
than to the few who own these means and operate them for their 
own profit. This is done by having society, or the state, or the 
government own the means of production on behalf of the people.
Consider, if you will, the great corporations like General 
Motors, General Electric, IBM. They aren’t really owned by any 
person or by any coordinated group of people. They are owned by 
thousands and thousands of Individual members of society.
Most large corporations now have directors who represent, not 
the shareholders, but distinct segments of society [minorities, 
women, consumers, and so on.] Most large German corporations, 
for example, now have representatives of labor unions on their 
boards of directors.
In the U.S., at least, wealth is not being concentrated in the 
hands of fewer and fewer. To be sure, more and more wealth is 
being generated, but it is being held far and wide through broadly 
based direct ownership by individuals and indirectly by partici­
pation in pension funds and union treasuries.
Is it possible that our form of capitalism is evolving into a 
sort of pure form of socialism — not by the government owning 
the means of production on behalf of the people, but by the 
people themselves directly owning the means of production?
What could be more pure than the idea carried to its extreme 
of all members of society owning industry directly without the 
intermediation of the government?
Maybe, with the expanding base of ownership, we are seeing 
an advanced capitalistic society assuming many of the positive
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aspects of an advanced socialistic society. Without the ne 
the government to intervene to interpret the will of socie y 
society can impose its will directly.
I entertain the notion and the hope that, if we live . 
long enough and carefully enough, and if we can keep 
ing each other out of the water, we might, in a few ’
wind up with a pretty good economic system that isn t ’
that isn t socialism, fascism, or communism. It ’*'*6 * . ,
new-ism that is better than any of the others and is more sui e 
to the kind of society we are becoming.
So much for the formal economic systems. Let’s talk for a 
minute about free enterprise . . . the free market . . • wi mg 
buyers meeting willing sellers.
Here a person is free to put bis efforts to whatever task he 
wishes. He can be an engineer or doctor and sell his services, e 
can grow corn and sell it to people who want corn; he can make 
manufactured products and sell them to those who want thern. 
This kind of system needs a high degree of organization, t 
involves specialization of labor and division of work.
In this system, I depend on the man who grows corn. I don t 
try to grow corn but become an engineer. The farmer depends 
upon me to develop machines to make hig job easier and better 
and so forth. This system cannot work where people spend most 
of their time subsisting or trying to be self-sufficient. Free 
enterprise involves interdependence of people within the system.
A free market always seems to me to be tbe best and the most 
efficient way to allocate resources. Consider the problems of the 
soviet planners trying to decide what style of clothing to produce 
and in what quantities. How can they possibly guess? Our 
economy has a fast way to make that determination. The con­
sumers tell the factories what they want by expressing their 
willingness to exchange their earned money for the products.
An economy governed by a free market is one that reacts 
pretty quickly. The productive unit that doesn’t react, (or that 
reacts in the wrong way) becomes a casualty. A system adminis­
tered by a government bureau or agency is one that reacts 
sluggishly. It contains lots of lethargy and status quo is the way 
to go.
Now, if we were called upon to reorganize the world’s econo-
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mies, what would we like to see? Well, I can tell you that 1 would 
like to see an economic system that allows the maximum freedom 
to an individual to do what he wants to do and to have his efforts 
rewarded (or penalized) not hy government edict or by rules, but 
by what his fellows in society (not the government) feel he has 
contributed to that society — whether it be products like automo­
biles, calculators, hoola hoops; or enjoyment from musicians, 
entertainers, or professional football players; or services from 
doctors, engineers . . . whatever.
I would like to see this system governed mostly by the market­
place, but, as much as I would like to be let loose in a really 
free enterprise system, I recognize that it has to be restrained by 
a government to avoid such a concentration of market forces that 
the marketplace can no longer function smoothly without unac­
ceptably violent changes. Large national monopolies could create 
problems of this magnitude.
I would like to see the rest of the government’s efforts con­
fined to doing things that individuals or groups cannot do well 
. . . things like building cross country highways; raising armies 
to defend the nation; providing subsistence for those who are 
unable to provide it for themselves.
Believing in free enterprise means taking the consequences 
when it works to our disadvantage. It means letting gasoline 
prices go to $1.50 or $2.00 a gallon if they want to. We can’t 
leave the market free except when it hurts us. We must leave it 
free and let it do its work.
People will cry out that the government must prevent enormous 
gasoline price increases because people have to have gasoline to 
drive to their work. Not so, let the market allocate the resource.
If gasoline went to $2.00 a gallon, I would join a car pool; or 
1 would get a job closer to my home; or I would move closer to my 
work. I probably wouldn’t drive 150 miles every day to Chautau­
qua Lake in the summer and I probably wouldn’t take as many 
boat rides. But I would be living and working in a free economy 
and a free market.
Now, lest we fear that someone will profiteer from $2.00 gaso­
line — the minute an oil company sees that it can sell gasoline 
for less than $2.00 and still realize a good profit, it is going to 
be tempted to do it in the hope of capturing its competitor’s 
business and selling more gasoline and making more total dollars.
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The competitors will resist by lowering prices and so it goes. A 
market like this is, for the most part, self adjusting and self 
policing if we leave it free to do so.
We can, in this country, produce enormous surpluses far 
beyond what is needed to keep our population alive. This is tiot 
true either of Soviet Russia or of China. It was not true in medie­
val Europe. There are no huge surpluses in those economies.
As people see that we can produce more than we need to sus­
tain life, they become more unwilling to go without . , . and we 
are unwilling to have them go without amidst such plenty.
Then we decide to take some of the privately generated sur­
pluses away from those who have generated them and give them 
to those who have not been able to generate them. This we do 
through taxation. We redistribute wealth domestically through 
social schemes and internationally through foreign aid programs.
At the height of its power, Rome was such an economy. Grad­
ually it began to believe that it could legislate gross national 
product. Gradually, it forgot about the need for someone to pro­
duce the goods.
Many have found a parallel to Rome in this country today in 
which taxes have risen to a level that begins to blunt the initia­
tive to produce. While we should share our surpluses, we must 
hope that our legislators will not begin to forget that what they 
give away must still be produced by someone. Goods are not 
created by legislatures.
What about the future? For myself, I am afraid. I am afraid, 
but I am optimistic. I fear, but I hope.
I FEAR the consequences of taxing to the point of dulling 
incentive so that finally nothing drives the engine anymore. If you 
have to give away 70% of every new dollar, you aren t apt to be 
anxious to go the extra mile to try to produce that dollar.
I FEAR the tendency of our government to meddle increasingly 
with our free enterprise system with schemes like OSIIA; ERISA; 
and equal opportunity ... to work the will — not of society — but 
of a government regulator.
I FEAR the heavy encroachment of government in our educa­
tional institutions. When I went to college in the’40’s, they were
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mostly supported by endowments and by private contributions. 
7’oday, they’re largely supported by government grants and sub­
sidies, and they have a million regulations that were unknown 
then. High schools the same. In 1948, attendance records were 
kept at Bradford High School by the principal’s secretary as a 
small part of her job. Today, we have a fully staffed attendance 
office employing several people. Why? It’s because of state regu­
lations. Probably good regulations, but what about the cost?
I FEAR the insidious intrusion of things like revenue sharing. 
The government takes the money from us; gives some of it back 
with one hand and holds a whip with the other. You don’t have to 
do it their way — you still have freedom. The only catch is that 
if you don’t do it their way, you don’t get the money and then 
there won’t be many other sources of money. Today’s benefactor 
is easily tomorrow’s tyrant.
I FEAR the idea that many young people have today that they 
are owed something. They deserve a certain measure of happiness 
and material goods from life.
I FEAR the ease with which people have become accustomed 
to food stamps and to strike benefits and to public assistance 
payments and to unemployment compensation double dips — things 
unknown thirty or forty years ago.
These are the bad things a government can do with an eco­
nomic system that is capable of producing such hugh surpluses. 
(Maybe this is the real meaning of the communist prediction that 
capitalism contains within itself the seeds of its destruction.)
I’m afraid, but I’m optimistic. I fear, but I hope. Just as I start 
to get despondent and look around for a country that s better (you 
may believe that there is not one better) I begin to reaffirm a 
faith in the American individual.
He has riseti to great occasions before and 1 think we are see­
ing signs through things like Proposition 13 (whether it was well 
conceived or not) that the average American has perceived these 
same dangers.
Even while he sees his library modernized through revenue 
sharing; even while his son or daughter is working under a CETA 
grant; and even while he is broiling a steak bought with food 
stamps while he is on strike ... he is made uneasy by a system 
that works just like this one does. He knows deep down that he
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ifin’t netting something for nothing and he realizes that, one way 
or another, as surely as the night follows day, the equation will 
be balanced and he will pay for what he gets.
I think the pendulum may be starting back. It 11 never get 
back, we hope, to the days when young children can be made to 
work long hours in poor conditions. 1 hope it will never get back 
to times I remember in the ’30’s when we first moved to Derrick 
City. Men without jobs would knock on our door and ask to do 
some small task in return for a sandwich because they were 
hungry. But I think it will swing back far enough to preserve the 
system that enabled this country to be tbe greatest producer and 
to provide the highest material standard of living and, I think, 
the highest moral standard of living the world has ever seen.
I think we are going to preserve and improve our way of life, 
and, at the same time, we can improve the well being of others 
in this world.
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